Railroad v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 30 September 1872
• Parties: Railroad v. Mitchell.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

58 Tenn. 400

Railroad

v.Mitchell.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1872.

FROM WASHINGTON.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Washington, April Term, 1872. E. E. GILLENWATERS, J.BARTON & BAXTER, for Railroad.

KIRKPATRICK & REEVE, for Defendant.

NICHOLSON, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Maria L. Mitchell, the widow and administratrix of H. J. Mitchell, sued the E. T., V. & Ga. R. R. Co., in the Circuit Court of Washington county, for injuries to H. J. Mitchell, which caused his death, and claimed $50,000 damages for the loss sustained by herself and her three children. Upon the trial of the cause the jury rendered a verdict against the Company for $10,000. The Company has appealed.

The first error relied on for a reversal of the judgment is, for misdirection of the court to the jury. The Judge commenced his charge as follows:

“To have a verdict, plaintiff must prove that defendant was a common carrier of passengers; that deceased was a passenger; that the injury was caused by the running of the wheels of the car over the person of deceased, as charged, and that this injury resulted in his death. Upon proof of these facts, without more, the law presumes liability; and if there is no explanatory evidence, showing that the injury resulted from the conduct of the deceased on the one hand, or that defendant had taken all necessary precaution, reasonably requisite to prevent like injuries, and was then in the exercise of that care and diligence required of carriers of passengers, this presumption of liability will continue, and plaintiff may recover.”

As there was no controversy as to the facts, that the Company was a common carrier of passengers, that the deceased was a passenger, and that he was injured by the running of the wheel of the car over his person, the effect of this charge was to instruct the jury that they should enter upon the examination of the case, with the presumption that defendant was liable, and that this presumption was sufficient to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, unless it should be overturned by proof showing either that the injury resulted from the conduct of the deceased on the one hand, or from the negligence of the defendant on the other hand. It is assumed that this presumption of liability results from the simple fact that deceased received the injury from which he died, while making his egress from the train on which he was a passenger, and without any reference to the question of negligence, either on his part or that of the defendant's agents. Can the instruction be maintained as sound law, to the full extent in which it is given?

In examining this question, it is proper to bear in mind a difference that exists between the liability which attaches to a common carrier of goods and that of a common carrier of passengers. It is agreed on all hands that carriers of passengers are only liable for negligence, either proximate or remote, and that they are not insurers of the safety of their passengers, as they are as common carriers of goods. 2 Redf. Railw., sec. 176. When it is shown that goods in the possession of a common carrier have been injured or lost, the presumption of liability arises, and can only be removed by proof of loss or injury by the act of God or the public enemy. But the common carrier of passengers does not warrant their safety at all events, but his liability as to them goes to the extent that he possesses competent skill; and that so far as human care and foresight can go, he will transport them safely. Stokes v. Sattenstall, 13 Pet., 192.

It would seem to follow, that until the proof shows, either the want of the proper skill on the part of common carriers of passengers, or the absence of that care and foresight required for the safety of passengers, no liability can attach. Yet it is true, that in 2 Redf. on Railways, sec. 176, the principle is laid down in the following broad terms: “The fact that injury was suffered by any one while upon the Company's train as passenger, is regarded as prima facie evidence of this liability.”

As a general proposition, this statement of the rule is sustained by many authorities, and is undoubtedly correct in all cases in which the proof which shows the injury, shows also circumstances from which some degree of negligence or want of skill may be attributed to the carrier as the proximate cause of the injury. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 286, say that, “Though it has been frequently said in course of judicial decisions, that the mere fact of an injury suffered by a passenger while on his journey, is sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, yet this is a doctrine altogether too broad to be sustained, and it has been expressly overruled in cases of high authority.” These authors deduce the following as the correct rule: “The law therefore requires, in an action against a carrier for injuries suffered by a passenger, prima facie proof that the proximate cause of such injuries was the want of something which, as a general rule, the carrier was bound to supply, or the presence of something which, as a general rule, the carrier was bound to keep out of the way.” It follows, that when the proof that shows the injury, fails to show the want of something which the carrier was bound to supply, or the presence of something which he was bound to keep out of the way, no presumption of negligence can arise. In such case the plaintiff must go further and make out his case by evidence which fixes negligence on the carrier. This rule was well illustrated in two cases relied on in support of the judge's charge. The first is the case of Stokes v. Sattenstall, 13 Pet., 190. In that case Sattenstall sued Stokes for an injury sustained by his wife by the upsetting of a stage-coach in which she was a passenger. The court held, that “the facts the carriage was upset, and the plaintiff's wife injured, are prima facie evidence that there was carelessness, or negligence, or want of skill on the part of the driver.” These facts furnish...