Raintree Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bleimann
| Decision Date | 03 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 572PA94,572PA94 |
| Citation | 463 S.E.2d 72,342 N.C. 159 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | RAINTREE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Karl R. BLEIMANN and wife, Rena Bleimann. |
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 116 N.C.App. 561, 449 S.E.2d 13 (1994), finding no error in a trial that resulted in a judgment for the defendants entered by Webb, J., on 31 March 1993 in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 September 1995.
Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. by John R. Lynch, Jr., and Michael David Bland, Matthews, for plaintiff-appellant.
Donald S. Gillespie, Jr., Charlotte, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff, Raintree Homeowners Association, Inc. (Raintree), makes four arguments on this appeal. In its first argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We agree and hold that defendants' evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to take the case to the jury.
The following facts were undisputed at trial:
Defendants Karl R. Bleimann and Rena Bleimann own a home within North Raintree, a section of a planned unit development known as Raintree. The property is subject to recorded covenants. Plaintiff Raintree owns property within Raintree and has the authority and duty to enforce, through its Architectural Review Committee (ARC), the terms of those covenants.
On or about 23 March 1990, defendants began to replace wood clapboard siding on their home with vinyl siding. On 26 March 1990, the Chairman of the ARC advised defendants to stop the installation because it had to be approved by the ARC pursuant to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (Declaration) signed by defendants when they purchased their home. These covenants require prior written approval by the ARC of the location, plans and specifications of alterations to any building within Raintree and, in order "to provide architectural value to the subdivision," require that, before any structural changes are made, a "site plan, final plans and specifications" must be submitted to and approved in writing by the ARC "as to harmony of exterior design and general quality with the existing standards of the neighborhood and as to location in relation to surrounding structures and topography."
On 26 March 1990, after being reminded of the requirements in the Declaration for approval of the construction on their home, defendants applied to the ARC for approval. Defendants attended an ARC meeting on the same evening and presented evidence in support of their application. The ARC denied defendants' application. Defendants sent a letter requesting that the ARC reconsider their application. The ARC discussed the application again at its meeting on 23 April 1990 and unanimously reaffirmed its prior decision. Defendants attended another ARC meeting on 21 May 1990 and again presented evidence in support of their application and suggested a compromise by which their home would be deemed a "test case" for vinyl siding. The ARC again denied the application.
While their requests for approval were being considered, defendants continued to install vinyl siding on their home. After the ARC's final determination to deny the application, plaintiff sued defendants seeking to enjoin them from placing the vinyl siding on their home and seeking to require them to permanently remove the vinyl siding and restore the house to its original condition. Defendants answered, praying that, among other things, plaintiff's prayers for relief be denied and that defendants be permitted to finish installing the vinyl siding.
At trial, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case was tried before a jury. The issue presented to the jury was whether plaintiff, through its ARC, acted reasonably and in good faith when it denied defendants' application for approval of installation of vinyl siding on defendants' home.
Plaintiff presented evidence that the ARC had made an extensive study of the use of vinyl siding in the subdivision because of a prior application. As a result of this study, the ARC concluded that vinyl siding was not appropriate because the area was "California Contemporary," a rustic style conveyed with houses made of either wood siding or stone. Vinyl siding was different in texture and would neither blend as well with the woody surroundings of North Raintree nor age in the same manner as the wood siding. The ARC concluded that houses with vinyl siding would stay shiny and would stand out, while wood siding would age and blend better with the foliage in the neighborhood. Members of the ARC also visited defendants' house before determining that the vinyl siding was not harmonious with the rest of the neighborhood.
Defendants' evidence consisted of photographs of the house before and after the vinyl siding was installed. They also presented the testimony of several neighbors who stated that the vinyl siding looked just like the wood siding and that they were not unhappy with defendants' house. The contractor also testified that because of defendants' desire to have vinyl siding that closely resembled wood siding, he installed a high-quality siding.
After the close of the evidence, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for directed verdict. The jury found that plaintiff had not acted reasonably and in good faith when it denied the application. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The trial court denied both motions. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment on 31 March 1993 (1) denying plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief and for an order directing defendants to remove the vinyl siding and restore the home to its original condition, and (2) enjoining plaintiff from preventing defendants from completing the installation of vinyl siding on their home. On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals found no error in the trial. We granted plaintiff's petition for discretionary review, and we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In Boiling Spring Lakes v. Coastal Services Corp., 27 N.C.App. 191, 218 S.E.2d 476 (1975), our Court of Appeals held that restrictive covenants that grant broad discretionary power to architectural review committees to approve all construction in subdivisions are enforceable. With regard to the exercise of the power of the architectural review committees, that court stated:
The exercise of the authority to approve the house plans cannot be arbitrary.... [A] restrictive covenant requiring approval of house plans is enforceable only if the exercise of the power in a particular...
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