Rainer v. Hansen
Decision Date | 10 March 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 18-1427,18-1427 |
Citation | 952 F.3d 1203 |
Parties | Atorrus RAINER, Petitioner - Appellant, v. Matthew HANSEN, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents - Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Kathleen A. Lord, Lord Law Firm, LLC, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Ryan A. Crane, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, with him on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before BRISCOE, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing ("Petition"). In the Petition, Respondents ask us to grant panel rehearing to clarify that they did not concede that the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Rainer, 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017) was contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Upon careful consideration, we direct as follows.
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 40, the petition for panel rehearing is granted to the extent of the modifications in the attached revised opinion. The court’s February 25, 2020 opinion is withdrawn and replaced by the attached revised opinion, which shall be filed as of today’s date.
The Constitution requires states to offer juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes "some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Invoking this constitutional obligation, Mr. Atorrus Rainer sought habeas relief, claiming that the State of Colorado had deprived him of this opportunity by imposing a 112-year sentence for crimes committed when he was a juvenile. We conclude that the State has provided Mr. Rainer with the required opportunity through the combination of the Juveniles Convicted as Adults Program (JCAP) and the general parole program.
After committing crimes when he was seventeen years old, Mr. Rainer was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. For these crimes, the district court sentenced Mr. Rainer to 224 years in prison.
On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. But the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered modification of the sentences, concluding that the prison terms for attempted first-degree murder and first-degree assault should run concurrently, rather than consecutively, because the crimes could have been based on identical evidence. The Colorado Court of Appeals thus modified Mr. Rainer’s sentences to run for 112 years.
After the direct appeal, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Under Graham , these juveniles are entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Id .
Shortly after Graham was decided, Mr. Rainer filed a postconviction motion in state district court, arguing that his 112-year sentence was unconstitutional. The state district court held that (1) Graham was inapplicable because it had addressed only sentences designated as life without parole, not lengthy term-of-years sentences, and (2) Graham did not apply retroactively.
Id. at 533–36. Because Mr. Rainer’s life expectancy preceded his eligibility for parole, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Mr. Rainer lacked a meaningful opportunity for release.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that Graham applied only to juveniles sentenced to life without parole for a single crime. People v. Rainer , 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). Because Mr. Rainer had a lengthy term-of-years sentence for six different offenses, the court reasoned, Graham did not apply. Id.
Mr. Rainer appealed, and we affirm. Although Graham applies, the State has provided Mr. Rainer with a meaningful opportunity for release through the combination of JCAP and the general parole program.
Standard for Habeas Relief
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Mr. Rainer’s claim on the merits. People v. Rainer , 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). Mr. Rainer was thus subject to the restriction in § 2254(d).
To determine whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law, we engage in a two-step process. We first identify the clearly established law based on Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 379, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We then determine whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court precedent. Id .
We conclude that the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to Graham . In Budder v. Addison , a state court declined to apply Graham to a juvenile offender sentenced to 131 years in prison, reasoning that Graham did not apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences. 851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017). We held that this decision was contrary to Graham , reasoning that the Supreme Court had not drawn "any distinctions with regard to the ... severity of nonhomicide crimes a defendant had committed or indicate that anything short of homicide would rise to the level of moral culpability that could justify a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender." Id. at 157–58, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Just like the state court in Budder , the Colorado Supreme Court declined to apply Graham here in light of the long term-of-years sentence for multiple crimes. People v. Rainer , 394 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Colo. 2017). The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision is thus contrary to Graham , and § 2254(d) does not bar relief.
Though § 2254(d) does not prevent habeas relief, we conclude that Mr. Rainer’s sentence complies with Graham .
The district court agreed, holding that Graham did not apply. We conclude that Graham does apply here because attempted first-degree murder is not a homicide offense.
Graham ’s holding is limited to offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses. Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ; see also Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (). The term "homicide" is widely understood as the killing of another person. See Black’s Law Dictionary 881 (Garner editor-in-chief, 11th ed. 2019) (giving the primary definition of "homicide" as "[t]he killing of one person by another"); I Bouvier Law Dictionary 1219 (2012) (defining "homicide" as "[c]ausing the end of the life of another human being"); Bryan A. Garner, Dictionary of Legal Usage 413 (3d ed. 2009) ("homicide refers ... to the lawful or unlawful killing of a person"). that The Colorado Supreme Court adheres to this broad understanding of "homicide," defining it as "the killing of a human being by another." Leopold v. People , 105 Colo. 147, 95 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1939).
Despite this widely recognized definition of "homicide," the district court and the respondents focus on a single sentence in Graham : "The Court has recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are...
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