Loeb v. City of Jacksonville

• Decision Date: 04 May 1931
• Citation: 101 Fla. 429,134 So. 205
• Parties: LOEB v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

134 So. 205

101 Fla. 429

LOEB v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

May 4, 1931

Suit by J. B. Loeb against the City of Jacksonville and others. From the decree, complainant appeals.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, judge.

COUNSEL

John F Hall, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Austin Miller and Emmet Safay, both of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

ELLIS J.

J. B Loeb, a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Jacksonville exhibited his bill in chancery against the city of Jacksonville, J. L. Hall as tax assessor, Alexander Ray as treasurer and tax collector, and J. E. Pace as auditor, of the city, to declare a certain item in the city budget for the year 1928 appearing under the title 'Division No 11' for advertising, $89,980, to be illegal, and that section 8 of Ordinance No. T-43, under which a tax of eight-tenths of one mill was levied upon the property in said city for such purpose, is void. It is alleged that the item under Division No. 11, mentioned above, is made up of appropriations by the city council and city commission as follows: For entertainment of the representatives of the Imperial Council of the Ancient Arabic Shrine of North America in Jacksonville, $25,000; for entertainment of the representatives of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in the city, $15,000; for entertainment of the representatives of the Order of Railway Conductors of America in the city, $15,000; for the Florida State Fair Association, $10,000; to reimburse the city commission for a like sum theretofore donated to Florida State Fair Association; to reimburse the city commission in the sum of $3,500 for advances made to the American Legion Drum and Bugle Corps; and the remaining $11,400 for pledges and promises of donations to other corporations, associations, institutions, and individuals under the pretense of advertising. It is alleged that such alleged misappropriations of the city's revenue violates sections 5 and 10 of article 9 of the Constitution and section 54 of the City Charter. It is alleged that such appropriations are not for a municipal purpose within the meaning of the Constitution and laws.

It is also alleged that in the budget adopted by the city officials there appear such items as appropriations for militia, $2,400, Chamber of Commerce Employment Bureau, $3,000, auditor's chief clerk, $600, which complainant says are illegal because they violate certain provisions of the Constitution not for purposes authorized by law and are prohibited by sections 54 and 99 of the city charter. The complainant alleges that he had paid all taxes which have become due and payable and tenders and offers to pay all taxes which have been legally levied.

The answer admits the allegations of the bill as to the levy of a tax of eight-tenths of a mill for advertising purposes, and avers that the appropriations as alleged were made in execution of the plan for advertising the city, its properties and advantages, to the end that hundreds of 'representative citizens from all parts of the United States' would 'personally visit and inspect the City of Jacksonville and its advantages and thereby foster an increase in the population of the said City and thereby materially increase the values of its property, business conditions, and otherwise contribute to the prosperity of its inhabitants.'

It averred that the appropriation of $10,000 for the State Fair was an error as no such appropriation was made, and that the sum referred to in the bill to reimburse the city commission for a like amount paid to the State Fair Association had already been paid to the association under authority of section 6526, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, out of funds transferred from the Storeroom Department. The same was true as to the appropriations for the American Legion Drum and Bugle Corps. The appropriation of $2,400 for the Militia is averred to be justined under chapter 6357 (section 13), Act of 1911; the appropriation of $3,000 to the Chamber of Commerce was in the interest of obtaining employment for the city's unemployed and which is averred to be a legitimate municipal function; and the $600 apportioned for city auditor's chief clerk is merely one of the items going to make up that employee's salary which is fixed by ordinance. The answer concluded with a demurrer to certain paragraphs of the bill.

The defendants interposed an additional answer in which the defense was set up in justification of the appropriation and tax levy for advertising purposes that the city exercised proprietary and quasi corporate functions as well as governmental functions; that it is a large commercial city and railroad terminus for many large trunk line railroads extending into all parts of the United States and had favorable railroad passenger and freight rates; that its population was large and the assessed value of its real and personal property amounted to $99,000,000; that it the transportation facilities by water and is climatically so situated that it is attractive to 'outside' people as a place for homes as well as a place for 'business, commercial and industrial purposes'; that it has the authority to acquire and own and operate under its charter large public facilities and improvements; that it owns an electric light and power plant worth approximately $5,000,000, athletic and recreation fields, golf courses, and stadiums and public buildings for recreation and amusement of an approximate value of $2,500,000; that the city has power under the provisions of chapter 10711, Acts of 1925, and chapter 11565, Acts 1925, Ex. Sess., to own and operate auditoriums in which to hold public hearings, concerts, and public conventions and to 'meet the changing conditions and necessities of the public'; that the city has power to issue bonds to raise money for such purposes as also to operate broadcasting stations, aeroplane landing fields, yacht basins, and all other stadiums, buildings, or improvements which the city may deem necessary or desirable.

The substance of the remaining portion of the answer is that the city, in order to operate all such conveniences, improvements, playgrounds, and pleasure or recreation fields and carry on its proprietary interests and extend, increase, and develop them, may tax the private property of the citizens to raise revenue to that end.

Motions to strike and exceptions to portions of the answer were denied. The chancellor prepared and filed an opinion upon what he conceived to be the principal question involved, made an order granting a temporary injunction against the defendants restraining them from making the appropriations of which the bill complained, and rendered a final decree on the hearing which was on bill and answer. He overruled the demurrer to the bill, denied the restraining order against the levy and collection of the tax levy of eight-tenths of one mill for advertising as provided by section 8 of Ordinance No. T-43, denied the application for a restraining order to prevent the auditor from drawing a warrant or voucher in payment of the appropriation of $2,400 to the Militia and the sum of $3,500 to American Legion Drum and Bugle Corps from the advertising fund, and denied an order restraining the city treasurer from paying such warrant.

The restraining order theretofore granted was made perpetual, which restrained appropriations for the 'Imperial council of the Ancient Arabic Shrine of North America,' Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Order of Railway Conductors of America; Auditor's chief clerk and Chamber of Commerce Employment Bureau, or any like institution, association, or individual, and the drawing of warrants for same and payment thereof by the city treasurer.

The complainant Loeb appealed from the final decree.

The power of the city to levy a tax for advertising purposes is presented in this appeal. As shown by the bill, the city undertook to levy and collect a tax of eight-tenths of one mill for such purpose, which according to the showing made would produce a sum amounting to $89,900, of which the chancellor deemed that approximately $60,000 or more were illegally appropriated.

An appellate court may not be concerned with the views or reasons given by a trial judge for the conclusion reached by him. See Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 180; Adams v. Am. Agricultural Chemical Co., 78 Fla. 362, 82 So. 850; Broward Estates Corporation v. Chilingworth, 93 Fla. 366, 112 So. 64. But the views expressed by the chancellor in his opinion filed in December, 1927, which antedated the final decree four months, will be instructive.

The chancellor held the first question to be whether the city may levy taxes and spend money for advertising; that the Legislature had not vested the city with any such power directly, and if it may exercise any such power it is because such power is incident to general powers conferred. He thought that the question had never before been presented to a court in any English speaking country because there were no reported cases in point. He proceeds then to state that the modern city is a very different organization from what it was a few decades ago. That while it still is a branch of the state sovereignty 'manifestly a local self-government, it is also vastly more.' It is, said he, 'a complex industrial organization and vast property owner. It has lots of things to sell--electricity, water, dockage, amusement and often gas and transportation. And it derives enormous revenues from these sources. It is interested in expanding its territory, increasing its population, and bringing in new industries. These accretions to the things that constitute the citymean more patronage for its municipal...