Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 19637.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1941
• Docket Number: No. 19637.,19637.
• Citation: 157 S.W.2d 785
• Parties: RAGSDALE v. BROTHERHOOD OF R. TRAINMEN.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

157 S.W.2d 785

RAGSDALE v. BROTHERHOOD OF R. TRAINMEN.

No. 19637.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 1, 1941.

Rehearing Denied January 5, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; Aubrey R. Hammett, Judge.

"Not to be published in State Reports."

Action by Ray Ragsdale against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to recover on a fraternal beneficiary certificate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which transferred the case to the Supreme Court, which retransferred the cause to the Court of Appeals, 147 S.W.2d 601.

Affirmed.

Hunter & Chamier, of Moberly, for appellant.

Wm. M. Stringer and Thos. J. Tydings, both of Moberly, for respondent.

BLAND, Judge.

This is an action upon a fraternal beneficiary certificate. The case was tried before the court, without the aid of a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $1350. Defendant has appealed.

The case was originally appealed to this court, but deeming that a construction of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution was involved, we transferred the case to the Supreme Court. That court found no such question in the case and re-transferred the cause to this court. See Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 147 S.W.2d 601.

Much is said in the brief of the defendant relative to the application to the case of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, but all of such questions have been eliminated by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The facts show that defendant is a fraternal beneficiary society, domiciled and licensed in the State of Ohio and that it is also licensed as such a society in the State of Kansas. Plaintiff was a member of a local lodge of the railroad trainmen, situated in Coffeyville, Kansas, when the certificate was delivered and accepted by him there shortly after it was issued by defendant, on or about March 23rd, 1909. At the time plaintiff was admitted to membership in the local lodge, which was during the month of March 1909, he signed the constitution and general rules of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and agreed to support the same. Plaintiff remained a member of the Coffeyville Lodge until November 28th, 1909, when he was transferred to Magic City Lodge at Moberly, Missouri, and remained a member of said lodge until November 14th, 1914, when he was transferred to Saline Lodge at Slater, Missouri.

Plaintiff became afflicted with chronic tuberculosis of both lungs on or about November 30th, 1932, as a result of which, he was totally and permanently disabled. He made application for the allowance of a claim under the certificate to the officers of the local lodge in Slater, who furnished him with blank forms upon which to make proof of his claim. These forms were duly filled out by the plaintiff and, after having gone through the different processes of the defendant relating to such matters, as provided in its constitution and general rules, the claim was finally rejected by it. The blank forms furnished were for claims such as were covered by section 70 of the constitution and general rules and which are addressed to the "systematic benevolence of the Brotherhood".

The beneficiary certificate upon which plaintiff brought this suit provided that he was "entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits of membership and to participate in the beneficiary department Class C of said Brotherhood to the amount set forth in the Constitution thereof which amount in the event of total and permanent disability shall be paid to him, or at his death shall be paid to Lottie Ragsdale his wife, if living, if not to the executors or administrators of said member. * * * This certificate is issued upon the express conditions that the said Ray Ragsdale shall comply with the Constitution and the Bylaws, rules and regulations, now in force or which may hereafter be adopted by the within named Brotherhood, which, as printed and published by the Grand Lodge of said Brotherhood, are made a part hereof". Plaintiff's application stated that the beneficiary certificate should be held to be a contract made in the State of Ohio and subject to its laws.

Section 60 of Defendant's constitution and by-laws, as they existed at the time of the issuance of the certificate sued upon, provided, among other things: "There shall be three classes of beneficiary, namely, Class A, $500, Class B, $1,000, and Class C, $1,350. Each class shall be evidenced by a beneficiary certificate. * * * Each certificate shall show in which class it is issued, and provide for the payment, in accordance with this Constitution, of the full amount of such class upon the death of the member insured therein, or upon his becoming totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of Section 68". The beneficiary certificate issued to plaintiff did not provide that upon his becoming totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of section 68 he should be paid, but upon his becoming totally and permanently disabled without qualification.

