Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co.

Decision Date14 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–6080.,10–6080.
Citation642 F.3d 1271,79 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1399
PartiesMisty RALEY, individually and as parent and next friend of C.G., W.G., and C.A.G., minor children, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., a Korean corporation; and Hyundai Motor America, a California corporation, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John M. Merritt, Merritt & Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for PlaintiffAppellant.Gene C. Schaerr, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C. (Jacob R. Loshin, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C.; James A. Jennings, Linda Kaufmann and Derrick Teague, Jennings, Cook & Teague, Oklahoma City, OK; and Thomas N. Vanderford, Jr., Hyundai Motor America, Fountain Valley, CA, with him on the brief), for DefendantsAppellees.Before LUCERO, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

Can you appeal a final judgment rendered against someone else? Especially when you aren't a named party to the lawsuit and voluntarily left the case long ago? At least generally, and specifically in this case, the answer is no.

Misty Raley brought this lawsuit against Hyundai alleging that a car it manufactured was defectively designed and responsible for injuries she suffered in an accident. But before trial began, Ms. Raley filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(c) asking the district court to substitute BancFirst in her place as “the real party in interest” and sole plaintiff in the case. Aplt.App. Vol. 5 at 1513. Ms. Raley explained that a state probate court had appointed BancFirst to serve as guardian for her and her minor children. In light of this development, she represented, all “interest” in the lawsuit had been “transferred” to the bank, to the exclusion of herself and her children. Aplt.App. Vol. 5 at 1514.

Hyundai disputed this. The company argued that substitution under Rule 25(c) would be improper because Ms. Raley, not the bank, remained the real party in interest in the lawsuit. The company argued, as well, that any substitution should take place only pursuant to Rule 25(b), not Rule 25(c)—though, the company stressed, Ms. Raley hadn't sought relief under Rule 25(b) or demonstrated the sort of incompetency necessary to invoke it. In the end, the district court overruled Hyundai's objections, granted Ms. Raley's motion, and substituted BancFirst as the party-plaintiff in place of Ms. Raley, both in her individual capacity and as the representative of her children.

After a lengthy jury trial, Hyundai prevailed. But when entering judgment on Hyundai's behalf, the district court mistakenly identified Misty Raley, not BancFirst, as the losing party-plaintiff. Adding to the confusion, Ms. Raley then proceeded to file a notice of appeal, listing herself—but not BancFirst—as the plaintiff-appellant seeking to undo the judgment. For its part, BancFirst did not file a notice of appeal.

Not long after the appeal was docketed, the district court noticed its clerical error. After obtaining leave pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) & 62.1, the district court issued an amended judgment identifying BancFirst, not Ms. Raley, as the only party-plaintiff to its judgment. In response, Ms. Raley filed another notice of appeal, this time seeking to contest the district court's Rule 60(a) ruling and the amended judgment. Again, she listed herself, not BancFirst, as the only plaintiff-appellant in the case. Again, BancFirst filed nothing.

It is this that poses a problem. Generally speaking, only named parties to a lawsuit in the district court may appeal an adverse final judgment. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 2230, 2234–35, 173 L.Ed.2d 1255 (2009); Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988) (per curiam); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77, 108 S.Ct. 388, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987); United States ex rel. Louisiana v. Boarman, 244 U.S. 397, 402, 37 S.Ct. 605, 61 L.Ed. 1222 (1917); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir.2008). After all, it is usually only parties who are sufficiently aggrieved by a district court's decision that they possess Article III and prudential standing to be able to pursue an appeal of it. See West v. Radio–Keith–Orpheum Corp., 70 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir.1934) (Learned Hand, J.) ([I]f not a party, the putative appellant is not concluded by the decree, and is not therefore aggrieved by it.”); Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir.2011) ([T]o have standing on appeal, one must be aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken.” (internal alterations and quotation omitted)).

