Rakes v. Coleman
Citation | 318 F. Supp. 181 |
Decision Date | 28 September 1970 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 174-70-R. |
Parties | Robert Bryant RAKES v. Bernard S. COLEMAN, etc., et al. |
Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia) |
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Philip J. Hirschkop, Alexandria, Va., for plaintiff.
Tabor Cronk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendants.
Robert Bryant Rakes, proceeding in forma pauperis, attacks herein the practice of Virginia officials, acting under various State statutes, of confining alcoholics for "treatment and rehabilitation." The defendant Coleman is a state circuit judge, sued as representative of state judges committing persons pursuant to Va.Code § 18.1-200.1 (Supp.1970). The defendant Brown is Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions of Virginia; the defendant Cunningham is Director of the Division of Corrections of that department; the defendant Oliver is Superintendent of the Virginia State Farm; the defendant Holton is Governor of Virginia, and Miller is Attorney General of the state.
When the suit was brought, on March 25, 1970, Rakes was confined at the State Farm under the order of Judge Coleman, who committed him pursuant to § 18.1-200.1 on September 22, 1969. Allegedly, Rakes was then in the immediate custody of Oliver. Oliver, along with Brown and Cunningham, were alleged to be responsible under state law for the treatment of Rakes and others committed in similar fashion. Holton and Miller are stated to be the "chief executive officers of the Commonwealth * * * responsible for the implementation of all state statutes."
Rakes sues each defendant "individually and in his official capacity and as a representative of his officers, agents, subordinates, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert with him."
Rakes, himself, sues as representative of the class of persons "who have been committed to the Department of Welfare and Institutions and/or who have been incarcerated in a regular penal institution under the color of § 18.1-200.1 or § 18.1-202."
The relief sought is as follows:
1. A declaratory judgment that the application of § 18.1-200.1 and § 18.1-202 violate due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, at least where rehabilitation for alcoholism is not provided and individuals are merely committed to regular penal institutions, and where courts activate the unserved portions of commitment terms when individuals reappear on charges of public drunkenness.
2. Mandatory injunctive relief requiring the defendant to provide effective rehabilitative facilities.
3. An injunction against the further incarceration of individuals pursuant to § 18.1-200.1 and § 18.1-202 until such facilities are provided.
4. An injunction against the enforcement of § 18.1-237 for the reason that it prescribes a penalty for the crime of chronic alcoholism, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
5. A declaration, and injunctive relief consistent therewith, that the seventy-hour work week required of the plaintiff while incarcerated is a form of involuntary servitude.
The relevant state statutes are as follows:
Rakes alleges that he has been a chronic alcoholic for many years and has been arrested seventy-five times for public drunkenness. He was first committed under § 18.1-200.1 in April of 1967, by the Municipal Court of Fredericksburg. Twice released after some months, the same court twice recommitted him, after Rakes was charged with public drunkenness, pursuant to § 18.1-202. After the second recommitment, he was released by court order after serving four months. (It is not alleged whether the earlier releases were pursuant to order of court or of that of the Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions.) Recommitment soon followed, again by the Fredericksburg Municipal Court, when Rakes was found to have been drunk in public. An appeal was taken, and the Circuit Court imposed a new indefinite term. "There appears," the complaint alleges, "to be a pattern of abuse of § 18.1-200.1 by the Fredericksburg judges to keep plaintiff under the three months to three year sentence at all times * *"
While incarcerated, Rakes alleges, he lives among ordinary convict prisoners and receives no rehabilitative treatment particularly related to his alcoholism. Nor does confinement have any curative effect upon his alcoholism.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 12(b) (6), 28 U.S. C. They state that no actual controversy exists between Rakes and the defendants Holton, Miller and Coleman, and that in essence the suit is without merit because it seeks to compel the expenditure of general state funds. Moreover, it is contended, Rakes has an available remedy by means of a state habeas corpus action, pending at the time the motion to dismiss was filed. Further objection is made to the plaintiff's alleged representative status.
On April 24, 1970, the defendants filed an amendment to their motion to dismiss, wherein they suggest that the case has become moot for the reason that Rakes was that day released by order of the defendant, Coleman, in the Fredericksburg Circuit Court on April 15, 1970. The order, also filed, is apparently one of unconditional release.2
The Court has heard argument, and both sides have submitted memoranda on the defendants' motions. The Court will confine its consideration at this point to the grounds for dismissal urged by the defendants. In addition, the Court is bound to consider the preliminary question of its jurisdiction to entertain the case without convening a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 et seq.
The question of the need for a three-judge court must be explored with reference to each individual item of relief sought. The statutory court must be convened when these requisites are met:
The function of a single judge is restricted:
When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962).
Dismissal of a claim by a single judge is proper when the constitutional question appears "insubstantial" or when a basis for equitable relief seems lacking.
Insubstantiality...
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