Ramic v. Bullock Enters.
| Decision Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 354374 |
| Parties | EDITA RAMIC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BULLOCK ENTERPRISES, LLC, doing business as BRADFORD SQUARE APARTMENTS, Defendant, and FAZLIJA SALI, Plaintiff, and BRADFORD SQUARE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
UNPUBLISHED
Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2019-000020-NO
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Shapiro and Gadola, JJ.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, Bradford Square Condominium Association (Bradford), appeals by leave granted the trial court's order denying Bradford's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) of plaintiff Edita Ramic's complaint against Bradford asserting negligence and liability under MCL 554.139. We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Bradford.
In October 2017, plaintiff Edita Ramic leased a condominium unit from Waldemar Liebich. Liebich owns the unit, which is located in a condominium complex owned by defendant Bullock Enterprises, LLC.[1] Defendant Bradford is a condominium association that was formed to manage the complex. On the evening of September 3, 2018, Ramic left the unit, which is located on the second floor of the complex, to retrieve her mail from her mailbox on the first floor of the complex. Ramic was wearing flip flops; when she reached the top of the stairs that were located in a common area of the building she attempted to step down the first step but lost her footing and fell down the stairs, sustaining injuries. Ramic alleges that at the time she fell none of the lights in the stairway were operating, and the stairway was dark.[2] Ramic claims that the fall was not the result of tripping on either her flip flops or the carpet but rather that the darkness caused her to lose her footing and fall as she stepped down the first step.
The common area of the building contains two stairways leading from the first floor to the second floor; the front stairway is farthest from Ramic's unit but closest to her mailbox, while the back stairway is closest to Ramic's unit. Ramic testified that at the time she fell, although none of the lights in the front stairway were operating, the back stairway had working lights and was illuminated. Ramic testified that nonetheless she chose to use the front stairway because it was the shortest route to the mailboxes, and also because she was concerned that the back stairway was not safe because the door by that stairway often was unlocked.
Plaintiffs initiated this action in the trial court against defendant Bullock Enterprises, LLC, and later amended the complaint to add Bradford as a defendant.[3] In the amended complaint, Ramic alleged that Bradford was negligent and breached its statutory duty under MCL 554.139. Bradford moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that it did not breach either a common law duty or a statutory duty. Bradford argued in part that Ramic's common law negligence claim failed because the condition in the stairway was open and obvious, no special aspects existed to make the stairway unreasonably dangerous, and Ramic could have avoided the alleged danger by using the back stairway. Bradford contended that Ramic's statutory claim failed because the stairway where plaintiff fell was fit for its intended use.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Bradford's motion for summary disposition, determining that genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court stated:
I'm going to deny this motion. It just seems to me that there is not a case directly on point, other than in dicta, which addresses this situation. And I believe that poor lighting by itself can be a dangerous condition if the jury believes it to be so. Almost all of the arguments presented by Defense are very persuasive arguments, but only in terms of a jury. Michigan law is, has been decided over the years to be very favorable to owners of premises. I think it started off with the fact that we get a lot of snow and ice, and so the Court of Appeals wisely said, hey, this is Michigan, people have to expect some problems when you live in a state that gets a lot of snow and ice that melts and warmth and cold spells. And so they rationalized our law to be consistent with the type of state that we live in and the weather that we have. And from that then it spread to all areas of premises liability, so that we now have the open and obvious doctrine. But essentially the open and obvious doctrine I believe, although I recognize that judges can and should enter a summary disposition if something is open and obvious and the plaintiff proceeded at his or her own risk. I understand that. But quintessentially the subjective determination if something was truly open and obvious and whether a, the premises are fit for the use for which they are intended, those are just jury questions about which reasonable minds can differ. And although Defense has come close to a summary disposition in this case I'm going to deny it, because if I granted it[, ] it seems to me that I'm essentially taking away a question about which reasonable minds can differ from the finders of fact that should be deciding these things, namely a jury rather than me as a Circuit Judge. So that's my response and so the motion is denied.
The trial court thereafter entered its order denying Bradford's motion. This Court granted Bradford's application for leave to appeal the trial court's order. Ramic v Bullock Enterprises, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 4, 2020 (Docket No. 354374).
Bradford contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Bradford argues that Ramic's claim under MCL 554.139 fails because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the stairway upon which Ramic fell was fit for its intended use, and that the open and obvious doctrine bars Ramic's common law negligence claim.
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, Vermilya v Delta College Bd of Trustees, 325 Mich.App. 416, 418; 925 N.W.2d 897 (2018), and the trial court's determination whether a duty exists. Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich. 651, 659; 822 N.W.2d 190 (2012). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim, and is warranted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at 160. When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. We will find that a genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might disagree. Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich. 751, 761; 918 N.W.2d 785 (2018).
Bradford contends that Ramic's claim under MCL 554.139 fails because the stairway upon which Ramic fell was fit for its intended use. We conclude that Ramic's claim against Bradford under MCL 554.139 fails because Bradford is not a "lessor" under the statute. MCL 554.139(1) states:
MCL 554.139(1) imposes a duty upon a lessor or a licensor of residential premises. "The statutory protection under MCL 554.139(1) arises from the existence of a residential lease and consequently becomes a statutorily mandated term of such lease." Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP 481 Mich. 419, 425; 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "Therefore, a breach of the duty to maintain the premises under MCL 554.139(1)(a) or (b) would be construed as a breach of the terms of the lease between the parties and any remedy under the statute would consist exclusively of a contract remedy." Id. at 425-426. If no lease exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, then the defendant is not a lessor, and no duty can be imposed under MCL 554.139(1). See Francescutti v Fox Chase Condo Ass'n, 312 Mich.App. 640, 642; 886 N.W.2d 891 (2015).
In Francescutti, this Court held that the owner of a condominium unit did not have a cause of action under MCL 554.139(1) against the condominium association for an injury allegedly arising from the condominium association's failure to maintain the common areas of the condominium development because the owner of the unit was not a lessee of the common areas, and the condominium association was not a lessor. Francescutti, 312 Mich.App. at 642. This Court reasoned that the plaintiff, as an owner of a unit in the condominium complex, had an ownership interest in, and the right to use, the common areas of the condominium complex; the defendant condominium association had not leased the common areas to the plaintiff, however, and was not a lessor under the statute. In accord Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, __ Mich. App__, __; N.W.2d (2021) (Docket No. 351813); slip op at 8 (...
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