Rahman X v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 27 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-2961EA.,01-2961EA. |
| Citation | 300 F.3d 970 |
| Parties | RAHMAN X, also known as Alvin Jackson, Appellant, v. Randall MORGAN, Warden, Arkansas Department of Correction; Steve Outlaw, Assistant Warden, Arkansas Department of Correction; J. Apel, Building Captain, Arkansas Department of Correction; J. Barger, Building Lieutenant, Arkansas Department of Corrections; H. Shelton, Field Lieutenant, Arkansas Department of Correction; Charles McIntosh, Classification Officer, Arkansas Department of Correction; H. Lewis, Building Manager, Arkansas Department of Correction; G. Harmon, Warden, Arkansas Department of Correction; G.D. Guntharp, Assistant Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; and R.E. Wimberly, Chief of Security, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Rahman X, pro se.
Michelle Banks Odum, AAG, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
Rahman X brought this lawsuit alleging that he suffered violations of his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights when he was placed in a segregation cell for 26 months at the Tucker maximum security facility of the Arkansas Department of Correction. The District Court1 conducted a bench trial and then dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice. After review of the arguments in Mr. X's brief, we affirm.
Rahman X, previously known as Alvin Jackson, was sentenced to death in June 1996 for killing a prison guard. He accomplished the murder by breaking out of his cell and stabbing the guard with a metal shank. After his conviction, Mr. X was housed on death row.
On October 5, 1997, Mr. X made a written request to be assigned to a segregation cell. These isolation cells are in a separate ward and contain double doors: an interior barred door and an exterior solid door with a small window. They are normally used for less than 30 days to punish prisoners for disciplinary violations. While most of the prisoners are in the segregation cells for "punitive" reasons, the prison officials had informally established an "in-house" classification for prisoners housed in this ward for reasons other than disciplinary infractions. In his request, Mr. X specified that he wanted a particular cell and certain privileges, similar to those granted to another death-row prisoner before his execution.
Around the time of Mr. X's request, the Chief of Security at Tucker prison, Mr. Wimberly, recommended "in-house" placement for Mr. X because he had again tampered with his barred cell door. Although he was not charged with a violation as a result of that incident, on October 31, 1997, the classification committee voted to change Mr. X's housing assignment to "in-house." Normally, prisoners are given written notice of hearings before they are held. The prison officials cannot produce the notice they claim was given to Mr. X, and he denies receiving such a notice, but officials did testify that it was customary to give notice, and that no hearing would have been held if notice had not been given.
At the hearing, Mr. X was allowed to address the committee. He complained that he had not received his choice of segregation cells and that he would not receive certain other requested privileges. The committee rejected his request and classified him as "in-house." Thereafter, Mr. X expressed unhappiness with his housing placement. On October 21, 1998, Mr. X filed a formal grievance requesting that he be released from his segregation cell and returned to a death-row cell. The classification committee met every 60 days but repeatedly voted against returning Mr. X to a death-row cell.
On December 10, 1998, the plaintiff was found in possession of a shank made out of a piece of his barred cell door. He received a 30-day punitive sentence for this violation, which did not result in a change in his housing, since he was already in the segregation ward of the prison. From the expiration of this 30-day sentence on January 9, 1999, until January 7, 2000, Mr. X remained in "in-house" segregation. He did not commit any disciplinary infractions during this 12-month period. He continued to request that he be released to a death-row cell. Only after the cells on death row were equipped with solid doors, on January 7, 2000, was Mr. X's housing changed.
Mr. X filed this lawsuit in May 1998 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court2 denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. On May 31, 1998, a bench trial was held before the magistrate judge. The plaintiff was represented by counsel. At the close of Mr. X's evidence, the Court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on Mr. X's equal protection claim. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court found in favor of the defendants and dismissed the due process and Eighth Amendment claims with prejudice. This pro se appeal followed.
Mr. X argues the District Court erred in dismissing his claims. We review the District Court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 984-85 (8th Cir.2002).
The equal protection claim is without merit. Although plaintiff was treated differently from other death-row inmates, the government's differential treatment will be upheld if there is any rational reason for it. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Mr. X's prior violent assaults and attempts to break out of his cell were a rational basis for housing him in a cell with more secure doors....
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