Rainer v. Hansen
| Decision Date | 25 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-1427,18-1427 |
| Parties | Atorrus RAINER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Matthew HANSEN, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility; and Phil Weiser, Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
The Constitution requires states to offer juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes "some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Invoking this constitutional obligation, Mr. Atorrus Rainer sought habeas relief, claiming that the State of Colorado had deprived him of this opportunity by imposing a 112-year sentence for crimes committed when he was a juvenile. We conclude that the State has provided Mr. Rainer with the required opportunity through the combination of the Juveniles Convicted as Adults Program (JCAP) and the general parole program.
After committing crimes when he was seventeen years old, Mr. Rainer was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. For these crimes, the district court sentenced Mr. Rainer to 224 years in prison.
On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. But the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered modification of the sentences, concluding that the prison terms for attempted first-degree murder and first-degree assault should run concurrently, rather than consecutively, because the crimes could have been based on identical evidence. The Colorado Court of Appeals thus modified Mr. Rainer's sentences to run for 112 years.
After the direct appeal, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Under Graham, these juveniles are entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Id.
Shortly after Graham was decided, Mr. Rainer filed a postconviction motion in state district court, arguing that his 112-year sentence was unconstitutional. The state district court held that (1) Graham was inapplicable because it had addressed only sentences designated as life without parole, not lengthy term-of-years sentences, and (2) Graham did not apply retroactively.
Id. at 533-36. Because Mr. Rainer's life expectancy preceded his eligibility for parole, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Mr. Rainer lacked a meaningful opportunity for release.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that Graham applied only to juveniles sentenced to life without parole for a single crime. People v. Rainer, 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). Because Mr. Rainer had a lengthy term-of-years sentence for six different offenses, the court reasoned, Graham did not apply. Id.
Mr. Rainer appealed, and we affirm. Although Graham applies, the State has provided Mr. Rainer with a meaningful opportunity for release through the combination of JCAP and the general parole program.
Standard for Habeas Relief
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Mr. Rainer's claim on the merits. People v. Rainer, 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). Mr. Rainer was thus subject to the restriction in § 2254(d).
To determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law, we engage in a two-step process. We first identify the clearly established law based on Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We then determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court precedent. Id.
As the respondents concede, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision was contrary to Graham. In Budder v. Addison, a state court declined to apply Graham to a juvenile offender sentenced to 131 years in prison, reasoning that Graham did not apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences. 851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017). We held that this decision was contrary to Graham, reasoning that the Supreme Court had not drawn "any distinctions with regard to the... severity of nonhomicide crimes a defendant had committed or indicate that anything short of homicide would rise to the level of moral culpability that could justify a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender." Id. at 1057-58.
Just like the state court in Budder, the Colorado Supreme Court declined to apply Graham here in light of the long term-of-years sentence for multiple crimes. People v. Rainer, 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). The Colorado Supreme Court's decision is thus contrary to Graham, and § 2254(d) does not bar relief.
Though § 2254(d) does not prevent habeas relief, we conclude that Mr. Rainer's sentence complies with Graham.
The district court agreed, holding that Graham did not apply. We conclude that Graham does apply here because attempted first-degree murder is not a homicide offense.
Graham's holding is limited to offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (). The term "homicide" is widely understood as the killing of another person. See Black's Law Dictionary 881 (Garner editor-in-chief, 11th ed. 2019) (giving the primary definition of "homicide" as "[t]he killing of one person by another"); I Bouvier Law Dictionary 1219 (2012) (defining "homicide" as "[c]ausing the end of the life of another human being"); Bryan A. Garner, Dictionary of Legal Usage 413 (3d ed. 2009) ( that "homicide refers ... to the lawful or unlawful killing of a person"). The Colorado Supreme Court adheres to this broad understanding of "homicide," defining it as "the killing of a human being by another." Leopold v. People, 105 Colo. 147, 95 P.2d 811, 813 (1939).
Despite this widely recognized definition of "homicide," the district court and the respondents focus on a single sentence in Graham: "The Court has recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers." 560 U.S. 48, 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). But right after this sentence, the Court focuses on the gravity of crimes leading to a victim's death:
There is a line "between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual." .... Serious nonhomicide crimes "may be devastating in their harm ... but `in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,' ... they cannot be compared to murder in their `severity and irrevocability.'" This is because "[l]ife is over for the victim of the murderer," but for the victim of even a very serious nonhomicide crime, "life ... is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Although an offense like robbery or rape is "a serious crime deserving serious punishment," those crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral sense.
Id. (citations omitted)1 (emphasis added). The Court thus relied on the broad understanding of "homicide," distinguishing between crimes based on whether they cause a death. Id. Given this context, we...
To continue reading
Request your trial