Ram v. Blum
| Decision Date | 13 November 1980 |
| Citation | 77 A.D.2d 278,432 N.Y.S.2d 892 |
| Parties | RAM, by its Executive Director Theresa Funiciello, on behalf of its members and all others similarly situated, Deitrich Williamson, Florence Mosher, Roena White, Mercedes Silva Sanchez, Dora Roberts, Bienvenido Zayas, Rogers Dido Ali, Christy Eloa, Roxanne Bullock, Anna Miranda, Deborah Van Valkenberg, Rose Ambrose, Carol Lisker and Nilsida Figueroa, each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Barbara B. BLUM, individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Ralph Murphy, Michael D. Kaufman, New York City, Cynthia Mann, John C. Gray, Jr. and Yvonne Lewis, Brooklyn, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Marvellen Weinberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel (George D. Zuckerman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with her on brief; Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., attorney) for defendant-respondent.
Before FEIN, J. P., and SANDLER, ROSS, YESAWICH and CARRO, JJ.
I would affirm the judgment appealed from. We are invited to intervene in a domain which is the exclusive responsibility of the Legislature. We decline. The Constitution of the State of New York grants to the Legislature the authority to establish the public assistance formula for this State. Article 17, Section 1, provides:
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such a manner and by such means, as the Legislature may from time to time determine."
The language of this Section clearly and convincingly places the burden of establishing and maintaining public assistance in the legislative body. It ill behooves us to venture into an area from which we are constitutionally excluded.
Accordingly, judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 25, 1980, which granted the motion of defendant-respondent, Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services, to dismiss the complaint, should be affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on March 25, 1980, affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.
All concur except FEIN, J. P., and SANDLER, J., who concur in separate opinions and CARRO, J., who dissents in an opinion.
FEIN, Justice Presiding (concurring).
In this action brought by plaintiff RAM, an unincorporated association whose members are recipients of public assistance, and by fourteen individual welfare recipients, plaintiffs seek (1) a declaration that the welfare payment levels prescribed by Social Services Law (SSL) § 131-a violate Article XVII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution and the due process clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions because the statute lacks a "methodology to adjust the 'standard of need' and benefit levels to account for inflation" and fails to set the "standard of need" and benefit levels to meet basic subsistence needs; (2) a declaration that the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services has a duty under SSL § 62, subd. 1 to provide public assistance at a level sufficient to meet subsistence needs and in violation of her legal duty has failed to do so; and (3) an appropriate injunction to enforce such declarations.
In essence the issue is whether the failure of the legislature to increase the flat grant benefit levels since the enactment of SSL § 131-a in 1974 to reflect inflation violates the constitutional mandate imposed by Article XVII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution, which provides:
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."
The legislative history of the adoption of Article XVII, Section 1 of the Constitution demonstrates that its purpose was "to remove all doubt as to the power of the legislature to authorize relief for those in need and to allocate responsibility therefor to the state and its political subdivisions." (Const. Conv. Comm., revised record, 1938, Vol. II, p. 1085.)
A prior draft proposed that the obligation of the state be to provide care and support "in such manner and by such means as will ensure maintenance to the inhabitants of this state." (Proposed Amendments, 1938 Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, No. 64.) The ultimate choice of language makes it manifest that the intention was to confer power and discretion upon the legislature, without imposing as a standard or guide an express duty of the legislature to "ensure maintenance." The purpose was to mandate beyond doubt the previously questioned power and duty of the state to provide care and support for the needy. As stated in Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 371 N.E.2d 449, "in New York State, the provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution."
In Matter of Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 449, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342, 373 N.E.2d 238, the Court recognized that the Constitution intended to impose discretion upon the legislature to determine the amount of aid. "We explicitly recognized in Tucker that the Legislature is vested with discretion to determine the amount of aid; what we there held prohibited was the Legislature's 'simply refusing to aid those whom it classified as needy.' " In the face of these holdings, it cannot be concluded that the failure of the legislature to increase the flat grant minimum subsistence grants "to reflect changes in the cost of living" since 1974 constitutes a violation of the constitutional mandate, as contended by plaintiffs. The Constitution imposes the duty of determination upon and grants discretion to the legislature, not the courts. The constitutional language must be given its ordinary, natural and plain meaning. (People v. Carroll, 3 N.Y.2d 686, 689, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812, 148 N.E.2d 875).
The pertinent legislation evidences a carefully considered program of aid. SSL, § 131-a provides for two types of allowances (1) a "flat grant" or "pre-add" allowance intended to meet most items of need varying by family size; and (2) a limited number of special grants for specified items of need such as shelter and fuel for heating, available up to certain maximum amounts only on an "as needed basis" (SSL, § 131-a subd. 1; Baumes v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 296, 379 N.Y.S.2d 760, 342 N.E.2d 543). The "flat grant" system has been sustained. (Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419-420, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1221-1222, 25 L.Ed.2d 442). Manifestly, the pre-add allowances under challenge are only part of the picture.
In essence what plaintiffs seek is a species of indexing welfare grants. Although we may recognize that the minimal allowances create difficulties in the face of inflation, there is plainly no constitutional basis which would permit the court to instruct the legislature that the failure to remedy such deficiency constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of the duty imposed upon it. It is not for the courts to determine whether indexing or some other mechanism to deal with inflation is requisite. As noted, in addition to the flat grant complained about, there are allowances consisting of special grants for certain specified items of need such as shelter and fuel, which do reflect inflationary trends in some measure. (Tucker v. Toia, supra; Matter of Bernstein v. Toia, supra). The court can judicially notice the effect of inflation. However, this does not permit the court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. We are not unaware that the 1980 session of the legislature debated a change and declined to make it, apparently because of the financial stringency of the State budget. The question is peculiarly one for the legislature and not for the courts.
Since we are faced with a constitutional question we should limit our consideration to the precise issue before us. In my view, on this record it is inappropriate to rule that judicial action can never be invoked or to speculate whether there may be circumstances which would require court intervention. It is enough to hold that on the evidence before us, the constitutional challenge is not well founded. The fact that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute does not require a trial. However well buttressed, the allegation that the level of benefits amounts to a virtual exclusion of the needy from the support directed by the Constitution does not make it so. Nor does it require a trial in the face of the constitutional mandate plainly imposing responsibility upon the legislature.
The due process argument is equally without merit. Plaintiffs ask this court to strike down the exercise of legislative discretion specifically vested in the legislature by the Constitution. The presumption in favor of constitutionality is strong, particularly where the challenge is addressed to remedial legislation dealing with the economy and social benefits and burdens, peculiarly legislative functions (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491). There is no violation of the State Constitution. Nor is there a violation of the due process clause of the Federal or State Constitution. States have broad discretion in fashioning public welfare programs. There is no constitutional requirement that states pay the full amount of a rationally determined standard of need (Dandridge v. Willaims, supra; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285).
Accordingly, I join in affirming the dismissal of the complaint.
In this action brought by an unincorporated association whose members are recipients of public assistance, and by fourteen individual welfare...
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