Raley v. Umatilla County

• Decision Date: 10 May 1887
• Parties: RALEY and another v. UMATILLA CO.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

13 P. 890

15 Or. 172

RALEY and another v. UMATILLA CO.

Supreme Court of Oregon

May 10, 1887

May 24 1887.

Appeal from Umatilla county.

W.M Ramsey, for appellants.

L.B Cox, for respondent.

STRAHAN J.

The object of this suit is to quiet plaintiffs' title to "College Block," being block No. 12, in the town of Pendleton, Umatilla county, Oregon. The defendant demurred to the plaintiffs' amended complaint, and to each of the alleged causes of suit therein, which demurrer was sustained by the court, and the suit dismissed, from which decree this appeal is taken. The plaintiffs state the interest which they claim in said real property, and then allege the defendant's title, so that on the complaint the main facts relied upon by the respective parties are before us. It appears from the complaint that on and prior to the fifth day of December, 1868, Moses E. Goodwin was the owner in fee of the real property in controversy, and on that day he, with the plaintiff A.M. Raley, who was then his wife, executed and delivered to the defendant a deed, whereby, in consideration of one dollar to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which sum was thereby acknowledged, they granted, bargained sold, and delivered unto the said party of the second part, said Umatilla county, the real property in controversy. The habendum clause of said deed is as follows: "To have and to hold the said block of ground, with all the appurtenances thereunto belonging, unto the said party of the second part forever; and said parties of the first part do hereby covenant and agree with said party of the second part that they are the true owners of said premises in fee-simple at the ensealing of these presents, and that they will warrant and defend the same against all claims whatsoever to the use and benefit of the parties of the second part for the special use, and none other, of educational purposes, and upon which block shall be erected a college or institution of learning, free from all sectional or political influence." It further appears from the complaint that the plaintiffs have succeeded to all the estate or interest of said Moses E. Goodwin in said property, if any, by inheritance, three-fourths thereof to said Olive I. and one-fourth to said Aura M.; and said Aura M. also claims dower in said property. It also appears from the complaint that, before the commencement of this suit, the plaintiffs entered into the possession of said property as for condition broken, and are now in the possession thereof.

1. Upon the argument, appellants' counsel insisted that Umatilla county had no power or capacity to take title to the property in controversy, or to receive said deed, and that, therefore, plaintiffs' title was unaffected by reason of the attempted execution and delivery of the same. This is the first question demanding our attention, for the reason that, if this objection is well taken, it renders the consideration of others unnecessary. By the statute of this state relating to the corporate power and capacity of the several counties therein, it is provided "that each county shall continue to be a body politic and corporate for the following purposes, to-wit: To sue and be sued; to purchase and hold for the use of the county lands lying within its own limits, and any personal estate; to make all necessary contracts; and to do all other necessary acts in relation to the property and concerns of the county." Gen.Laws, 535, § 1. Also, by sections 346 and 347, counties are classed as public corporations. They are public, for the reason they are designed as agencies in the administration of civil government, and they possess and can exercise such powers as have been conferred upon them by the legislature, and none others. By the terms of the section above quoted a county may purchase and hold, for the use of the county, lands lying within its own limits. Counsel for the appellants claim that the terms "for the use of the county" are to be taken as a limitation upon the power of the county to take, and that, therefore, unless it plainly appears that the deed is taken for some purpose or object which the legislature had previously pointed out or authorized by some act, the grant is a nullity, and confers no title. I doubt the correctness of this construction. It is harsh, and in many instances, if rigidly applied, might tend to defeat the very object of the legislature in the creation of such corporations. While the subject is not entirely free from difficulty, and it is conceded there is a conflict of authorities on the subject, still the later and better view is that both counties and cities may take land, by purchase, gift, or devise, under charters and statutes of the same legal import as our own.

Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, fully sustains such a conveyance. Under the statute of that state all corporations had power "to hold, purchase, and convey such real estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter." It was further provided in said act that "no corporation shall possess or exercise any corporate powers except such as shall be necessary to the exercise of the powers so enumerated and given." By the charter of the city of St. Louis the city was authorized to "purchase, receive, and hold property, real and personal, within said city, and pay, call, lease, or dispose of the same for the benefit of the city, and may purchase, receive, and hold property, real and personal, beyond the limits of the city, to be used for the burial of the dead of the city; also for the erection of water-works to supply the city with water; and also for the establishment of a hospital for the reception of persons infected with contagious and other diseases; also for poor-house, work-house, or house of correction; and may sell, lease, or dispose of such property for the benefit of the city." The statute was silent on the subject of devises. Under these provisions of the charter, Bryan Mullanphy made his will whereby he bequeathed "one equal undivided one-third of all my property, real, personal, and mixed, I leave to the city of St. Louis, in the state of Missouri, in trust to be and constitute a fund to furnish relief to all poor emigrants and travelers coming to St. Louis on their way bona fide to settle in the west." Much of the real property bequeathed was beyond the limits of the city, and it was not claimed that it was intended or could be used for any of the purposes contemplated by the charter, but the title of the city under the will was sustained. The court said: "There being a right in the city to purchase, if there is a capacity in the vendor to convey, so soon as the conveyance is made there is a complete sale; and if the corporation, in purchasing, violates or abuses the power to do so, that is no concern of the vendor or his heirs. It is a matter between the state and the city. The law is only directory in relation to a corporation taking lands. It imposes no penalty, nor does it in terms avoid the conveyance. Nowhere is a corporation in express terms prohibited from taking and holding lands. The city is duly incorporated, with authority to hold, purchase, and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require; and if, in holding and purchasing real estate, she passes the exact line of her power, it belongs to the government of the state to exact a forfeiture of her charter; and it is not for the courts in a collateral way to determine the question of misuser by declaring void conveyances made in good faith. In this view of the subject, we are fully sustained by the authorities. Baird v. Bank of Washington, 11 Serg. & R. 418; Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. 136; Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & R. 319; Ang. Corp. § 152; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns.Ch. 370." And the same case fully sustains the power of the city to execute the trust created by the will.

So in Craig v. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419, it was held that a county had the legal capacity to take a devise of the property of a testator as a permanent fund, the income of which was to be used in educating a specified class of the children of such county. In disposing of this branch of the case the court said: "It is further insisted by appellant's counsel that the will in this case is void for the reason that the trustee named therein is incapable in law to accept the trust created in and by said will. It is provided, by the fifth section of the act under which the devisee in this will may be said to be incorporated, that such corporations 'may prosecute and defend suits, and have all the duties, rights, and powers incident to corporations not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.' 1 Rev.St. 1876, p. 350. In 1 Perry, Trusts p. 30, § 42, it is said 'that at the present day corporations of every description may take and hold estates as trustees for purposes not foreign to their own existence.' And in section 43 the same writer says: 'But if the trusts are within the general scope of the purposes of the institution or the corporation, or if they are collateral to its general purposes, but germane to them, as if the trusts relate to matters which will promote and aid the general purposes of the corporation, it may take and hold and be compelled to execute them, if it accepts them. Thus towns, cities, and parishes may take and hold property in trust for the establishment of colleges, for the purpose of educating the poor, *** and for the support of schools.' The text of this writer is abundantly supported by the authorities he cites. Certainly, the purposes of the trust created by the will now being considered are not foreign to nor inconsistent with the general purposes for...