Rainey v. State

Citation572 N.E.2d 517
Decision Date04 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. 18A02-9004-CR-201,18A02-9004-CR-201
PartiesSuzanne RAINEY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
ORDER FOR PUBLICATION OF PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION

This court upon its own motion deems Issue VII of the unpublished Memorandum Decision bearing the above caption, to satisfy the criteria for publication pursuant to Appellate Rule 15(A). Now therefore the redacted version of the Memorandum Decision as attached hereto and made a part hereof is ordered published.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Suzanne Rainey (Rainey) appeals her convictions and sentences upon two counts of murder.

* * * * * *

We affirm.

* * * * * *

VII.

Rainey argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions of murder. Specifically, she argues that the murder convictions are inconsistent with her companion's convictions of voluntary manslaughter.

The State correctly notes that upon review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we will look to the evidence favorable to the verdict and will not reweigh the evidence. Smedley v. State (1990) Ind., 561 N.E.2d 776. In the present case, the record reveals ample evidence that Rainey knowingly participated in the killings of the two victims. Rainey admitted that she and her companion, Samuel Redwine, were involved in a fight with the victims at Crowder's Gun Shop on December 31, 1988, the night the victims were killed. She further testified that Redwine had a knife and Redwine told her that he "cut" Donnie Smith, one of the victims. Two witnesses testified that they ran into Rainey and Redwine on the same evening and that Rainey said she and Redwine had "stabbed Donnie and left him laying with his guts hanging out." Record at 875, 890. The two witnesses testified that Rainey had blood on her.

Anthony Robertson testified that he was at Rainey's sister's house on December 31, 1988 and that Rainey and Redwine came to the house that night. He overheard the two arguing about fingerprints on the knife, and saw Redwine wiping a knife. Later, the police came to the house, and Rainey told Robertson to tell the police that she and Redwine were not there. The police found Rainey and Redwine fully dressed in a back bedroom in bed under the covers.

Tracy Hines testified that, while in prison with Rainey, Rainey told her that Rainey and Redwine had gone to a gun shop intending to rob it and had murdered two people. The prosecutor asked whether Rainey had discussed her participation in the fight at the gun shop, and Hines testified that Rainey "told me she held the victims." Record at 1254.

This evidence supports Rainey's convictions for murder. Rainey argues that there is no evidence that she killed the victims. However, an accomplice is criminally responsible for the acts of her confederate which are done in the probable and natural consequence of the common plan. Moredock v. State (1987) Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1247, 1249; Harris v. State (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 154, 156.

"Evidence indicating the accomplice acted in concert with those who physically committed the elements of the crime is sufficient to support a conviction on the accessory theory." Moredock, supra, 514 N.E.2d at 1249.

Rainey also argues that the court erred in denying her motion for a verdict of a lesser included offense. She contends that because she was an accessory, her conviction must be viewed in light of, and conform to, Samuel Redwine's conviction of voluntary manslaughter. She then argues that because voluntary manslaughter contains the element of "sudden heat", which is subjective and individualized, she could not possibly have been an accessory to voluntary manslaughter. 1

Because the law formerly made, and now makes, no distinction between a principal and an accessory, it is clear that a person may be charged as a principal and convicted as an accomplice or accessory. Whittle v. State (1989) Ind., 542 N.E.2d 981. This very principle, prior to a statutory enactment in 1977, dictated the common law precedent represented by Schmidt v. State (1973) 261 Ind. 81, 300 N.E.2d 86 and other similar cases. The doctrine required consistency in the guilt determinations of principal and accessory. The Schmidt court stated it as follows:

"In this case both petitioner and the principal to the crime were convicted after separate jury trials on the merits. Both were charged and tried for the offense of first degree murder. The underlying crime in the case of the accessory, the petitioner here, was established as murder, while in the case of the principal, it was found to be manslaughter. This is the legally contradictory situation which was considered in Combs [v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 294, 295 N.E.2d 366], and in which we must impose a consistency on the findings of the respective trials.

We therefore...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Sanquenetti v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 14 April 2000
    ...defendants are convicted under this statute. See Johnson, 687 N.E.2d at 349; McKnight, 658 N.E.2d at 561. See also Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ("[T]his rule [of mandated consistency], reflecting logical consistency, was modified by the 1977 legislative enunciation......
  • Snow v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 27 November 2019
    ...a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act." Rainey v. State , 572 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Griffin v. State , 16 N.E.3d 997, 1003-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). [20] The State presented ample circumstantial eviden......
  • Griffin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 11 September 2014
    ...a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act.” Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). While it is true that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to make one an accomplice, the Court may con......
  • Clark v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 4 August 2000
    ...was erroneous.8 It is well established that a person can be charged as a principal and convicted as an accomplice. Rainey v. State (1991) Ind.App., 572 N.E.2d 517, 519. Here, Clark was charged as a principal and convicted under accomplice liability. Clark states that the instruction should ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT