Ralston v. Prelesnik

• Decision Date: 07 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13-cv-4
• Parties: JAMES LESTER RALSTON, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

JAMES LESTER RALSTON, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

September 7, 2016

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

OPINION

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a former state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.¹ Following a jury trial in the Ingham County Circuit Court, Petitioner James Lester Ralston was convicted of aggravated stalking, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411i. On January 6, 2009, the Ingham County Circuit Court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.10, to a prison term of 28 to 90 months.

In his pro se petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:

I. Petitioner's right to due process was violated because he was not given Miranda warnings upon his arrest on June 27, 2008.

II. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel: (I) refused to let Petitioner testify; (ii) refused to subpoena witnesses; (iii) failed to raise an issue of jury tampering at trial; and (iv) refused to enter a poem as an exhibit for trial.

III. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise issues presented in Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment.

IV. Prosecutorial misconduct for: (I) denying exculpatory evidence and (ii) improperly tainting the jury during voir dire.

V. Judicial misconduct for: (I) not allowing Petitioner to attend pre-trial hearings; (ii) denying submission of Petitioner's exhibits at sentencing or on appeal; (iii) allowing the prosecutor to contaminate the jury at voir dire; and (iv) refusing to allow Petitioner to release his appointed counsel before sentencing.

(Pet., ECF No. 1, Page ID.6, 7, 9, 10, 12.) On January 10, 2014, Respondent filed an answer to the petition (ECF No. 21), stating that the grounds should be denied because they are either procedurally defaulted, and/or without merit. On January 16, 2014, Respondent filed the state-court record, as required by Rule 5, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES. (ECF Nos. 23-35.) Upon review and applying the AEDPA standards, the Court finds that all habeas grounds are meritless. Accordingly, the Court will deny the petition for failure to raise a meritorious federal claim.

Procedural and Factual Background

The state prosecution arose from Petitioner's violation of a personal protection order obtained by the complainant, Heather McGuire. Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated stalking, and following a preliminary examination on July 10, 2008, he was bound over on that charge. (Prelim. Exam. Hr'g Tr., ECF Nos. 24-25.) Prior to trial, the prosecution sought a competency examination. At a hearing held on September 30, 2008, the parties stipulated to the report of the competency examiner, and the court found Petitioner competent to stand trial. (Competency Hr'g, 3, ECF No. 26.)

Petitioner was tried before a jury beginning January 5, 2009,² and concluding on January 5, 2009. Prior to jury selection, defense counsel moved to dismiss the proceeding under MICH. CT. R. 6.004(E), which provides the remedy of dismissal to a defendant who has been incarcerated pending trial for more than 180 days, subject to certain exclusions, as set forth under MICH. CT. R. 6.004(C). The court denied the motion, as the one-and-one-half month period during which Petitioner was referred to the forensic center for a competency evaluation, was excludable under MICH. CT. R. 6.004(C)(1). (Tr. I, 4.)

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, as recited by the Michigan Court of Appeals:

Complainant testified that she first encountered defendant while she was working alone at the Crystal Bar in Holt in January 2008. Her hairstyle at the time consisted of a shaved head. According to complainant, near the end of her shift defendant handed her a poem he had written, which she described as "disgusting," "dominating and forceful," and sexual in nature, causing her to feel "uncomfortable and really unsafe." When defendant asked what she thought of his effort, complainant replied, "That's not my style, I'm not into that." Complainant further testified that she made a note of defendant's name and E-mail address in the bar's logbooks the night of that encounter, "just in case I came up missing."

Complainant did not see defendant again until doing so in court, but in February 2009 she received at the bar "a few more pages of his version of poetry," again laced with references to sexuality, violence, and Satan. Then, in May of that year, she received ten more pages of such ruminations.

Complainant obtained a personal protection order (PPO) against defendant, barring him from any further contact with her. After the order was in effect, however, she received from defendant two more mailings at her work address. Complainant identified a motion to terminate the PPO, and a proof of service, and sample court order from the first mailing, and a supplemental motion to modify or terminate with supporting documentation from the second. Above her name on the first envelope was written "Lesbee Friends," and at the top of one page was written"Let's not be enemies . . . ." Complainant opined that the "Lesbee" wording was probably a reference to lesbianism, prompted by her baldness. The return address of the second envelope was styled as "Johnny Rotten, John Salemi Attorney at Law." The documentation within included the statements, "I'm going to spank the guilty. Every one take cover," and "Revenge is sweet when you are in jail or in prison locked up tight."

(Mich. Ct. App. (MCOA) Op., 1-2, ECF No. 32.) Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, contending that Petitioner was required by law to send copies of the motion and supplemental motion to terminate the PPO, so those contacts could not be considered to be violations of the PPO. In addition, he argued that the notations contained on the envelopes were insufficient to amount to harassment in violation of the PPO. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the added messages to the complainant, in the context of the PPO and the earlier harassing conduct, would support a reasonable jury's finding of guilt. (Trial Tr. II, 29-33.) The defense called no witnesses, and Petitioner did not testify. (Id., 34.)

At the conclusion of trial, on January 6, 2009, the jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated stalking. (Tr. II, 87, ECF No. 28.) On January 28, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a prison term of 28 to 90 months as a second-offense habitual offender. (Sentencing Transcript, (S. Tr.), 13, ECF No. 29.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising two questions:

I. [PETITIONER'S] CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED STALKING SHOULD BE REVERSED, AND THE SENTENCE VACATED, AS THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT [PETITIONER'S] ALLEGED ACTIONS MET THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS FOR A COURSE OF CONDUCT, AT LEAST ONE OF SUCH ACTS BEING IN VIOLATION OF A PERSONAL PROTECTION ORDER OF WHICH HE HAD NOTICE.

II. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS HIS JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED BY SEEING A UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICER SITTING WITH MS. MCGUIRE DURING THE TRIAL, IMPLYING THAT [PETITIONER] WAS SUCH A THREAT TO HER SAFETY THAT ADDITIONAL SECURITY WAS NECESSARY, WHEN IN FACT THAT OFFICER WAS THE COMPLAINANT'S BROTHER.

(Pet'r's Br. on Appeal, ECF No. 32.) In an unpublished opinion issued on February 25, 2010, the court of appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the conviction.

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same two issues. On July 26, 2010, the supreme court denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the court.

Petitioner thereafter filed his first habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which this Court dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust all habeas claims. See Ralston v. Howes, No. 1:11-cv-25 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2011). Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court on June 8, 2011, raising the same five issues he presents in this habeas petition. The trial court denied the motion June 24, 2011. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in this Court. That petition also was dismissed without prejudice for lack of exhaustion. See Ralston v. Klee, No. 1:11-cv-1057 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2011). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on December 27, 2011, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on September 27, 2012. (See ECF Nos. 32, 33.)

Petitioner filed the instant action on or about December 30, 2012, raising only those issues presented to the state courts on collateral review.

Standard of Review

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas 'retrials'" and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). The AEDPA has "drastically changed" the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This...