Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 662 P.2d 534,104 Idaho 662
• Decision Date: 09 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13883,13883
• Parties: Richard RAJSPIC and Grace M. Rajspic, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 534

662 P.2d 534

104 Idaho 662

Richard RAJSPIC and Grace M. Rajspic, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13883.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 9, 1983.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1983.

John W. Barrett, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant.

David A. Frazier, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiffs-respondents.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

On November 27, 1973, William Brownson was shot during an altercation with the plaintiff-respondent Grace M. Rajspic. In a subsequent criminal action against Mrs. Rajspic she was acquitted of assault with a deadly weapon upon the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. Later a civil suit for assault and battery was brought by Brownson against the Rajspics to recover damages including punitive damages. The Rajspics had an insurance policy with the defendant-appellant, Nationwide, and were defended by counsel employed by Nationwide and their own attorney. During that proceeding, a stipulation was entered into by counsel for the parties that Grace M. Rajspic was, in the definition of the law, insane at the time of the shooting. The trial judge in that action instructed the jury that this stipulation removed the issue of punitive damages from the case. A judgment was rendered against the Rajspics in favor of Brownson. The Rajspics were informed by Nationwide that their insurance policy did not cover this judgment, as it fell within a provision excluding liability for intentional torts.

The Rajspics brought suit against Nationwide alleging the exclusionary provision was improperly invoked. Nationwide filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence or testimony of the stipulation in the prior proceedings on the basis that it had not been a party and thus had no opportunity to litigate the issue presented. This motion was denied and Rajspic's motion for partial summary judgment was granted. Collateral estoppel was applied with respect to the issue of Grace M. Rajspic's sanity and the district court granted judgment for the Rajspics on the issue of liability. Nationwide appeals.

I.

Before we determine whether Nationwide is collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of Mrs. Rajspic's sanity, it is necessary that we consider an issue of law inextricably interwoven with that issue. Is a person who is characterized as insane under the law of Idaho capable of forming the intent necessary to commit an intentional tort such as battery or phrased in terms of this case, can the acts of such a person as a matter of law be considered within the intentional acts exclusion of the insurance policy at issue. We believe that it is possible for insane persons to commit intentional acts. Whether Mrs. Rajspic's conduct came within the exclusion policy presents an issue of fact.

Idaho, until recently, had a statute, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 336, § 1, p. 844, which provided that mental illness could be a defense to criminal conduct:

"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. at 850 (emphasis added).

Idaho has no statute which provides that a person suffering from mental disease or defect is not liable for intentional torts. Even if the stipulation in the earlier civil case were to estop Nationwide in this case, summary judgment on this record would as a matter of law be error because the capacity of a person with a mental disease or defect to commit an intentional act is a question of fact not capable of resolution at the pretrial summary judgment phase.

"A lunatic may be capable of having an intent to bring about a specific result, even though the intent is induced by a delusion; and in that respect his acts are to be distinguished from those of an epileptic or a person seized with temporary unconsciousness, which are regarded as involuntary and accidental. If tort liability without fault is to be imposed upon sane persons who make reasonable mistakes, a lunatic who acts under a perpetual mistake, unreasonable in the eyes of the community, may very well be held liable for his intentional torts. It has been recognized, however, that his insanity may be such that he is incapable of entertaining the specific intent necessary for a particular tort ...." Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 135, at 1001 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).

Authorities may be found which support the liability of an insane person for his torts. Mullen v. Bruce, 168 Cal.App.2d 494, 335 P.2d 945 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1959) (factual question whether patient had sufficient capacity to intend violent conduct essential to the commission of the battery); Bolen v. Howard, 452 S.W.2d 401 (Ky.1970); McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass.1937); Van Vooren v. Cook, 273 App.Div. 88, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y.App.Div.1947); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023 (Wash.1918).

In McGuire v. Almy, supra, an insane woman was held liable for assault and battery. The McGuire court stated that:

"Turning to authorities elsewhere, we find that courts in this country almost invariably say in the broadest terms that an insane person is liable for his torts. As a rule no distinction is made between those torts which would ordinarily be classed as intentional and those which would ordinarily be classed as negligent, nor do the courts discuss the effect of different kinds of insanity or of varying degrees of capacity as bearing upon the ability of the defendant to understand the particular act in question or to make a reasoned decision with respect to it, although it is sometimes said that an insane person is not liable for torts requiring malice of which he is incapable." Id. 8 N.E.2d at 762.

Later the McGuire court stated that:

"[W]here an insane person by his act does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage in the same circumstances in which a normal person would be liable. This means that in so far as a particular intent would be necessary in order to render a normal person liable, the insane person, in order to be liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must have entertained it in fact. But the law will not inquire further into his peculiar mental condition with a view to excusing him if it should appear that delusion or other consequence of his affliction has caused him to entertain that intent or that a normal person would not have entertained it." Id. 8 N.E.2d at 763 (emphasis added).

In part the McGuire decision was based upon the earlier Massachusetts case, Dean v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co., 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 96 (1862) (suicide committed by insane person who understood the nature of his act and intended to so act voids a life insurance policy which provides for exclusion if the assured shall die by his own hand). The Dean case concerned a claim for insurance benefits following the death of the insured. We agree with the following statement by the Dean court:

"A person may be insane, entirely incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and without any just sense of moral responsibility, and yet retain sufficient powers of mind and reason to act with premeditation, to understand and contemplate the nature and consequences of his own conduct, and to intend the result which his acts are calculated to produce." Id. at 100.

The act of self-destruction by the insured in the Dean case resulted in no insurance coverage.

Similarly, in the present case insanity under the law would not be dispositive of whether the act committed...