Raleigh & C.R. Co. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 08 March 1916 |
| Docket Number | 9318. |
| Citation | 88 S.E. 896,104 S.C. 332 |
| Parties | RALEIGH & C. R. CO. v. JONES ET AL. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
April 13, 1916.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marion County; J. W. De Vose, Judge.
Action by the Raleigh & Charleston Railroad Company against P. F Jones and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
L. D Lide and H. S. McCandlish, both of Marion, for appellants.
M. C. Woods, of Marion, for respondent.
This is an action to recover possession of a small parcel of land, in the town of Marion, over which, it is alleged, the plaintiff has a right of way. It appears from the record that W. J. Montgomery, who formerly owned the land in dispute, executed a deed of conveyance thereof to T. C. McNeely, who thereafter, to wit, on the 5th of May, 1902, conveyed to the Carolina Northern Railroad Company an easement in said land 100 feet wide--50 feet from the center of the track on each side--and an additional 100 feet on the west side, where the land in dispute lies. The said deed was recorded on the same day it was executed. By successive conveyances, which were duly recorded, the property of the Carolina Northern Railroad Company became vested in the plaintiff. After T. C. McNeely had conveyed the easement to Carolina Northern Railroad Company, he also made a conveyance of his remaining interest in said property to Mrs. Fannie McNeely, who, in turn, conveyed to the defendants. There is no question that the plaintiff is entitled to the land unless it is estopped by its conduct. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for the possession of the land, and the defendants appealed upon exceptions, the first of which is as follows:
"Because his honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in refusing to allow the defendants' witness P. F. Jones to testify as to the worth of the buildings placed upon the lands in question by the defendants, or as to the cost thereof, and in holding that the character of the said improvements was not relevant, in that such testimony was strongly relevant and competent on the defense of the estoppel, on which the defendants relied, to wit, that plaintiff stood by and allowed them to make valuable improvements on the land in question, the defendants believing in good faith that they had title thereto, the refusal to permit such testimony being highly prejudicial to the defendants, because the same would have naturally tended to support their said defense, and because this testimony was unquestionably the only way the defendants could give the jury an adequate and fair idea of the nature of the improvements, which was the very essence of their defense of estoppel, and without this testimony the jury could not have properly considered said defense."
The record shows that this question arose as follows:
The improvements consisted of an office, boiler house, and mill house. In order to sustain the defense of estoppel, it was incumbent on the defendants to show that they made the improvements bona fide, and under the belief that the land belonged to them. Not only is the nature of the improvements important in determining whether they were made in good faith, but the amount expended in erecting them likewise throws light upon such a question. If a person expends a large sum in improvements, such fact more naturally tends to show good faith than would arise from the expenditure of an insignificant sum. This exception is sustained.
The second exception is as follows:
"Because his honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in allowing M. C. Woods, Esq., to testify in behalf of plaintiff, over defendants' objection, to privileged communications made to him by the defendant P. F. Jones, in regard to the purchase of land covered by defendants' deed, such privileged communications being, in effect, that he owned the ginhouse on the land that he understood belonged to Miss Fannie McNeely, and that he understood some mortgages on the land were about to be foreclosed, and that he was greatly worried about it, in that the evidence shows that the relation of attorney and client existed between Mr. Woods and defendants, with reference to the purchase of and procuring of a deed for this land, and such communications were privileged; and his honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in holding that if a lawyer wants to state the confidential communications of a client, he can do so, and that he is the only one that can take advantage of keeping silence, in that the rule of law is the reverse of that stated by his honor."
There was testimony to the effect that the defendant Jones bought a ginhouse on the land in dispute before he received the title from Miss Fannie McNeely; that he went to see J. M. Turner about the title to the land upon which the ginhouse was situated; that Turner referred him to M. C. Woods, Esq., who was Turner's attorney and was then foreclosing a mortgage on the property then owned by Miss Fannie McNeely; that Jones employed M. C. Woods, Esq., as his attorney, to negotiate the purchase of the land for him, free from all incumbrances; that when Jones was on the stand as a witness, he was cross-examined by the plaintiff's attorney as to the transactions and communications between him and his attorney, for the purpose of showing that he then had notice of the plaintiff's right of way. Jones did not object to answering the questions propounded to him. Afterwards, when M. C. Woods, Esq., took the stand as a witness for the plaintiff, and commenced to testify as to what took place between him and his client, for the purpose of showing that he then informed Jones that the plaintiff's right of way covered the land in dispute, the defendants' attorneys objectedon the ground that the communications between attorney and client are privileged and cannot be disclosed by his attorney. In the case of Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 N.Y. & K. 102, 103, Lord Ch. Brougham uses the following language, which is quoted with approval in Greenleaf on Evidence,§ 237:
" If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they [attorneys] receive a communication in their professional capacity, either from a client or on his account and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper in the course of employment on his behalf matters which they know through their professional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers in any court of law or equity, either as party or as witness."
See, also, 40 Cyc. 2361.
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... ... decide that question. Safren v. Meyer, 103 S.C. 356, ... 88 S.E. 3; Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Jones ... ...