Problem is, we have no appeal from a named party in this case. The only named party-plaintiff in the lawsuit after the district court granted Ms. Raley's substitution motion was and is BancFirst. Yet, the bank has not filed a notice of appeal. And this presents a particular difficulty because of Rules 3(c) and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 3(c) says that a notice of appeal “must ... specify the party or parties taking the appeal.” Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(A). And Rule 4 states that a complaint notice “must be filed” in most civil cases like this one within 30 days after judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Both of these rules are “mandatory” in nature and, taken together, form a “single jurisdictional threshold” to appellate review. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988); see also Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765, 121 S.Ct. 1801, 149 L.Ed.2d 983 (2001); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 116, 122 S.Ct. 1145, 152 L.Ed.2d 188 (2002). And the threshold, simply put, is this: the [f]ailure to name the proper party taking the appeal,” within the time allotted by Rule 4, can and “will result in the dismissal of an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.” Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir.1991).

Of course, the rules of contemporary civil litigation are replete with exceptions, perhaps too many exceptions—and this rule itself is no exception. Those who are the subject of civil contempt orders, sanctioned attorneys, class members who object to a judgment settling their rights—among others—may sometimes be parties to an appeal even though they were not named parties in the district court litigation. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002); U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76, 108 S.Ct. 2268, 101 L.Ed.2d 69 (1988); Hinckley v. Gilman, Clinton & Springfield R.R., 94 U.S. 467, 469, 24 L.Ed. 166 (1876); Blossom v. the Milwaukee & C., R.R., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 655, 656, 17 L.Ed. 673 (1863); In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th Cir.1988); Dietrich Corp. v. King Res. Co., 596 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir.1979); Plain v. Murphy Family Farms, 296 F.3d 975, 979–81 (10th Cir.2002). Like named parties, these individuals possess Article III standing in the sense that they have been injured by a district court ruling and a favorable decision on appeal would ameliorate that injury. They also possess prudential standing; they do because they don't seek to pursue another person's legal rights, litigate a mere generalized grievance, or raise a challenge falling outside the zone of interests protected by the law involved. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7, 122 S.Ct. 2005. And of particular note, the individuals in each of these situations (1) personally appeared in district court; (2) suffered a real and concrete injury as a result of a district court ruling that is entitled to preclusive effect; and (3) possess interests that would not, on appeal, be adequately represented by the named parties to the district court lawsuit. See, e.g., Devlin, 536 U.S. at 7–9, 122 S.Ct. 2005; Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 807 F.2d 879, 880–81 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam); Dietrich, 596 F.2d at 424; West, 70 F.2d at 624; see also Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full–Fledged Parties, 39 Ga. L.Rev. 411 (2005).

In light of this, the question naturally arises whether Ms. Raley might be allowed to proceed as a party to this appeal even though she was, by the time the district court rendered its rulings, no longer a named party to the district court proceedings. But while the question naturally arises, it isn't one Ms. Raley has sought to answer. She makes no mention of this possibility in her opening or reply brief. Curious still about the question, we drew the parties' attention to it at oral argument. In response, Hyundai filed a Rule 28(j) letter attempting to address our inquiry. But Ms. Raley had nothing to say on the subject at oral argument or later.

Where an appellant fails to lead, we have no duty to follow. It is the appellant's burden, not ours, to conjure up possible theories to invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal. Neither are we comfortable guessing for ourselves, without her help, what the answer might be to the complex question whether and when a substituted and now former party to the district court proceedings is eligible to appear as a party to an appeal. Accordingly, we leave all that for another case another day. See United States v. Ceballos–Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir.2004) ([T]he party claiming appellate jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing our subject-matter jurisdiction.”); see also United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1518 n. 2 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that arguments in support of jurisdiction may be waived like any other contention).

In this case, we will focus on, and limit our attention to, the three arguments that Ms. Raley has chosen to pursue in an effort to sustain her appeal.

First and primarily, she tries a factual angle. She urges us to read the district court's Rule 25(c) substitution order as permitting her to remain a named party to the district court...

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