Rahman v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 83428–8.,83428–8.
• Citation: 170 Wash.2d 810,246 P.3d 182
• Parties: Rizwana RAHMAN, Respondent,v.STATE of Washington, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

170 Wash.2d 810

246 P.3d 182

Rizwana RAHMAN, Respondent,

v.STATE of Washington, Petitioner.

No. 83428–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 18, 2011.Decided Jan. 20, 2011.

John Coulter Dittman, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, Pamela H. Anderson, Tacoma Public School District #10, Tacoma, WA, for Petitioner.State of Washington (Appearing Pro Se), Office of the Attorney General, Tumwater, WA.Karen Marie Kay, Law Office of Harold Carr, PS, Lacey, WA, for Respondent.Stewart Andrew Estes, Keating Bucklin & McCormack, Melissa O'Loughlin White, Kevin Anthony Michael, Cozen O'Connor, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Defense Trial Lawyers.Bryan Patrick Harnetiauxm, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Law Firm PLLC, Moses Lake, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Association for Justice.STEPHENS, J.

[170 Wash.2d 813] ¶ 1 In this case, we must decide if the State is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for injuries to an unauthorized passenger in a state vehicle. Rizwana Rahman was injured in an automobile accident while riding with her husband, Mohammad Shahidur Rahman, from Olympia to Spokane on state business. The trial court dismissed her suit against the State on the ground that Mohammad ¹ was not authorized to allow his wife to ride with him in a state car and was thus acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that as a matter of law the State is vicariously liable for Mohammad's negligence. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2 Mohammad was employed as an intern with the Washington State Department of Ecology during the summer of 2005. He worked in the dam safety office where, among other duties, he accompanied senior engineers on inspections and helped to write reports. On July 26, 2005, Mohammad drove from Olympia to Spokane in a state-owned vehicle to meet a department hydrologist with whom he would inspect a construction site; unbeknownst to his employer, he brought his wife, Rizwana, along. At the time, department policy 11–10 provided: “Ecology vehicles are not to be used for personal trips unrelated to the state business for which they were assigned, nor to transport passengers that are not on official state business.” Clerk's Papers at 155.

¶ 3 While driving near Tiger Mountain Summit on State Route 18, Mohammad failed to negotiate a curve. The car left the roadway, struck a tree and rolled several times. Rizwana was badly injured. She brought this action for negligence against both Mohammad and the State. The complaint was later amended to name the State as the sole defendant.

[170 Wash.2d 815] ¶ 4 Rizwana moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order determining that the State was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for her husband's negligence in causing the accident. The State filed a crossmotion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal on the ground that its employee's use of a state vehicle to transport an unauthorized passenger fell outside the scope of his employment.

¶ 5 The trial court granted the State's motion and denied Rizwana's motion. Observing that no Washington case was directly on point, the court relied in part on the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 242 (1958) to conclude that vicarious liability did not apply in situations involving unauthorized passengers. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered entry of a partial summary judgment in Rizwana's favor. Writing for a unanimous panel of the court, Judge C.C. Bridgewater concluded, “Because Mohammad was clearly engaged in his employer's business when his negligence caused injury to Rizwana, Mohammad's employer, the Department, is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior as a matter of law.” Rahman v. State, 150 Wash.App. 345, 359, 208 P.3d 566 (2009).

¶ 6 The State petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Rahman v. State, 167 Wash.2d 1009, 220 P.3d 207 (2009).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 The doctrine of respondeat superior—literally, “let the master answer”—holds that an employer is liable for the negligent acts of its employees that are “ ‘within the scope or course of employment.’ ” Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 457, 466, 716 P.2d 814 (1986) (quoting Nelson v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 53 Wash.2d 239, 241, 332 P.2d 460 (1958)). The test for determining when an employee acts within the scope of employment is well settled:

whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the duties required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or, as sometimes stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest.

