Ramantanin v. Poulos

• Decision Date: 09 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 17883,17883
• Citation: 124 S.E.2d 611,240 S.C. 13
• Parties: Alexander J. RAMANTANIN, Appellant, v. Valencia M. POULOS, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Daphne Ramantanin, Aspasia Lasker, and Valencia M. Poulos, as Administratrix, C. T. A. D. B. N. of the Estate of John Ramantanin, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 611

124 S.E.2d 611

240 S.C. 13

Alexander J. RAMANTANIN, Appellant, v. Valencia M. POULOS, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Daphne Ramantanin, Aspasia Lasker, and Valencia M. Poulos, as Administratrix, C. T. A. D. B. N. of the Estate of John Ramantanin, Respondents.

No. 17883.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 9, 1962.

James J. Raman, Claude R. Dunbar, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Lyles & Lyles, Spartanburg, for respondents.

LEWIS, Justice.

The issues in this case concern the claim of the plaintiff, Alexander Ramantanin, to ownership of a house and lot, title to which was formerly held by his father, John Ramantanin. At the time of his death, on February 20, 1959, John Ramantanin held title to a house and lot in Spartanburg, South Carolina, referred to in the record as the Asheville Highway property. Under the residuary clause of his will, this property was devised to his wife, Daphne. She died on April 5, 1959 and title to the house and lot in question passed to the defendant, Valencia M. Poulos, as the sole heir at law of Daphne. The defendant Poulos is now the holder of record title to the property.

The plaintiff Alexander Ramantanin and the defendant Valencia M. Poulos are children, respectively, of John and Daphne Ramantanin by prior marriages, the plaintiff being the son of John and the defendant Poulos being the daughter and only child of Daphne. No children were born to the marriage of John and Daphne.

On May 11, 1955 John Ramantanin executed a mortgage over the foregoing property to the defendants Poulos and Aspasia Lasker, which is still outstanding of record. The defendant Lasker is made a party to this action as one of the holders of such mortgage. The main controversy here, however, is between the plaintiff and the defendant Poulos and concerns the ownership of the above mentioned house and lot.

The plaintiff seeks in this action a decree of the Court adjudging him to be the sole owner of the foregoing property by virtue of the alleged investment therein of funds derived from the sale of other real estate in which he owned an interest. On March 31, 1936 a house and lot, located in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on North Church Street, was conveyed to John Ramantanin for life and at his death to the plaintiff. In April, 1945 John Ramantanin and the plaintiff decided to sell the North Church Street property for the sum of $15,000 and on or about April 20, 1945 entered into the following agreement, relative to the handling of the proceeds of such sale:

'NOW THEREFORE know all men by these presents that we, the undersigned parties hereby agree and bind ourselves to the following handling and disposing of the net proceeds of sale to be so received by us.

'The entire amount of said net balance shall first be deposited in the Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina to the joint credit of John Ramantanin and Alexander Ramantanin. No check shall be paid thereon except by a pen signature of both parties. The entire corpus of this estate of funds is to be regarded as belonging to John Ramantanin for life with remainder to Alexander Ramantanin. It is to be regarded as realty and not as personalty.

'8 in the event of the death of John Ramantanin prior to the reinvestment of the monies, the entire amount thereof shall belong to Alexander Ramantanin under the provision of the trust deed recorded in Book 8-U at Page 160, and in accordance with the consent decree in Judgment Roll No. 30820. As soon hereafter as practicable, the money is to be reinvested in real estate, which is agreed upon and suitable to both of the parties; and it is expressly understood that such real estate shall belong to John Ramantanin for and during the term of his natural life only, with remainder in fee to Alexander Ramantanin, his heirs and assigns forever, and that the deed shall so stipulate.'

On April 20, 1945 John Ramantanin and the plaintiff executed a deed for the North Church Street property to the purchaser and, on the same day, the purchase price, less the costs of sale, was deposited in the South Carolina National Bank of Spartanburg, South Carolina, on which account checks were to be paid only if they bore the pen signature of John Ramantanin and the plaintif. The deposit, after deducting the costs of sale, amounted to $13,900.00.

On the same day that the deposit of the foregoing funds was made, two checks were drawn on the account, one in the amount of $2,010.00 payable to the Citizens and Southern National Bank in payment of a personal note of the plaintiff and the other in the amount of $5,000.00 payable to John Ramantanin. Within approximately six months the joint account was completely exhausted by the issuance of a number of checks, all bearing the signatures of John Ramantanin and the plaintiff. No deed was ever made conveying any real estate to John Ramantanin for his life with remainder to the plaintiff, as stipulated in the agreement hereinabove set forth.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint, however, that all of the foregoing funds derived from the sale of the North Church Street property, plus additional personal funds contributed by him, were used in the purchase of the foregoing. Asheville Ighway lot and the construction of a house thereon, and that he did not know that the title to said lot had been taken solely in the name of John Ramantanin 'until after he had finished paying for the house and lot as above stated.' It is the contention of the plaintiff, therefore, that all of the funds derived from the sale of the North Church Street property were reinvested in the Asheville Highway property in question pursuant to the agreement above set forth between him and his father and that by virtue thereof the property should be impressed with a constructive or resulting trust in his favor, 'under which trust it belonged to John Ramantanin as long as he lived, and at his death it belonged to the appellant (plaintiff) in fee simple.'

The defendants deny that the plaintiff owns any interest in the property in question and interposed the defenses of res adjudicata, bar of the statute of limitations and laches. They also seek affirmative relief by way of an injunction against the prosecution of further claims by the appellant and, in the event the plaintiff's claim to the property is upheld, foreclosure of the mortgage held by the defendants, and the subjection of the property to the payment of the debts and administrative expenses of the respective estates of John and Daphne Ramantanin.

Both the Master, to whom the case was referred for trial, and the Circuit Judge, before whom exceptions to the report of the Master were argued, held that the appellant had failed to establish his claimed title to the property in question under the alleged trust and that, even if the alleged trust had been established, the claim of the plaintiff was now barred by his laches. Both the Master and the Circuit Judge further held that the defendants were entitled to the injunctive relief which they sought and, accordingly, the appellant as 'permanently enjoined from prosecuting any action and from making any other claim or demand with respect to any of the property, real or personal, formerly owned by Daphne Ramantanin or John Ramantanin, and from prosecuting any action, claim or demand of any kind against the defendants upon matters arising prior to the commencement of this suit.'

The plaintiff has appealed from the foregoing order of the lower Court. He has filed seventy six exceptions, accompanied by written argument of one hundred fifty one pages, which, he states, presents ten questions for decision. Under our view of the matter, however, we need decide only two questions, to wit: (1) Did the lower Court err in holding that the plaintiff was barred from asserting his claim to the property in question by his laches, and (2) Did the lower Court err in granting an injunction against the prosecution of any and all further claims by the plaintiff with respect to any of the property formerly owned by John and Daphne Ramantanin?

The record contains voluminous testimony on the part of the plaintiff in which he seeks to prove that the funds derived from the sale of the North Church Street property, together with additional personal funds, were invested in the property in question in accordance with the foregoing written agreement between him and his father. The Master and Circuit Judge have concurred in the finding that the evidence falls short of that clear, definite, unequivocal, and convincing proof required in the establishment of either a constructive or resulting trust. Carmichael v. Huggins, 221 S.C. 278, 70 S.E.2d 223; Privette v. Garrison, 235 S.C. 119, 110 S.E.2d 17. They have further held that, even if the plaintiff had established by the requisite proof the existence of a trust relationship, he is now barred by laches from obtaining a judicial...