Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:15–CV–0551
• Citation: 135 F.Supp.3d 284
• Parties: Holly Judge, Plaintiff, v. Shikellamy School District, Patrick M. Kelley, Dr. James P. Hartman, Wendy Wiest, Lori Garman, Kellie Cianflone, James Garman, C. Scott Karpinski, Thomas Michaels, Michael Stepp, and Dr. Jeffrey Walter, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

135 F.Supp.3d 284

Holly Judge, Plaintiff,

v.Shikellamy School District, Patrick M. Kelley, Dr. James P. Hartman, Wendy Wiest, Lori Garman, Kellie Cianflone, James Garman, C. Scott Karpinski, Thomas Michaels, Michael Stepp, and Dr. Jeffrey Walter, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:15–CV–0551

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 28, 2015

Donald H. Brobst, Thomas J. Campenni, Rosenn Jenkins & Greenwald, Wilkes–Barre, PA, for Plaintiff.

Christopher J. Conrad, Nicole M. Ehrhart, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, Camp Hill, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MATTHEW W. BRANN

, District Judge

Pending before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by all Defendants. The motion seeks to dismiss all claims asserted in the Complaint, including Plaintiff's claims for procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection, and breach of contract, as well as her request for punitive damages. The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. In accordance with the following reasoning, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the termination¹ of Plaintiff, Holly Judge, from her position as principal of the Shikellamy Elementary School. Plaintiff's Complaint ¶ 19, March 19, 2015, ECF No. 1 (hereinafter "Pl.'s Complaint). She was employed by the Shikellamy School District in that position from October 2011 until June 20, 2014. Id. At all material times, she performed her work as principal of the elementary school in a good, professional, and competent manner. Id. ¶ 23.

On June 19, 2014, Plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with Defendant Kelley, District Superintendent, but was given no advance notice as to the purpose of the meeting. Id. ¶ 25. Following the meeting² , she was given a letter signed by Defendant Kelley which explained the purpose of the meeting and detailed some particulars of the discussion between him and Plaintiff at that meeting. Id. He first explained that he had learned from outside sources that Plaintiff had been involved in a traffic stop under suspicion of driving under the influence. Pl.'s Complaint, Exhibit A. He further elucidated that at the meeting Plaintiff originally represented that she had not received a field sobriety test, although she later admitted that a blood alcohol test was conducted at the State Police barracks. Id. The letter went on to inform Plaintiff that she had failed to disclose these events to Defendant Kelley for twenty days and that, when confronted at their meeting, Plaintiff had attempted to explain that no charges had been filed, "as if it was nothing more than a routine traffic stop." Id. Finally, the letter requested Plaintiff's immediate resignation and offered a neutral reference in the future if she should choose to resign before 12:30 p.m. the next day. Id. In the alternative, Defendant Kelley stated that if Plaintiff should choose not to resign and DUI charges were filed against her, then he would be forced to issue a written statement of charges for dismissal which would be based upon immorality, intemperance, and moral turpitude. Id. He further explained that these charges for dismissal could have an impact upon Plaintiff's status with the Department of Education. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the next day she was forced to resign "under protest," and this constituted a constructive discharge. Id. ¶ 27–28, 35.

Several months later, in October 2014, Defendant Kelley was arrested in New York for aggravated DUI and for leaving the scene of a property damage accident. Id. ¶ 36. The Shikellamy school board members only imposed a twenty day unpaid suspension on Defendant Kelley for this conduct, despite having terminated Plaintiff for her similar conduct. Id. ¶ 37–38.

As a result of the letter and her subsequent termination, Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered damages to her reputation, and that her ability to continue to be employed as an elementary school principal has been impaired. Id. ¶ 39. She has, moreover, suffered damages in the form of loss of income, employment benefits, and the inability to obtain another position with another school district. Id. ¶ 40. Because she alleges that the actions of the Defendants were "outrageous, extremely offensive and intentional and discriminatory," and that they "were performed with malicious, reckless indifference, and/or wanton disregard of Plaintiff's civil rights," she seeks an award of punitive damages. Id. ¶ 41–42, 46, 49, 55, 66.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

, a court must view all allegations stated in the complaint as true and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ; Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the [factual] allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). In ruling on such a motion, the court primarily considers the allegations of the pleading, but is not required to consider legal conclusions alleged in the complaint. See Kost, 1 F.3d at 183. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court considers whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the allegations in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000).

A complaint should only be dismissed if, accepting as true all of the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiff has not pled enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–664, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

"In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, we must be mindful that federal courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading." Hellman v. Kercher, No. 07–1373, 2008 WL 1969311 at *3 (W.D.Pa. May 5, 2008) (Lancaster, J.). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8"requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds on which it rests,’ " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). However, even under this lower notice pleading standard, a plaintiff must do more than recite the elements of a cause of action, and then make a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. See Hellman, 2008 WL 1969311 at *3. Instead, a plaintiff must make a factual showing of his entitlement to relief by alleging sufficient facts that, when taken as true, suggest the required elements of a particular legal theory. SeeTwombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955

. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not "shown"—"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) ).

The failure-to-state-a-claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6)

"streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where there is a "dispositive issue of law." Id. at 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827. If it is beyond a doubt that the non-moving party can prove no set of facts in support of its allegations, then a claim must be dismissed "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I Procedural Due Process

Defendants initially argue that Plaintiff has not pled a procedural due process claim for several reasons. First, they contend that she did not request a hearing, as required under Pennsylvania law governing the dismissal of school district employees, and therefore she cannot allege that her failure to receive one was in violation of her procedural due process rights. Moreover, they argue, contrary to her assertions of constructive discharge, she actually resigned from her position and, accordingly, Defendants did not deprive her of her rights. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conduct was tantamount to "immoral behavior" under Pennsylvania law and thus there was cause to dismiss her.³

Plaintiff responds that she did have a constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment pursuant to 24 P.S. § 11–1122

, and that one DUI does not constitute an act of immorality sufficient to trigger the provisions of that law. Furthermore, she asserts that she had a protected liberty interest in her reputation which was violated when Defendants terminated her employment for allegedly engaging in conduct of intemperance, immorality and moral turpitude. Finally, she avers that she was denied her pre- and post-termination due process rights to sufficient notice and a hearing.⁴

To begin with, § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights; rather, it merely provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)

. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must initially demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of...