Rains v. Maxwell House Co.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1904
• Parties: RAINS v. MAXWELL HOUSE CO.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

79 S.W. 114

112 Tenn. 219

RAINS v. MAXWELL HOUSE CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 23, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Davidson County; Jno. W. Childress Judge.

Action by A. B. Rains against the Maxwell House Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

James A. Ryan, for appellant.

Chas C. Trabue, for appellee.

WILKES J.

This cause was commenced before a justice of the peace. It was tried before the circuit judge on appeal, on an agreed statement of facts, without the intervention of a jury.

The agreement is in the following words: "In this cause it is agreed and stipulated by and between counsel representing plaintiff and defendant that the following facts are true and that the same are all the material facts involved in the litigation, and that the same may be treated in all respects on the trial of this case as competent and uncontradicted testimony:

"On July 13, 1902, A. B. Rains, the plaintiff in this case, accompanied by his wife and daughter, a young lady, left their home at Columbia, Tenn., and stopped at Nashville, on their way to Bon Aqua Springs for a vacation. The party arrived at Nashville on July 13th, in the evening, and registered as guests at the Maxwell House. The Maxwell House Company, the defendant in this case, is a corporation, chartered under the laws of Tennessee, engaged in a general hotel business.

"The train for Bon Aqua Springs left Nashville at 7 o'clock in the morning, and the party left a call at the office of the defendant company for 5:30 a. m. the next morning.

"Mr. and Mrs. Rains occupied one room, and their daughter, Miss Rains, an adjoining room.

"On retiring, Mr. Rains placed his watch under his pillow, and, awakening at 4:30 o'clock on Monday morning, looked at it to ascertain the time. The bell boy in the employ of defendant company called Mr. Rains at 5:30 a. m., according to instructions. Whereupon Mr. Rains arose and dressed, and went down to the office and settled his bill.

"Before leaving his room he told his wife that he would have a boy sent up for the hand baggage, and that he wound go to the dining room and order breakfast for three, which he did, and his wife and daughter shortly thereafter joined him at the table.

"After the party had been at the table not exceeding 15 minutes, Mr. Rains discovered that he had left his watch in his room. He went to the rotunda railing and called to the office to send the porter up for the watch. Mr. Rains then went back to the dining room, waited a few minutes, looked at the clock, and saw that it was within a few minutes of the time for the departure of his train. He hurriedly returned to his room, and found the porter in the act of looking for his watch. The watch was not found, and has not since been recovered by him. He then went hurriedly down and joined his wife and daughter, and caught a car for the depot. The bell boy who gave Mr. Rains his grips, and who heard the potter talking about it, said: 'I could not have gotten the watch, as your wife was in the room when I got the grips.' This conversation occurred when they were getting on the car. Mrs. Rains and Miss Rains both state that they were not in the room at the time the boy got the grips, but were outside in the hotel passage. The room was unlocked when the porter reached it. Mrs. Rains and Miss Rains had kept the door locked while they were in the room, as all of their valuable jewelry was in their grips. The watch was never returned or found.

"It was a watch without jewels.

"The Maxwell House Company had posted within the room occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Rains, and also in the room occupied by Miss Rains, a conspicuous notice that it had provided a safe and vault, etc., in accordance with the act of 1879, p. 185, c. 145, being section 3593 of Shannon's Compilation of the Laws of Tennessee, which statute is as follows:

"'Whenever the proprietor of any hotel or inn shall provide a safe in the office in such hotel or inn or other convenient place for the safe keeping of any money, jewels or ornaments, belonging to the guests of such hotel or inn, or for any samples of merchandise of any kind carried by drummers or commercial travelers, and shall notify the guests thereof by posting a notice stating the fact that such safe or other convenient place in which money, jewels, ornaments or samples might be deposited, in the room or rooms occupied by such guests in a conspicuous manner, if such guest shall neglect to deposit such money, jewels, ornaments or samples of merchandise in such safe or other convenient place, the proprietor shall not be liable for any loss of such money, jewels, ornaments or samples of merchandise sustained by such guests by theft or otherwise.'

"It is further stipulated and agreed that the value of the watch lost or stolen from Mr. Rains was $100, which was its reasonable market value, and that the fob attached to said watch was reasonably worth $10, its market value, making a total of $110, for which he sues.

"It is agreed that all of the hotel officials and employés testified that they did not take the watch or fob in controversy, and knew nothing about it."

This is all the evidence in the case.

The common law, as well understood, is that an innkeeper is an absolute insurer of the property of his transient guest, and under that rule the hotel company would be liable in this case.

The sole question, therefore, is a proper construction of the act of 1879, p. 185, c. 145, which, under the conditions named in the act, exempts the hotel keeper from liability for any money, jewels, ornaments, or samples of any kind carried by drummers or commercial travelers.

We think it very clear that none of the terms used in the statute embrace a watch, unless it be the term "jewels."

The statute, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed, but at the same time with reference to the evident object and purpose, and only such articles as are named can be considered as coming within its provisions.

In the case of Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N.Y. 539, 3 Am. Rep. 728, it is said: "A watch and chain are not jewels within a statute relieving hotels from liability for loss of money, jewels or ornaments of guests when they have provided a safe for the deposit of such."

The same was held in the case of Berstein v. Sweeny, 33 N.Y. Super. Ct. 276, which quotes with approval Webster's definition of a jewel, as "an ornament of dress in which the precious stones form a principal part."

In the case of Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 77, the court held: "The watch and pen and pencil case are certainly valuable, and perhaps might be called jewels, but I think should be considered a part of the traveler's personal clothing or apparel. The Legislature certainly did not expect the traveler, after retiring, to send down his ordinary clothing or apparel to be deposited in the safe."

It was also held that a reasonable amount of money for traveling expenses and articles for personal use and convenience, though within the terms of the statute, are not within its spirit, and that a guest by retaining such articles in his own possession, instead of depositing them with the innkeeper, does not absolve the innkeeper from his common-law liability. See, also, 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 543.

In the case of Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310, it, was held that a guest was not bound to deposit with the innkeeper for safe-keeping a watch or a sum of money amounting to $90.

Under a Georgia statute which specifies "valuable articles," it was held that a guest cannot be required to deposit a watch of reasonable value worn by him, and a reasonable sum of money had by him for the purpose of paying his traveling expenses. Murchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 207, 47 Am. Rep. 754.

And the court in that case said: "Even if notice had been published to him, according to law, to deposit valuables in another place, it would not apply to traveling money, nor a watch of reasonable amount and value."

In the case of Ramaley v. Leland, supra, the court, construing the words of the statute, which are the same as the words of our statute, said:

"The words of the statute must be taken in their ordinary sense in the absence...