Greene v. St. Paul–Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Wash.2d 569, 573, 320 P.2d 311 (1958) (citing Lunz v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 50 Wash.2d 273, 310 P.2d 880 (1957); Roletto v. Dep't Stores Garage Co., 30 Wash.2d 439, 191 P.2d 875 (1948)). This generally presents a jury question, but the issue may be resolved on summary judgment when there can be only one reasonable conclusion from the undisputed facts. Breedlove v. Stout, 104 Wash.App. 67, 70 n. 5, 14 P.3d 897 (2001) (citing Strachan v. Kitsap County, 27 Wash.App. 271, 274–75, 616 P.2d 1251, review denied, 94 Wash.2d 1025, 1980 WL 153298 (1980)).

¶ 8 Rizwana argues that Mohammad was acting within the course of his employment at the time of the automobile accident because he was driving from Olympia to Spokane in a state vehicle at his employer's direction. The State counters that Mohammad's unauthorized act of allowing his wife to ride along took his conduct outside the scope of his employment, as it was done for his own purposes and was contrary to department policy. In a sense, both parties are correct. Mohammad was indisputably engaged in the duties his employment required, not having departed on a “frolic or detour,” but he was also serving his own interests (and his wife's) by having Rizwana along on the drive. His conduct at the time reflected a mixture of both benefit to his employer and to himself.

¶ 9 This circumstance is nothing new. We observed 60 years ago in McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co., 37 Wash.2d 495, 499, 224 P.2d 627 (1950):

If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he may be in the course of his employment though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own; but if the work for the employer had no part in creating the necessity for travel, and the journey would have been made though no business was transacted for the employer, or would not have been made if the private purpose was abandoned, the journey may be regarded as personal and there would be no employer liability.

In McNew, the employee, a head cook at a logging camp, drove his own car home for the weekend to visit his family, bought supplies to take back to the camp en route, and on his return trip was involved in an automobile accident. We held that the employee was acting beyond the scope of his employment as a matter of law because he would have made the trip regardless of purchasing the supplies, and the fact that the supplies were in his car was “merely incidental and contributed in no way to the accident.” Id. While rejecting vicarious liability on the facts in the case, we observed:

The general trend of authority is in the direction of holding that, where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the employee was actually engaged in when a third person was injured, and the employer will be held responsible unless it clearly appears that the employee could not have been directly or indirectly serving his employer; also the fact that the predominant motive of the employee is to benefit himself does not prevent the act from being within the course or scope of employment, and if the purpose of serving the employer's business actuates the employee to any appreciable extent, the employer is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service.

Id. at 497–98, 224 P.2d 627.

¶ 10 Under this analysis, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Mohammad was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident that injured Rizwana. Though he combined his own business with the State's by allowing Rizwana to ride along as a passenger, the trip and the route taken were dictated by official state business, and there is no evidence that Rizwana's presence in any way contributed to the accident.

¶ 11 The State objects that applying the doctrine of respondeat superior in this manner ignores the important fact that Mohammad violated department policy by inviting his wife to ride with him in a state vehicle, leaving the State no meaningful way to limit its liability exposure. See Pet. for Review at 13. This argument deserves careful scrutiny, as we should be sensitive to the increased risk employers may face when employees disregard workplace rules. Nonetheless, both precedent and sound policy weigh in favor of recognizing vicarious liability.

¶ 12 First, as to precedent, we have previously rejected the notion that an employee's violation of a workplace rule renders the employee's conduct outside the scope of employment. Dickinson, 105 Wash.2d at 470, 716 P.2d 814 (“ ‘[A]n act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be within the scope of employment.’ ” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 230 (1958))); Smith v. Leber, 34 Wash.2d 611, 623–24, 209 P.2d 297 (1949). In each of these cases, an employee's drunk driving caused an accident for which the employer was held vicariously liable. In Smith, the employee drove after having been specifically told by his supervisor not to drive. This court upheld a verdict finding vicarious liability, noting that “ ‘as a general rule, an employer is liable...