RAINBOW PROPERTIES v. Wilkinson
Citation | 556 S.E.2d 11,147 NC App. 520 |
Decision Date | 04 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. COA01-48.,COA01-48. |
Parties | RAINBOW PROPERTIES, a Limited Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Walter M. WILKINSON, and wife, Ada Fowler Wilkinson, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Williams, Boger, Grady, Davis & Tuttle, P.A. by Samuel F. Davis, Jr., Concord, for plaintiff-appellee.
Hartsell, Hartsell & White, P.A., by Fletcher L. Hartsell, Jr. and Kimberly A. Lyda, Concord, for defendants-appellants.
On 10 July 1985, the plaintiff entered into an Option to Purchase Real Estate (Option Agreement) with the defendants. For an initial consideration of $5,000.00, the Option Agreement gave the plaintiff the option, for a period of 12 months, to purchase thirty acres of land owned by the defendants in Cabarrus County for $200,000.00. Thereafter, plaintiff and defendants annually entered into thirteen separate agreements to extend the time for the plaintiff to exercise its option by one year for a consideration of $2,000.00 each. The last such extension agreement occurred on 1 July 1998 and extended the time to exercise the option until 10 July 1999. Plaintiff paid the defendants a total of $31,000.00 for the option under the Option Agreement and the extension agreements.
The Option Agreement states in part:
On 2 July 1999, defendants received written notice of plaintiff's election to exercise its option to purchase the land. The Option Agreement specified that, after the exercise of the option, the plaintiff had ninety days to complete closing on the land. Plaintiff prepared to close on 24 September 1999 even though the defendants had refused to allow the plaintiff to have the land surveyed pursuant to the Option Agreement. The record shows that the plaintiff was ready and able to purchase the land at closing. However, defendants did not attend the closing and they have since refused to convey the land to the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this action to enforce the Option Agreement by compelling the defendants to allow the survey of the land and by ordering the defendants to convey the land pursuant to the Option Agreement. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment which was granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Langley v. Moore, 64 N.C.App. 520, 522, 307 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1983). Defendants appeal contending the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the plaintiff in that the language of the Option Agreement is ambiguous and as such there is an issue of fact. Defendants specifically contend that their dependence on the land to produce food for their cattle...
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