Rahn v. Carkner

• Decision Date: 03 July 1997
• Citation: 241 A.D.2d 585,659 N.Y.S.2d 143
• Parties: Theodore R. RAHN et al., Respondents, v. Timothy P. CARKNER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 143

659 N.Y.S.2d 143

241 A.D.2d 585

Theodore R. RAHN et al., Respondents, v. Timothy P. CARKNER, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

July 3, 1997.

Conboy, McKay, Bachman & Kendall LLP (David B. Geurtsen, of counsel), Watertown, for appellant.

Sugarman, Wallace, Manheim & Schoenwald (Matthew D. Gumaer, of counsel), Syracuse, for respondents.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MERCURE, WHITE, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.

WHITE, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), entered April 25, 1996 in St. Lawrence County, which granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve an amended complaint.

In this action, plaintiffs seek to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Theodore R. Rahn (hereinafter plaintiff) when his vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by defendant. Following joinder of issue and after some discovery had been conducted, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. Defendant now appeals.

It is well settled that the decision to grant leave to amend a pleading rests within the trial court's discretion and, absent a showing that prejudice to the nonmoving party will result or that the amendment plainly lacks merit, leave will be freely given (see, CPLR 3025[b]; Bombard v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 205 A.D.2d 1018, 1019, 614 N.Y.S.2d 577, lv. dismissed 84 N.Y.2d 923, 621 N.Y.S.2d 521, 645 N.E.2d 1221). Defendant argues that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting leave to amend the complaint insofar as plaintiffs failed to establish that their claim for punitive damages has merit. We do not agree. "With respect to claims for punitive damages, they 'may be awarded when a defendant's conduct is so reckless or wantonly negligent as to be the equivalent of a conscious disregard of the rights of others' " (Harrell v. Champlain Enters., 222 A.D.2d 876, 634 N.Y.S.2d 880, quoting Dumesnil v. Proctor & Schwartz, 199 A.D.2d 869, 870, 606 N.Y.S.2d 394). Although that conduct need not be intentional (see, Rinaldo v. Mashayekhi, 185 A.D.2d 435, 436, 585 N.Y.S.2d 615), it must be "so flagrant as to transcend mere carelessness" (Frenya v. Champlain Val. Physicians' Hosp. Med. Ctr., 133 A.D.2d 1000, 1001, 521 N.Y.S.2d 150).

Here, plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is based upon the fact that after colliding with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle, defendant struck plaintiff's vehicle a second time in his successful attempt to flee the scene of the accident, leaving plaintiff injured and his passengers unattended. This claim is supported by plaintiff's affidavit in which he avers that he was injured by the second rear-end collision caused...