Rainaldi v. City of Albuquerque
| Citation | 338 P.3d 94 |
| Decision Date | 14 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,059.,32,059. |
| Parties | Deborah RAINALDI, Shonna Baca, and Robert Kessel, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Reversed and remanded. Youtz & Valdez, P.C., Shane C. Youtz, Stephen Curtice, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.
City of Albuquerque, David Tourek, City Attorney, Samantha M. Hults, Assistant City Attorney, Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Assistant City Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} In this single issue appeal, we are called upon to resolve a matter of first impression: whether the City of Albuquerque's (the City) overtime compensation schedule for Albuquerque Police Department (APD) employees violates the statutory time payment provisions required of New Mexico employers. See NMSA 1978, § 50–4–2(A) (2005) (). The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the collective action complaint brought by certain affected APD employees (Plaintiffs), ruling that the City's two-week processing delay of overtime accrued during the second week of a given bi-weekly pay period complies with Section 50–4–2(A). We hold that the City's overtime compensation schedule violates the statutory requirement of Section 50–4–2(A) that employees be compensated for “all services rendered” within ten days after the close of a given pay period, and that the City is not exempt from compliance. We reverse.
{4} Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998–NMSC–046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “[I]f no material issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal presents only a question of law, we apply de novo review.” City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng'rs, Inc., 2009–NMCA–081, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 717, 213 P.3d 1146.
B. The City's Overtime Compensation Schedule for APD Employees Does Not Comply With Section 50–4–2(A)
{5} On appeal, Plaintiffs do not assert that summary judgment was improper due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the City “[u]nquestionably [v]iolates” the “[c]lear and [u]nambiguous [c]onstraints” of Section 50–4–2(A) as a matter of law, and none of the City's “proffered defenses excuse [its] failure to abide by the plain language of the statute[.]”
{6} Section 50–4–2(A) imposes on employers two distinct wage payment requirements: (1) that employers “shall designate regular pay days, not more that sixteen days apart, as days fixed for the payment of wages to all employees paid in [the] state[,]” and (2) that employers “shall pay for services rendered from the first to the fifteenth days ... by the twenty-fifth day of the month during which services are rendered, and for all services rendered from the sixteenth to the last day of the month ... by the tenth day of the succeeding month.” Id. The parties do not dispute that the City's bi-weekly compensation schedule, designating pay days every fourteen days, is in compliance with the frequency of compensation requirement. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the City complies with the second statutory requirement establishing the timing by which compensation for services is due. See § 50–4–2(A).
{7} Plaintiffs assert that because the City does not compensate for overtime earned during the second week of a pay period until the pay day following the subsequent pay period, which occurs twenty-one days later, the City is afoul of the requirement that payment for all services rendered be made by the tenth day following conclusion of any given period. The City initially responds that because its pay days occur more frequently than is required by Section 50–4–2(A), it is in compliance with the statute. Our review of the wording of the statute, however, provides no indication that employers choosing to schedule pay periods at a greater frequency than is statutorily required are consequently freed from having to compensate employees for all services rendered by the time payment is otherwise due. In fact, with the limited exception of “state employees, other than employees of institutions of higher education,” whose salaries and wages are governed by the rules of the department of finance and administration, “an employer shall pay wages in full[.]” Section 50–4–2(B).
{8} We recognize that Section 50–4–2(A) facially illustrates a semimonthly payment schedule, requiring one pay day by the twenty-fifth day of the month for services rendered between the first and fifteenth days, and another by the tenth day of the succeeding month for services rendered between the sixteenth and last days of the month. As we have noted, the City does not utilize this semimonthly schedule, but rather a bi-weekly payment schedule; thus, the specific semimonthly payment deadlines are inapplicable here. Nonetheless, we have previously observed the statutory compensation time line to require payment within ten days after the close of any given pay period, not just a bi-monthly one. See N.M. Dep't of Labor v. A.C. Elec., Inc., 1998–NMCA–141, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 779, 965 P.2d 363 (). The City's current overtime compensation schedule does not render payment for overtime services within ten days after the close of the given pay period, but defers payment for the second week of the pay period until the subsequent pay day, twenty-one days following the conclusion of the pay period. This delayed compensation of accrued overtime is not consistent with the ten-day payment window specified in Section 50–4–2(A).
{9} Accordingly, we conclude that the manner in which the City compensates its APD employees is inconsistent with that statutorily required of employers in New Mexico. We must next resolve whether the City has asserted any basis on which it is excluded or is otherwise exempt from the category of employers governed by Section 50–4–2(A).
C. The City's Proffered Exemptions Do Not Liberate it from Compliance With Section 50–4–2(A)
{10} The City argues that even if its overtime compensation schedule is disallowed by Section 50–4–2(A), it is exempt from compliance on any of four distinct bases: (1) Section 50–4–2(B) provides an exception for state public employers, and as an auxiliary of the state, the City is likewise exempt; (2) the Legislature did not intend Section 50–4–2(A) to apply to any public employers; (3) public employers are explicitly excluded from the definition of “employer” under Section 50–4–21 of the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (MWA), NMSA 1978, §§ 50–4–19 to –30 (1955, as amended through 2009); and (4) as a home rule municipality, the City may “exercise all legislative and policy making functions[.]” We address each of the City's arguments below and conclude that none exempt it from the statutorily mandated compensation time line of Section 50–4–2(A).
{11} First, the City argues that it is exempt from compliance with Section 50–4–2(A) because Section 50–4–2(B) excepts “payment of salaries and wages to state employees[.]” As an “auxiliary of the state[,]” the City asserts that it is included within the grouping of statutorily exempt state public employers. The City relies on Morningstar Water Users Ass'n v. Farmington Municipal School District, 1995–NMSC–052, ¶ 37, 120 N.M. 307, 901 P.2d 725, and City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, 2003–NMSC–028, ¶ 3, 134 N.M. 472, 79 P.3d 297 for this proposition.
{12} We conclude that Plaintiff's reliance on both cases is misplaced. While Morningstar Water Users Ass'n does state, as the City contends, that a municipality “is an auxiliary of the state government,” this relationship does not equate municipalities such as the City with the state for the purposes of benefits or privileges. See Morningstar Water Users Ass'n, 1995–NMSC–052, ¶ 37, 120 N.M. 307, 901 P.2d 725 ); Hurley v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 2006–NMCA–041, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 306, 131 P.3d 693 (). Likewise, Public Regulation Commission does not establish the proposition that municipalities are treated identically to the state for purposes of benefits such as statutory exemption, but instead holds that political subdivisions of the state possess “only such powers as are expressly granted to it by the Legislature[.]” 2003–NMSC–028, ¶ 3, 134 N.M. 472, 79 P.3d 297 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe (NMFE), 2006–NMCA–007, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149 ().
{13} More tellingly, the plain wording of Section 50–4–2(B) expressly exempts only the State from the payment rigors to which New Mexico employers must adhere. Because municipalities such as the City are not discharged from compliance by the statutory language chosen by the Legislature and are not...
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