Section 68 provided as follows: "Any beneficiary member in good standing who shall suffer the amputation or severance of an entire hand at or above the wrist joint, or who shall suffer the amputation or severance of an entire foot at or above the ankle joint, or who shall suffer the complete and permanent loss of sight of both eyes, shall be considered totally and permanently disabled and shall thereby be entitled to receive, upon furnishing sufficient and satisfactory proofs of such total and permanent disability, the full amount of his beneficiary certificate, but not otherwise".

In 1931 the constitution and general rules were amended by the society in a manner not material to the issues raised in this suit.

At and before the time plaintiff became a member, and ever since he accepted and received his beneficiary certificate, he knew of the statement on the back of defendant's constitution and general rules, which had been in general circulation among defendant's members, reading as follows: "Every beneficiary member is insured against total and permanent disability and death". Plaintiff testified: "I relied on such statement, and continued to rely upon the same during all the time I was a member of the defendant Association or organization; that said statement (was) made over the facsimile signature of the defendant's General Secretary and Treasurer".

Defendant, in its answer, among other things, pleaded that plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of its constitution and general rules and pleaded the decisions in the cases of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Walsh, 89 Ohio 15, 103 N.E. 759; Henry A. Hyman v. Grand Lodge, B.R.T. (Dec. 24, 1913) Vol. 3, 289, unreported opinion, Ohio 8th District Court of Appeals; Joseph W. Austin v. B.R.T., No. 397, June 21, 1915; Hamilton County Court of Appeals, Ohio; Order of Railway Conductors v. Carpenter, 114 Ohio, 255, 151 N.E. 45.

The principal matter in controversy between the parties on this appeal is whether plaintiff is bound by section 68 of defendant's constitution and general rules. It is admitted that if he is he cannot recover for the reason that he is not totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of that section.

Ordinarily, the construction of the contract before us would be governed by the laws of the State of Kansas but, in view of the provision of the contract that it should be governed by the laws of the State of Ohio, we must look to the laws of that state in ascertaining, if possible, what construction should be placed upon the contract. 14 R.C.L. p. 893; 12 C.J. p. 451, 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, § 11.

We do not take judicial notice of the laws of the State of Ohio. Morriss v. Finkelstein, Mo.App., 127 S.W.2d 46. Recognizing this, defendant has pleaded four decisions of the courts of the state of Ohio, none of which we think are in point. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Walsh, 89 Ohio 15, 103 N.E. 759, insured made his claim specifically under section 68. In Hyman v. Grand Lodge, it does not appear that any question was raised that plaintiff was not bound by section 68 of the constitution and general rules of defendant. He sought to claim, under that section, permanent loss of the sight in both eyes. The court held that the evidence showed that he had not lost such sight and, neither was he entitled to recover because he was incapacitated from carrying on his occupation of a railroad trainman. From all the opinion shows plaintiff was claiming under section 68.

In Austin v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the opinion states that plaintiff was claiming under section 68 and that, in addition, plaintiff intimated that he should be entitled to recover also under section 70. In Order of Railway Conductors v. Carpenter, 114 Ohio 255, 151 N.E. 45, claim was made under a policy entirely different from that in the case at bar. In construing these cases we are confined to the points presented for decision in them and are not concerned with the general statements made in the opinions therein. As was stated in State ex rel. v. City of St. Louis et al., 241 Mo. 231, 239, 240, 145 S.W. 801, 803:

"In a closely reasoned case (Lucas v. Commissioners, 44 Ind. [524], loc. cit. 541), Downey, C. J., uses language often approved, to wit: `It may be well to state * * * that the language used in an opinion is always to be restricted to the case before the court, and the decision is only authority to that extent. The reasoning, illustrations, and references contained in the opinion of the court are not authority, not precedent, but only the points arising in the particular case and which are decided by the court. The members of a court often agree in a decision but differ decidedly as to the reasons or principles by which their minds have been led to a common conclusion. It is therefore the conclusion only,...