Raley v. Williams
| Decision Date | 23 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-2652-JAM-CMK,2:14-cv-2652-JAM-CMK |
| Parties | STEPHEN B. RALEY, Plaintiff, v. BOB WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and defendant filed a reply. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on June 6, 2018, before the undersigned in Redding, California. Plaintiff appeared pro se; Attorney Jonz Norine appeared on behalf of defendants.
Plaintiff filed this action against Tehama County officials, including the Board of Supervisors, each named individually as well as the Board itself, the County Counsel of Tehama County, the County Administrator, the Director of the Department of Environmental Health, the County Sheriff, an Enforcement Officer, the County Clerk, and the Code Enforcement Coordinator. The allegations in the complaint are difficult to decipher, but it appears plaintiff is a medical marijuana user who was growing marijuana plants on his property. The County enforcement officer cited plaintiff for growing too many plants, without proper fencing, and too close to the property line. Plaintiff was issued a notice to abate, as he was in violation of the County ordinance regulating marijuana grows. Plaintiff appealed the notice, and received a hearing before the Board of Supervisors. He was then fined for untimely abatement.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated in regards to the notice of abatement and hearing procedures; his Equal Protection rights were violated as he was singled out for enforcement; the County ordinance is unlawful, unreasonable, and discriminatory; the excessive fines he was assessed were cruel and unusual punishment; his right to privacy was invaded by the enforcement officer trespassing on his property; the violation notice violated ex post facto laws because he was growing before the County passed the ordinance; he was deprived of his medication; and there were procedural violation as the appeal was heard by the Board of Supervisors.
Defendants brings this motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiffs fail to state a claim. Alternatively, defendants moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5).
Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the complaint is sufficient to state a due process violation, as well as other violations.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). "Although a pro se litigant ... may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes his pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong." Brazil v. United States Dept of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity noparty questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).
Finally, leave to amend must be granted "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Prior to addressing the merits of the motion, the request for judicial notice should be addressed. As stated above, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider documents of which the court take judicial notice. Defendant has filed two requests for the court take judicial notice of different documents (Docs. 8-1, 14-1). The first request, filed with the motion to dismiss, asks the court to take judicial notice of the Tehama County Code regarding marijuana cultivation, the Notice to Abate issued to plaintiff, plaintiff's demand for appeal of notice to abate, plaintiff's claim for damages, the County's notice of rejection of claim for damages, the notice of hearing, the notice to abate unlawful marijuana cultivation appeal narrative, the Tehama County Board of Supervisors Resolution, the notice of fines due, and the code enforcement account invoice. The second request, filed with defendants' reply brief, asks the court to take judicial notice of the certified transcript of the Tehama County Board of Supervisors, dated May 20, 2014.
The court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008).
A majority of the documents defendants want the court to take judicial notice are documents which are referred to in the complaint, or are documents upon which the complaint relies, whose authenticity is not questioned. Other documents, including the Tehama CountyCode regarding marijuana cultivation, and the transcript of the Board of Supervisor's hearing, are matters of public record. However, the court does not find the documents necessary to address the motion to dismiss.
Defendants argue the court should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to prosecute.
The federal basis of plaintiff's complaint appears to be a denial of due process and equal protection. The remaining possible claims appear to be state law claims, but those are somewhat unclear. The defendants focus on the state law issues raised in the complaint, and fail to adequately address the federal issues. In essence, the defendants contend plaintiff failed to follow the proper procedure for challenging the Board of Supervisor's decision. They argue the exclusive remedy plaintiff has for such a challenge is an administrative writ. Similarly, they argue plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act. However, plaintiff raises due process violations as well as equal protection claims, which would not be thwarted by the defects the defendants raise. As those are lesser arguments, which only relate to the court's pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim, those are addressed later. First, it is more important to address the federal claims, violation of the 14th Amendment Due Process rights, and Equal Protection.
Although plaintiff's contentions are not stated succinctly and clearly, reading the complaint broadly as the court must, he alleges his due process rights were violated throughout the abatement process. Essentially, he alleges the Board of Supervisors relied upon a report by Enforcement Officer Rulofson, which contained false information. He also contends he was not given adequate notice as he was provided a copy of the report by Rulofson five minutes before the hearing.
"The Fourteenth Amendment places procedural constraints on the actions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the stature of 'property' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light Gas & Water Div. v....
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