Raley v. State, 95-2070

• Citation: 675 So.2d 170
• Decision Date: 10 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2070,95-2070
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1125 Wayne E. RALEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 170

675 So.2d 170

21 Fla. L. Weekly D1125

Wayne E. RALEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 95-2070.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fifth District.

May 10, 1996.

Rehearing Denied June 18, 1996.

Wayne Edgar Raley, Daytona Beach, pro se.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

ANTOON, Judge.

Wayne E. Raley is serving a prison term in Tomoka Correctional Institution for the crime of sexual battery. He appeals the trial court's order summarily denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that he should be released immediately because he is serving an illegal sentence. We affirm in part, and vacate in part.

In his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Raley alleged that his sentence is illegal because (1) the trial court failed to give him an opportunity to be sentenced under the new sentencing guidelines; (2) the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over his guidelines sentence; (3) the trial court improperly calculated his sentencing guidelines scoresheet; (4) the trial court improperly imposed a departure sentence; (5) the trial court failed to issue a written sentencing order that conformed with the court's oral findings; and, (6) the trial court failed to make proper findings in accordance with the Florida Statutes pertaining to "mentally disordered sex offenders."

In denying the writ, the trial court set forth two reasons to support its ruling: (1) The Orange County circuit court lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant habeas corpus relief because he was incarcerated in Volusia County; and (2) Mr. Raley's claims concerning the legality of his sentence were not cognizable for post-conviction relief because the issues had already been addressed and rejected in prior rules 3.850 ¹ and 3.800(a) ² proceedings.

The trial court was correct that habeas corpus relief is not available in Orange County since Mr. Raley is incarcerated in Volusia County. Section 79.09, Florida Statutes (1993), requires that petitions for habeas corpus be filed with the clerk of the court in the county where the defendant is detained. Thus, Mr. Raley should have pursued habeas corpus relief in Volusia County where he is detained and where the writ, if issued, would have been executed. Campbell v. Florida Parole Commission, 630 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accord Newman v. Hornsby, 385 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The trial court properly recognized that it lacked authority to rule upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner detained outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. Savage v. State, 662 So.2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

Even though habeas corpus relief was not available, the trial court could have considered Mr. Raley's petition to be a request for relief under rule 3.800(a). This is so because our courts are duty bound to correct an illegal sentence whenever presented with a motion indicating that the sentence is truly illegal. ³ Judge Cowart aptly described this responsibility as follows:

All persons in prison under a sentence for the commission of a crime are there because the judicial system declared they did not follow and obey the law but, to the contrary, they did an illegal act. Certainly in imposing the sanctions of the law upon a defendant for illegal conduct the judicial system itself must follow and obey the law and not impose an illegal sentence, and, when one is discovered, the system should willingly remedy it. The purpose of all criminal justice rules, practices and procedures is to secure the just determination of every case in accordance with the substantive law. While imperfect, our criminal justice system must provide remedy to one in confinement under an illegal sentence. There is no better objective than to seek to do justice to an imprisoned person.

Hayes v. State, 598 So.2d 135, 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The promulgation of rule 3.800(a) has enabled our courts to effectuate this responsibility.

The crux of the problem though has been outlining the scope of relief authorized under the rule, and defining what is meant by the term "illegal sentence." In recent years there have been numerous efforts made to answer this question. Our court has decided to adopt the second district's interpretation of the limited nature of rule 3.800(a) proceedings:

Rule 3.800 is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law. It is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to impose the punishment comported with statutory law and due process. Unlike a motion pursuant to rule 3.850, the motion can be filed without an oath because it is designed to test issues that should not involve significant questions of fact or require a lengthy evidentiary hearing.

Judge v. State, 596 So.2d 73, 76-77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 5 (Fla.1992).

The test often used to determine whether a defendant is entitled to rule 3.800(a) relief is whether the trial court could rule on the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. While this test still applies, the recent decisions in State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla.1995), and Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995), appear to further narrow the scope of relief available under this rule. In Callaway, our supreme court, citing Judge, explained that there are three distinct categories of sentencing errors:

(1) An erroneous sentencing error which is cognizable upon direct appeal;

(2) An unlawful sentence which is correctable only after an evidentiary hearing under 3.850; and

(3) An illegal sentence which must be corrected as a matter of law in rule 3.800(a) proceeding.

Callaway, 658 So.2d at 988. Then, in Davis, the court stated that illegal sentences are those sentences which exceed the maximum sentences provided by law without regard to the sentencing guidelines. In other words, "an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines ..." and "[o]nly if a sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law would the sentence be illegal." Davis, 661 So.2d at 1196.

Importantly, our courts are authorized to review a defendant's request for relief from an illegal sentence even though consideration of such a rule 3.800(a) motion would be successive to the consideration of the defendant's previously asserted claims for post-conviction relief because rule 3.800(a) specifically authorizes trial courts to correct an illegal sentence or scoresheet error "at any time." Florida courts have consistently ruled that, unlike rule 3.850 proceedings, there is no bar to successive rule 3.800(a) proceedings because the rule exists for the purpose of addressing illegal sentences. See Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla.1995); Hayes v. State, 598 So.2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). For example, in Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994), Bedford was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to the death penalty for the murder and a term of life in prison without eligibility for parole for the kidnapping. On direct appeal, the supreme court vacated Bedford's death penalty sentence but affirmed his life sentence. Bedford subsequently challenged his life sentence, seeking relief under rule 3.800(a) by asserting that the kidnapping sentence was illegal because it exceeded the maximum sentence provided by law to the extent it barred eligibility for parole. The trial court denied the motion and the district court affirmed, reasoning that the law of the case doctrine precluded Bedford from challenging his kidnapping sentence because the sentence had been affirmed by the supreme court on direct appeal. ⁴ However, the supreme court reversed, concluding that it was improper to deny rule 3.800(a) relief on the basis that Bedford's sentence had been affirmed on direct appeal since the issue of the legality of the kidnapping sentence had not been raised or adjudicated. Id. at 14:

Does this mean that the law of the case doctrine has no application in disposing of rule 3.800(a) claims for relief? We do not think so. In our view, the law of the case doctrine is viable in those post-conviction proceedings wherein a defendant requests review of a specific claim of error which has been already raised and decided by an appellate court. For example, a defendant is not permitted to re-litigate in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding a claim of error which was raised and rejected on direct appeal. Pula v. State, 652 So.2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); White v. State, 651 So.2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), approved, 666 So.2d 895 (Fla.1996). Likewise, a defendant is not entitled to successive review of a specific issue decided against him in an earlier post-conviction proceeding, even if the question pertains to the legality of his sentence. Burns v. State, 637 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). To conclude otherwise would subject our courts to unrestrained barrages of successive motions filed by defendants claiming relief from illegal sentences.

Applying this law to the facts of the instant case, the first question necessarily becomes whether any of Mr. Raley's claims are barred by the law of the case doctrine. Our court is very familiar with Mr. Raley's sentence since this is his fifth appeal. Review of our court records reveals that in Raley v. State, 471 So.2d 57 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), Mr. Raley filed a direct appeal challenging his departure sentence which was affirmed. Three years later, he filed an appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion for rule 3.850 relief. The appeal was dismissed, however, for failure to perfect the appeal. In 1989, we again received an appeal from the denial...