Ragsdale v. Hargraves
| Decision Date | 19 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | 4-5605 |
| Citation | 129 S.W.2d 967,198 Ark. 614 |
| Parties | RAGSDALE v. HARGRAVES, MAYOR |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Phillips Chancery Court; A. L. Hutchins, Chancellor affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
John C Sheffield, for appellant.
C. L Polk, Jr., for appellee.
The appellant, Will Ragsdale, a property owner of the City of Helena, Arkansas, instituted this action seeking to enjoin the city of Helena from issuing bonds in the sum of $ 16,000. The complaint alleges that the city of Helena, by an ordinance duly passed, called for an election, and a notice in pursuance of the ordinance was given. The election was held on April 14th to determine if the city should issue bonds for the purpose of the purchase, development and improvement jointly with the city of West Helena of a flying field or airport. It is alleged that a similar ordinance was passed in the city of West Helena, calling for an election on the same day for the purpose of determining whether the city of West Helena should issue bonds in the sum of $ 4,500 for the purpose of the purchase, development and improvement, jointly with the city of Helena, of a flying field or airport. The election was held on the day named, and by the Mayors' proclamation of both Helena and West Helena, a majority had voted for a bond issue in each town. It is alleged that the mayor of Helena and the mayor of West Helena are preparing to advertise for the sale of bonds in each city, the proceeds of both issues to be used for the purpose of financing the purchase, development, and improvement jointly with each other of the flying field or airport, and that the council would levy a special tax, not to exceed three mills to pay the principal and interest on said bonds. It is alleged that under Amendment. No. 13 of the Constitution there is no authority for the issuance of bonds and levying of a tax by each city for the purpose of development and improvement of a flying field or airport to be controlled by both cities and that the amendment only authorizes the issuance of bonds for a separate airport in the city; that the tax to be levied would be a cloud on appellant's real estate, and the prayer was that appellees be permanently enjoined from advertising the bonds for sale, and be enjoined from delivering them to anyone, and from levying the tax to pay for them. It is alleged by the appellant that the suit is brought for himself and all others similarly situated who wish to join in the suit.
The appellees filed a demurrer stating that the complaint did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint for want of equity, and the case is here on appeal.
It is the contention of appellant that Amendment No. 13 does not give authority to a city to go into a joint project with a neighboring city to develop and purchase an airport.
Amendment No. 13 provides, among other things: "Provided that cities of the first and second class may issue by and with the consent of a majority of the qualified electors of said municipality voting on the question at an election held for the purpose, bonds in sums and for the purposes approved by such majority at such election as follows: . . . for the purchase, development and improvement of public parks and flying fields located either within or without the corporate limits of such municipality."
Act No. 80 of the Acts of 1939 provides: "Any two or more municipal corporations in the State of Arkansas may own and hold in joint tenancy, by gift or purchase, lands for use as airports or flying fields, which may be located either within or without their corporate limits; and may enter into contracts or agreements with each other, duly authorized by ordinances, for their joint operation, control, maintenance, improvement and development."
Amendment No. 13 has been construed by this court in a number of cases. In the last case, Todd v. McCloy, 196 Ark. 832, 120 S.W.2d 160, this court said:
Constitutional provisions should receive a reasonable construction, the purpose being to ascertain the meaning of the framers of the provision of the Constitution, and the intention of the electors in adopting the provision.
Amendment No. 13 gives express authority for the purchase, development and improvement of...
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