Ragsdale v. State

• Decision Date: 28 June 1902
• Citation: 32 So. 674,134 Ala. 24
• Parties: RAGSDALE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

32 So. 674

134 Ala. 24

RAGSDALE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 28, 1902

Appeal from circuit court, Greene county; S. H. Sprott, Judge.

William Ragsdale was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

In the organization of the jury the defendant reserved an exception to the ruling of the court holding that the juror Pippen was qualified. The facts relating to this ruling are sufficiently shown in the opinion.

On the trial of the case, it was shown that Bert Hollingsworth was shot and killed by William Ragsdale in Greene county, Ala on Saturday afternoon, October 5, 1901; that the killing occurred in a pasture owned by one Chas. B. Pippen, where there was a baseball ground; that on the Saturday afternoon of the killing several persons, including Bert Hollingsworth and his brother, Claude Hollingsworth, had assembled at said pasture for the purpose of playing ball in accordance with their custom; that while the persons so assembled were engaged in playing ball, the defendant Ragsdale and Thad Gibson rode inside of the pasture, through the gate, hitched their horses, and then went up to where the ball game was going on; that Ragsdale immediately walked over to where Bert Hollingsworth was standing and in an angry manner said to him: "You said that you wanted to see me; you can see me now all that you want to," or words to that effect; that immediately Bert Hollingsworth left the defendant Ragsdale and went in the direction of the pitcher's box (some of the witnesses testifying that Bert said "I do not want to see you," or words to that effect); that as Hollingsworth walked off he was in his stocking feet and in his shirt sleeves; that the defendant Ragsdale immediately followed Bert Hollingsworth, cursing him, and about the time Hollingsworth reached the pitcher's box, they clinched and Ragsdale pulled his pistol and fired upon Bert Hollingsworth, who fell and died immediately.

The evidence for the defendant tended to show that after reaching the pitcher's box, Bert Hollingsworth grabbed the defendant by the throat, and struck him in the face with something hard, which the defendant took to be a knife, and thereupon the defendant fired.

The court at the request of the plaintiff, gave to the jury the following written charges: "(1) The court charges the jury that if they believe beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, that the defendant Ragsdale, and the deceased Hollingsworth had had some trouble a few days before the homicide, and that when he, Ragsdale, on the day of the homicide came to where the deceased Hollingsworth was standing at the 'new home base' he stepped up in front of the deceased, and in an angry manner said to him 'You said you wanted to see me; now you can see me,' and the jury should further find, from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased left the place and went to the pitcher's stand, some 60 or 65 feet away, and the defendant followed the deceased to that place, and they there became involved in a difficulty, and the defendant killed deceased, then he cannot set up self-defense in this case. (2) The court charges the jury that to make the plea of self-defense available, the defendant must be without fault. If he was himself the aggressor, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense, even if the deceased struck him and whether the necessity to take the life of the deceased was real or only apparent, if brought about by design contrivance or fault of the defendant, he cannot be excused on the plea of self-defense. (3) 'Deliberate' and 'premeditated' as those words are used in the statute, mean only this: that the slayer must intend before the blow is delivered, though it be for only an instant of time before, that he will strike at the time he does strike, and that death will be the result of the blow, or in other words, if the slayer had any time to think, before the act, however short such time may have been, even a single moment, and did think, and he struck the blow as a result of an intention to kill, produced by this even momentary operation of the mind, and death ensued, that would be a deliberate and premeditated killing within the meaning of the statute defining murder in the first degree." The defendant separately excepted to the giving of each of these charges, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following charges requested by him: "(9) The court charges the jury that if they believe the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, then they cannot convict the defendant of murder in the second degree." "(11) The court charges the jury that if they believe the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, then they cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree." "(25) The court charges the jury that you find the defendant not guilty, unless the evidence against him should be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but that of his guilt of the offense imputed to him." "(30) The court charges the jury that if you believe the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, then you cannot convict the defendant of any higher degree of homicide than manslaughter in the second degree. (31) The court charges the jury that if you believe the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, then you cannot convict the defendant of any higher degree of homicide than manslaughter in the first degree."

J. P. McQueen and Harwood & McKinley, for appellant.

Chas. G. Browne, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARALSON J.

Eleven men having been selected as jurors, one Pippen was called and asked if he had "a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant which would bias his verdict," and he answered that he had.

Being examined further by the court, he stated that he was not present at the difficulty in which the deceased was killed, nor did he know anything about the facts except from hearsay, and had only heard a few people speak of it. In answer to the further question by the court, "whether the opinion he had would affect his verdict, or would he be governed entirely by the evidence?" he replied, "I would be governed entirely by the evidence, and what I have heard would not affect my verdict." The court then asked him, "Have you a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant that would bias your verdict?" to which he replied, "No, sir. I will be governed entirely by the evidence in the case."

It often occurs, when answering on their voir dire, as to their qualification as jurors, or whether subject to challenge for cause, that persons do not understand the meaning of the questions propounded, and are mistaken in the answers they reply. One may say, that he has not been a resident householder or freeholder of the county for the last 12 months; that he thinks a conviction should not be had on circumstantial evidence, and that he has a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, which would bias his verdict, and is honestly mistaken in his replies, as is often shown by his further examination.

The answers of the juror to the questions propounded by the court, fully show that he did not intend to say that he had a fixed and disqualifying opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, for he stated, that he only knew of the case from hearsay; that he would be governed entirely by the evidence; that what he had heard would not influence his verdict, and finally he stated, that he had no fixed opinion that would bias his verdict. We think that under our former rulings, the court did not, as for the objection raised to his competency, err in holding him to be competent. Carson v. State, 50 Ala. 134; Long v. State, 86 Ala. 37, 5 So. 443; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380; Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301, 19 L. R. A. 357, 38 Am. St. Rep. 137; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala. 641, 654, 24 So. 459.

2. The witness for defendant, Thad Gibson, was indicted jointly with the defendant for this homicide, and there was evidence tending to show his complicity in it. He had testified that he went with the defendant to the place where, and was present when defendant slew the deceased; that he had his pistol in his holster or belt, but did not draw it; that he had carried his pistol that way for over a year, and it was his habit to carry it wherever he went, for some time...