Ralph v. State, 21281.
| Decision Date | 05 February 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 21281.,21281. |
| Parties | RALPH v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Archer County Court; Joe Shelton, Judge.
Johnnie Ralph was convicted of offense of engaging in a riot, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
John Davenport and W. W. Ballard, both of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
Appellant was convicted of the offense of engaging in a riot, and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the county jail for a period of one year.
The appellant's first contention is that the court erred in overruling his motion to quash the complaint and information on the ground that the allegations therein are too uncertain and indefinite, and that they are confusing, etc. The information, which follows the language of the complaint, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
"* * * that Johnnie Ralph, hereinafter styled defendant, on or about the 1st day of March, A.D., 1940, and before the filing of the complaint and this information, in the County of Archer and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully engage in a riot with J. C. Willis, Lloyd Henry, Jim Jackson, J. L. Reece, Sam Smith, Austin Reynolds, E. H. Pearce, C. H. Pearce, C. J. Hoganmiller, and other persons whose names are unknown, who did then and there unlawfully assemble and meet together for and with the purpose and intent to aid each other by violence and by the use of hatchets, metal wrenches, clubs, and wooden mattock handles, to interfere with, intimidate, and prevent J. Earl Martin and his crew, namely, George Absher, Jefferson Lawson, Irlan Hendrix, Floyd Rouse, and Leroy Rouse, from lawfully pursuing his and their labor, occupation and employment and from pursuing his and their daily avocation, which was skidding, moving, and erecting oil field derricks, and the avocation of oil field rig builders, and the said defendant and other persons herein named and divers other persons whose names are unknown, being so unlawfully assembled for said purpose, they, the said defendant and the persons herein named and divers other persons whose names are unknown, did then and there engage in said riot and did then and there act together in said unlawful purpose and did then and there unlawfully, with hatchets, metal wrenches, clubs, and wooden mattock handles, attack and by loud and vociferous cursing, swearing, and by threatening gestures, and rudely displaying weapons, and by threatening to do serious bodily injury and to kill, did terrify and intimidate the said J. Earl Martin, George Absher, Jefferson Lawson, Irlan Hendrix, Floyd Rouse, and Leroy Rouse, and did make an assault upon and beat, bruise, and wound the said J. Earl Martin, George Absher, Jefferson Lawson, Irlan Hendrix, Floyd Rouse and Leroy Rouse, and thereby said defendant and said other persons herein named and said divers persons whose names are unknown, did unlawfully and riotously interfere with, intimidate, and prevent the said J. Earl Martin, George Absher, Jefferson Lawson, Irlan Hendrix, Floyd Rouse, and Leroy Rouse, from pursuing their labor, occupation, and employment as aforesaid and from pursuing their daily avocation aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the State."
Appellant contends that while it is charged in the complaint and information that he and others unlawfully assembled with the purpose and intent to aid each other by violence and by the use of hatchets, wrenches, etc., to interfere with, intimidate and prevent J. Earl Martin and others from lawfully pursuing his and their labor, occupation and employment and from pursuing his and their daily avocation, which was skidding, moving and erecting oil field derricks, etc., yet it does not definitely charge that J. Earl Martin and others were actually so engaged at the time of the alleged riot, and cites us to the case of Bradford v. State, 40 Tex.Cr.R. 632, 51 S.W. 379. We are of the opinion that the averment in the information is not subject to any other reasonable construction than that Martin and others were employed and were pursuing their daily vocation at the time of the riot. However, in our opinion, it was not necessary that Martin and others should have been actually engaged in skidding or building oil field derricks. If such was their vocation and they were prevented by the appellant and his associates from pursuing the same or from being so employed, it would be of no moment whether they were at the time actually performing the physical act in line with their daily vocation or not. Martin and others may not have performed any work at the very time in question or for some time prior thereto, yet if they were contemplating the performance of such physical labor or were returning to their homes from such labor and appellant and his companions, by the means charged, intimidated them from returning to the area and engaging therein, it would be a violation of the law. A man's daily vocation is the means by which he makes a livelihood and supports his family, and any set of men who prevent another from pursuing his daily vocation are interfering with a legal right, which makes the interference unlawful.
The averments in the present instance are not like those in the case of Bradford v. State, supra, cited by appellant in support of his contention. In the Bradford case, the appellant was charged with illegally depriving L. H. Ernst of the right to employ and retain in his employ Mexicans as laborers upon his farm and to disturb him, the said Ernst, in the enjoyment of said right to employ and retain in his employ Mexicans as laborers on his farm. In that case there was no direct and specific averment that Ernst operated a farm and was engaged in farming or that he had employed Mexican laborers or intended to employ Mexican laborers upon his farm, which was a necessary element constituting the offense. In the present case, every essential element constituting the offense is charged. The information follows the form laid down by Mr. Branch in his Ann.Tex.P.C. p. 539, and Willson's Tex.Crim. Forms, 4th Ed., p. 130, form 233e. In support of what we have said here, we refer to the case of Reynolds v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 505, 199 S.W. 1092, and overrule the appellant's contention.
Appellant next complains that the court erred in overruling what he terms an application for a severance in which he states that he did not request a severance for himself but asked that his motion, which was incorporated in the motion for a severance with J. C. Willis, be granted; that the order of trial be adopted by the court as set out in the motion for a severance; that J. L. Reece was the first man charged with the riot in the complaint against J. C. Willis. He also asked that the court adopt the order of procedure in that case. The motion claimed to be an...
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Ex Parte Frye
...a lawful vocation who is on his way to or from the place where he is engaged to work. In support of our contention we cite Ralph v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 148 S.W.2d 401; State v. Tibbetts, 21 Okl.Cr. 168, 205 P. 776, (in fact, page 779, on motion for rehearing) where the words "vicinity", "lo......
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Henry v. State
...of Wichita Falls, and Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State. GRAVES, Judge. This is a companion case to Johnnie Ralph v. State, 148 S.W.2d 401, and J. C. Willis v. State, 148 S.W.2d 397. The appellant being convicted under Chapter Two of the Penal Code defining and puni......
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Cline v. State
...grant the severance and have appellant's co-indictees tried prior to appellant does not reflect reversible error. See Ralph v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 371, 148 S.W.2d 401. Also, it was not shown that appellant's co-indictees could agree among themselves as to the order of trial. When co-defend......
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Stevens v. State
...rule is waived. A bill of exception, to be sufficient, must within and of itself disclose the error complained of. See Ralph v. State, 141 Tex. Cr.R. 371, 148 S.W.2d 401; Branch's Ann. Tex.P.C., p. 131, § 207, and cases there cited. However, it seems to be an established rule that trial cou......