Ramey v. DeCaire

Decision Date19 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2003-CC-1299.,2003-CC-1299.
Citation869 So.2d 114
PartiesKatherine RAMEY (Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of David F. Ramey, M.D., and on Behalf of her Minor Children, Kristen Ramey and Brad Ramey) and Renee Ramey v. Michael DeCAIRE (Administrative Director, Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana), Martha Brown, (Medical Director, Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana), Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana (PHFL), Physicians' Health Program (PHP), Physicians' Health Committee (PHC).
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Angela W. Adolph, Baton Rouge, Roselyn B. Koretzky, New Orleans, George M. Papale, Milling, Benson, Woodward, Counsel for Applicant.

Sean D. Fagan, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Respondent.

KIMBALL, Justice.

In this case, plaintiffs, decedent's survivors, allege defendants' negligence caused decedent to commit suicide. The sole issue presented is whether plaintiffs' amended petition states a cause of action against defendants. For the following reasons, we find that plaintiffs' petition does not contain sufficient well-pleaded facts to state a cause of action in negligence. The judgment of the district court to the contrary is reversed; however, plaintiffs will be allowed time within which to amend their petition pursuant to the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 934.

Facts and Procedural History

This case arises from a petition for damages filed on January 23, 2002 by Katherine Ramey (individually and on behalf of the Estate of David F. Ramey, M.D. and on behalf of her minor children, Kristen Ramey and Brad Ramey) and Renee Ramey ("plaintiffs") and naming as defendants Michael DeCaire (Administrative Director of Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana), Martha Brown (Medical Director of the Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana), Physicians' Health Foundation of Louisiana ("PHFL"), Physicians' Health Program ("PHP"), Physicians' Health Committee ("PHC"), and Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.1 The original petition filed by plaintiffs alleges the following in pertinent part:

2.
Plaintiffs specifically show that defendants failed to have in force procedures that ensured twenty-four (24) hour turn around time for test results relating to random drug sampling done of physicians under their direction, supervision and control, which procedure would have minimized the emotional distress and turmoil of a physician tested, and further would have ensured immediate intervention to protect the physician under defendants['] direction, supervision and control.
3.
Plaintiffs further show that defendants failed to have in force procedures that ensured immediate face to face intervention of physicians under their direction, supervision and control, which procedure would have minimized the emotional distress and turmoil of a physician tested, and further would have ensured immediate intervention to protect the physician under defendants['] direction, supervision and control if a positive drug test is made.
4.
Petitioners show that said defendants, through the above negligent acts and omissions, improperly supervised and provided care to David F. Ramey for his addiction and illness in the specific following respects:
a. After random testing of Dr. Ramey, defendants failed to take steps to ensure a twenty-four (24) hour turn around analysis of the sample;
b. Defendant, Martha Brown, after learning of the positive drug test, instructed defendant, Michael DeCaire, to contact Dr. Ramey by telephone, not face to face and advise of the results;
c. Defendants, Martha Brown and Michael DeCaire, took no steps at all to ensure immediate face to face intervention took place with Dr. Ramey to protect him from his illness and to ensure his safety.
5.
As a result of the above negligent acts and omissions of said defendants, David F. Ramey, M.D. committed suicide at approximately 5:30 o'clock p.m., the same day after receiving a telephone call from defendant, Michael DeCaire, advising Dr. Ramey of the positive drug test.
6.
Plaintiffs show had defendants exercised the standard of care and degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by members of their profession in good standing in their community and locality, and had defendants used reasonable care and diligence, along with their best judgment, David F. Ramey would not have committed suicide.
7.
Specifically, had defendants acted within the standard of care by implementing procedures to ensure proper notification, intervention and treatment of David F. Ramey, he would not have committed suicide.

Defendants responded by filing a peremptory exception of no cause of action, asserting that the allegations made by plaintiffs in the petition did not disclose any actionable negligence by defendants and failed to set forth any theory of liability upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, defendants contended that the petition failed to allege a legal or factual relationship between defendants and the decedent from which a legal duty to act or not to act could have arisen. Additionally, defendants alleged that the petition failed to specify the professions or purposes of defendants. Finally, defendants argued that even if all the allegations of plaintiffs' petition are true, the petition fails to state how the defendants' behavior caused the decedent's suicide.

After a hearing on defendants' peremptory exception of no cause of action, the district court granted the exception, concluding that plaintiffs' petition failed to state an actionable claim under Louisiana law. The district court allowed plaintiffs thirty days within which to supplement and amend their petition to state a cause of action.

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amending and supplemental petition in which they alleged that defendants had knowledge of decedent's history of substance abuse and treatment, and should have known that decedent was at an increased risk of committing suicide. Specifically, plaintiffs' amended petition supplemented the original petition with the following pertinent allegations:

15.
At all times pertinent to this litigation, defendants were aware that prior to May 8, 2001[,] the decedent, David Ramey, had been the subject of two separate substance abuse "interventions."
16.
Prior to May 8, 2001, defendants knew that David Ramey had completed the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous on three separate occasions.
17.
Prior to May 8, 2001, defendants knew that David Ramey had received inpatient therapy for substance abuse on two separate occasions.
18.
Prior to May 8, 2001, defendants know that David Ramey was actively involved in the outpatient counseling of other substance abusers.
19.
Given David Ramey's extensive involvement with the impaired physicians program, defendants knew or should have known on May 8, 2001 that, upon notification of the failed drug screen, Ramey was actually aware that he would lose his license to practice medicine.
20.
Given that David Ramey was a diagnosed substance abuser, defendants knew or should have known that a relapse placed him at increased risk for committing suicide.
21.
Defendants knew that prior to May 8, 2001 it was standard practice to "intervene" in person when confronting relapsing physicians (i.e. those who had already been diagnosed as substance abusers).
22.
Defendants knew or should have known that personal intervention under such circumstances was done, in part, to guard against the increased risk of suicide.
23.
Upon receiving the results of David Ramey's drug screen, Michael DeCaire notified Martha Brown.
24.
Both Martha Brown's and Michael DeCaire's involvement (vis[-]a[-]vis the notification of David Ramey) was within the course and scope of their employment by the Physicians['] Health Foundation of Louisiana.
25.
Martha Brown instructed Michael DeCaire to advise David Ramey of the failed drug screen.
26.
On May 8, 2001, Ramey received a telephone call from defendants' agent, Michael DeCaire, advising him that he had failed a drug screen that had been administered approximately two weeks earlier.
27.
Following that telephone call, Dr. Ramey finished seeing patients over the next few hours and then took his own life at his office.

In response to this amending and supplemental petition, defendants again filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action. Defendants' second exception of no cause of action raised essentially the same objections that had been sustained by the district court in its earlier ruling regarding the original petition for damages.

After a hearing, the district court denied defendants' exception of no cause of action, finding that plaintiffs' petition, as amended, states an actionable claim under Louisiana Law.2 Defendants applied for supervisory writs from this ruling. The court of appeal, with one judge dissenting, denied the writ without comment. Ramey v. DeCaire, 02-2674 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/7/03).

At defendants' request, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of the district court's judgment denying the peremptory exception of no cause of action. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299 (La.10/10/03), 855 So.2d 355.

Discussion

The narrow issue presented in this case is whether plaintiffs' amended petition states a cause of action against defendants such that their suit should be allowed to proceed.

A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La.1993). The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Id. at 1235. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931. Consequently, the court reviews the petition...

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