Ramer v. State
| Decision Date | 18 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 70110,70110 |
| Citation | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 495,530 So.2d 915 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 495 Ralph RAMER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Philip G. Butler, Jr., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Amy L. Diem, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
This is a petition to review State v. Ramer, 501 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). The major issue concerns the authority of a municipal police officer to conduct a search and seizure outside the city limits without knowledge or specific direction by the sheriff. The district court held that section 30.09(4), Florida Statutes (1985), authorized a municipal police officer, who was also a special deputy under that section, to conduct a warrantless search in an unincorporated area of West Palm Beach County. This construction substantially expands the responsibility of sheriffs for their appointed special deputies and, as such, affects a class of constitutional officers. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we quash the district court's decision and find the officer had no authority for his actions under these circumstances.
The necessary facts are as follows. West Palm Beach Police officials ordered a municipal police sergeant, who was also a special deputy sheriff, to investigate a possible stolen or abandoned vehicle located outside the municipal boundaries of West Palm Beach. The vehicle was parked in an apartment parking lot on private property. Accompanied by an agent from the National Auto Theft Bureau, a private insurance organization specializing in the location and retrieval of stolen cars, the sergeant located the automobile and directed the agent to crawl under the chassis and obtain the confidential vehicle identification number (VIN) off the frame. After obtaining the VIN, the agent contacted his Atlanta, Georgia, office and was told the vehicle had been reported stolen. Based on this information, the police sergeant seized the vehicle and had the vehicle towed to the West Palm Beach police station, where an inventory search was conducted without a warrant.
At the time of this event, the sergeant had been a police officer with the West Palm Beach Police Department for eighteen years. He testified that in March, 1983, he was sworn in as a special deputy sheriff under section 30.09, Florida Statutes (1981), and had been a special deputy ever since. The sergeant explained that, to retain his special deputy status, he merely renewed the card every year. His oath of office was not readministered, nor was he required to post a bond.
Based in part on evidence seized from the automobile, Ramer was indicted for murder. Before the trial court, Ramer moved to suppress the physical evidence discovered in the search. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that (1) the search and seizure were illegal because the police department lacked authority to act outside its jurisdiction and (2) the vehicle was illegally searched and the evidence seized without a search warrant. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed on both points. The court determined that the municipal police officer had authority to act as a special deputy in this instance, concluding that 501 So.2d at 53, State v. Campbell, 427 So.2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). As to the second point, the district court found "the agent's conduct in obtaining the confidential VIN did not, under the facts of this particular case, violate constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures." Ramer, 501 So.2d at 53.
We address first the authority of this West Palm Beach municipal police officer to search and seize this vehicle by reason of his special deputy status.
The phrase "special deputy sheriffs" is found only in section 30.09(4). That section reads:
(4) EXCEPTIONS--The provisions of this section, and of s. 30.08, shall not apply to the appointment of special deputy sheriffs when appointed by the sheriff, under the following circumstances:
(a) On election days, to attend elections.
(b) To perform undercover investigative work.
(c) For specific guard or police duties in connection with public sporting or entertainment events, not to exceed thirty days; or for watchman or guard duties, when serving in such capacity at specified locations or areas only.
(d) For special and temporary duties, without power of arrest, in connection with guarding or transporting prisoners.
(e) To aid in preserving law and order, or to render necessary assistance in the event of any threatened or actual hurricane, fire, flood, or other natural disaster, or in the event of any major tragedy such as an airplane crash, train or automobile wreck, or similar accident.
(f) To raise the power of the county, by calling bystanders or others, to assist in quelling a riot or any breach of the peace, when ordered by the sheriff or an authorized general deputy.
(g) To serve as a parking enforcement specialist pursuant to s. 316.640(2).
The appointment of any such special deputy sheriff in any such circumstance, except with respect to paragraph (g), may be made with full powers of arrest whenever the sheriff deems such appointment reasonable and necessary in the execution of the duties of his office. Except under circumstances described in paragraphs (a), (e), (f) and (g), the appointee shall possess at least the minimum requirements established for law enforcement officers by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. The appointment of any such special deputy sheriff shall be recorded in a register maintained for such purpose in the sheriff's office, showing the terms and circumstances of such appointment.
A regular deputy appointed under section 30.07 is not so restricted, 1 and must fulfill the requirements of section 30.09(1)(a). 2
The district court relied on the Second District's decision State v. Campbell, 427 So.2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We find Campbell clearly distinguishable. In that case, although the court permitted Tampa Police Department agents to perform arrests outside of Tampa in Hillsborough County, the officers were performing undercover investigative work, an activity expressly permitted by section 30.09(4)(b). The testimony in Campbell established that both officers had taken oaths, executed surety bonds, and held authorized cards identifying them as special deputies with the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bolton
...view. Other states have indicated that there is no protected privacy interest in the underside of a motor vehicle. Cf. Ramer v. State, 530 So.2d 915, 918 (Fla.1988) (VIN viewed from under car); People v. Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 274 N.W.2d 430 (1979) (same); Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 306 Pa.......
-
White v. City of Waldo
...argues that the directed verdict was proper as to him, even if judgment in favor of the City must be reversed. He cites Ramer v. State, 530 So.2d 915 (Fla.1988) (municipal police officer's seizure of private property without sheriff's knowledge was unlawful, outside city limits); Holloway v......
-
U.S. v. Gilbert
...I concur in the judgment only. 1 Florida statutory authority does not authorize special deputies to execute search warrants. Ramer v. State, 530 So.2d 915 (Fla.1988). See also Fla.Stat.Ann. § 30.09(4) (West 1988).2 See e.g. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir.1974) ("The fourth am......
-
State v. Duhart
...of a vehicle is considered to be in plain view, even if one must use a flashlight or bend down to view the numbers. See Ramer v. State, 530 So.2d 915, 918 (Fla.1988)(citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986))(looking under the car to obtain the VIN number i......
-
APA: legislative reform of disputed competitive procurement decisions.
...of the district court, and remanded for the entry of a final order denying the award of the contract to Groves-Watkins. Groves-Watkins, 530 So. 2d at 915. In reaching its decision, the Florida Supreme Court noted "the strong judicial deference accorded an agency's decision in competitive bi......