Ralph's Chrysler-Plymouth v. New Car Dealers Policy & Appeals Bd.

• Citation: 8 Cal.3d 792,106 Cal.Rptr. 169,505 P.2d 1009
• Decision Date: 07 February 1973
• Docket Number: P,CHRYSLER-PLYMOUT
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 505 P.2d 1009 RALPH'Slaintiff and Respondent, v. NEW CAR DEALERS POLICY AND APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 30060. In Bank

Page 169

106 Cal.Rptr. 169

8 Cal.3d 792, 505 P.2d 1009

RALPH'S CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NEW CAR DEALERS POLICY AND APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 30060.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 7, 1973.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Mark Leicester and Mark A. Levin, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and appellant.

Linder, Schurmer, Drane & Bullis, and Scott Schurmer, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

BY THE COURT.

New Car Dealers Policy and Appeals Board appeals from a judgment awarding costs to Ralph's Chrysler-Plymouth (hereinafter referred to as Ralph's) for preparation of the record accompanying a petition for a writ of mandamus.

An accusation against Ralph's, the subject of which is not here material, was filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles and a hearing was held before a hearing officer to determine the merits of the accusation. The officer's proposed decision was adopted by the department.

Pursuant to Vehicle Code section 3052, subdivision (c), Ralph's appealed the department's decision to the board. Ralph's accompanied the appeal with evidence indicating that it had made application for preparation of the administrative record of the department and had advanced the necessary costs.

At the hearing before the board no additional evidence or testimony was taken. The board based its findings entirely upon the record supplied and paid for by Ralph's, and rendered a decision against Ralph's.

Primarily urging irregularities reflected in the transcript of the original hearing before the Department of Motor Vehicles, Ralph's petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a writ of mandamus. The writ was granted, and the trial court allowed recovery of the costs incurred in petitioning for the wirt, including the costs of preparing the transcript.

At the outset it seems clear that before appealing to the superior court, Ralph's was first required to appeal the department's adverse decision to the board. It is a well-recognized rule that if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and such remedy exhausted before relief can be had under section 1094.5, subdivision (a), of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs For The Blind, 67 Cal.2d 536, 543, 63 Cal.Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717; Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 55 Cal.2d 736, 746--747, 13 Cal.Rptr. 201, 361 P.2d 921; Temescal Water Co. v. Dept. Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 106, 280 P.2d 1; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 292, 109 P.2d 942; Muir v. Steinberg, 197 Cal.App.2d 264, 269, 17 Cal.Rptr. 431; Vogulkin v. State Board of Education, 194 Cal.App.2d 424, 434, 15 Cal.Rptr. 335; Pete v. State Board of Education, 144 Cal.App.2d 38, 41, 300 P.2d 147.) The administrative remedy in the case at bar was an appeal to the board pursuant to Vehicle Code section 3052 et seq.

Section 3052, subdivision (c), reads in part: 'The appeal shall be accompanied by evidence that the appellant (Ralph's) has made application for the administrative record of the department and advanced the cost of preparation thereof. . . .' Clearly Ralph's was to provide a complete copy of the administrative record before it could proceed with any further appeal. Thus, the costs advanced to prepare the record were not voluntarily incurred but were undertaken in order to exhaust administrative remedies.

Judicial review of administrative decisions is provided for by section 11523 of the Government Code. That section requires petitioner to furnish the court with a record of the administrative proceedings including the transcript and exhibits at petitioner's expense. It reads as follows: 'Judicial review may be had by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, subject, however, to the statutes relating to the particular agency. . . . The complete record of the proceedings, or such parts thereof as are designated by the petitioner, shall be prepared by the agency and shall be delivered to petitioner, within 30 days after a request therefor by him, upon the payment of the fee specified in Section 69950 of the Government Code . . . for the transcript, the cost of preparation of other portions of the record and for certification thereof. The complete record includes the pleadings, all notices and orders issued by the agency, any proposed decision by a hearing officer, the final decision, a transcript of all proceedings, the exhibits admitted or rejected, the written evidence and any other papers in the case. . . .'

Because Ralph's was required under Vehicle Code section 3052, subdivision (c), to obtain the administrative record in order to appeal to the board in exhausting its administrative remedies, the 'request' specified in section 11523 of the Government Code obviously was not made. The record which was required by the board for its purposes and for which costs were necessarily incurred and advanced at that intermediate stage included the transcript and exhibits which were presented to the superior court with the petition for the writ of mandamus.

No additional evidence or testimony was taken at the hearing before the board. The record in this case included the transcript of the administrative hearing which was provided both to the board and to the superior court at Ralph's expense.

Section 1094.5, subdivision (a), of the Code of Civil Procedure which concerns judicial review by the use of a writ of mandamus provides: 'Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the...