Railway Co. v. Shoecraft

• Decision Date: 08 October 1892
• Citation: 20 S.W. 272,56 Ark. 465
• Parties: RAILWAY CO. v. SHOECRAFT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

20 S.W. 272

56 Ark. 465

RAILWAY CO. v. SHOECRAFT

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 8, 1892

APPEAL from Monroe Circuit Court, GRANT GREEN, JR., Judge.

The Little Rock & Memphis Railway Co. has appealed from a judgment against it in favor of George Shoecraft for the value of certain stock killed by the negligence of its train-men. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

U. M. & G. B. Rose for appellant.

The suppressed portions of the deposition were statements of facts and not opinions, and clearly competent.31 A. & E. R Cases, 539; 11 Ohio St. 333.

H. A Parker for appellee.

The court properly suppressed the depositions. They were merely opinions. 31 A. & E. R. Cases, 539. Even if their opinions were admissible as expert evidence, no foundation was laid no experience was shown.

OPINION

COCKRILL, C. J.

A witness' opinion is admissible as evidence, not only where scientific knowledge is required to comprehend the matter testified about, but also where experience and observation in the special calling of the witness gives him knowledge of the subject in question beyond that of persons of common intelligence. Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 24 L.Ed. 477.

We have held that farmers residing in the neighborhood of a farm over which a railway is located, who are acquainted with the property, may give opinions as to the amount of damages the owner has sustained by the location (St. Louis &c. Railroad v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167; Texas & St. Louis Railway v. Kirby, 44 Ark. 103); and also that one who by reason of his service with a railway has special knowledge in the adjustment of freight charges is competent to give his opinion as to the reasonableness of a given charge. Railway Co. v. Bruce, 55 Ark. 65.

Many other instances illustrative of the rule are given in 1 Wharton on Evidence, at § 444.

Following this rule, it has been held, in the only cases in point which have come under our observation, that an experienced locomotive engineer or fireman may testify as to his opinion of the possibility of avoiding a collision with animals which have strayed upon the track. Bellefontaine & Indiana R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Ohio St. 333; Grinnell v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. 31 A. & E. R. Cases, 539.

In the case in hand, cattle which were crossing the track ahead of the engine were run into and killed. The engineer testified that he sounded the stock alarm, put on the air brakes and reversed the engine when he saw the cattle, and that that was all he could do to prevent the collision--or to use his own language, he said: "I did all I could to prevent hitting them." The court struck that sentence from the deposition.

The fireman who was in the cab with the engineer when the collision occurred testified to the facts which the engineer was permitted to detail, and added the following statement "As soon as we saw the stock,...