Ramik v. Darling Intern., Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 98-40276.,No. Civ. 98-40439.,Civ. 98-40276.,Civ. 98-40439.
• Citation: 161 F.Supp.2d 772
• Parties: Peter John RAMIK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DARLING INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant. City of Melvindale, Plaintiff, v. Darling International, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

161 F.Supp.2d 772

Peter John RAMIK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DARLING INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant.

City of Melvindale, Plaintiff, v. Darling International, Inc., Defendant.

No. Civ. 98-40276.

No. Civ. 98-40439.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 10, 2001.

David R. Dubin, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

William H. Horton, Troy, MI, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GADOLA, District Judge.

Before the Court are the following motions: the Ramik Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability; Plaintiff City of Melvindale's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability; and Plaintiff City of Melvindale's Motion for Rule 65 Injunctive Relief. For reasons stated below, this Court denies Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and Plaintiff City of Melvindale's motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Darling International, Inc. owns and operates a "rendering" plant in the City of Melvindale. Rendering is a form of "recycling" that involves using heat and pressure to reduce dead animals and inedible animal parts from the slaughtering process into ingredients for consumer, medical, and industrial products. Two separate actions have now been filed against Defendant resulting from complaints about Defendant's business practices. Ramik v. Darling International, Inc., No. 98-40276, and City of Melvindale v. Darling International, Inc., No. 98-40439. All Plaintiffs assert that Defendant's plant emits noxious odors and pollutants including animal by-product air contaminants, the so-called "Darling odor."

On February 22, 1998, Plaintiffs in Ramik (the "Ramik Plaintiffs") filed the instant civil action in the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne. Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court based on this Court's diversity jurisdiction. In the operative Complaint at this point in the litigation—the First Amended Complaint filed June 12, 2000—the Ramik Plaintiffs assert claims for trespass (Count I), nuisance (Count II), and negligence and/or gross negligence (Count III).

On May 24, 1999, this Court entered an order granting the Ramik Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in part, certifying a class for injunctive relief only pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court declined to certify a class for damages pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) because the Ramik Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that common issues of law and fact predominated among the claims of the members of the purported class.

Meanwhile, on July 30, 1998, Plaintiff City of Melvindale filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne. Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court based on this Court's diversity jurisdiction. In its Complaint, Plaintiff City of Melvindale asserted claims for nuisance (Count I), trespass (Count II), negligence (Count III), violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the creation of a public nuisance (Count IV), and declaratory judgment (Count V). Plaintiff City of Melvindale's claims for relief are not brought on behalf of its citizens but are intended to protect its own interests, such as interference with Plaintiff City of Melvindale's use of its own property and loss of tax revenue from declining property values. See Ramik v. Darling International, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 680, 692 (E.D.Mich.1999). On July 30, 1999, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff City of Melvindale's trespass claim for relief (Count II) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 691. This Court also denied Defendant's motion to dismiss either Plaintiff City of Melvindale's negligence claim or nuisance claim as redundant, in part because "any threat of double recovery may be alleviated by proper instructions to the jury at trial." Id. On January 19, 2001, this Court dismissed Plaintiff City of Melvindale's claim for damages for alleged loss of tax revenue. In orders entered on March 29, 2001 and August 20, 2001, this Court dismissed several of the Ramik Plaintiffs.

On February 16, 2001, the Ramik Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability presently before this Court. On March 22, 2001, Plaintiff City of Melvindale filed its Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability. On March 23, 2001, Plaintiff City of Melvindale filed its Motion for Rule 65 Injunctive Relief. On June 13, 2001, a hearing was held before this Court on these three motions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Ramik Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the nonmoving party's case on which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.1992).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). The Court is not required or permitted, however, to judge the evidence or make findings of fact. Id. at 1435-36. The moving party has the burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1435.

A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment where proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, where a reasonable jury could not find that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.; Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 654 (6th Cir.1993).

Once the moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts to prove that there is a genuine issue for trial. To create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must present more than just some evidence of a disputed issue. According to the Supreme Court, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the [nonmoving party's] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Consequently, the nonmoving party must do more than raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmoving party must produce evidence that would be sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi Transportation Service, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 214, 217 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 701, 1991 WL 49687 (6th Cir.1991). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Cox v. Kentucky Department of Transportation, 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir.1995).

The Ramik Plaintiffs assert that Defendant's emissions constitute a "nuisance per se." "A nuisance per se is `an activity or condition which constitutes a nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, without regard to the care with which it is conducted or maintained.'" Palmer v. Western Michigan University, 224 Mich.App. 139, 144, 568 N.W.2d 359 (1997) (quoting Li v. Feldt (After Second Remand), 439 Mich. 457, 476-477, 487 N.W.2d 127 (1992)). The activity in question must be "an intrinsically unreasonable or dangerous activity, without regard for care or circumstances." Li, 439 Mich. at 477, 487 N.W.2d 127. If the activity serves a beneficial public purpose and is capable of being performed in a manner so as not to pose any nuisance, then it cannot be considered a nuisance per se. See id.; Palmer, 224 Mich.App. at 144-45, 568 N.W.2d 359. Because "[t]he question as to what constitutes a nuisance per se is a question of law for the court ...," Beard v. Michigan, 106 Mich.App. 121, 124, 308 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1981) (citing Brown v. Nichols, 337 Mich. 684, 689, 60 N.W.2d 907 (1953)), it is well-suited for summary judgment.

In support of their motion, the Ramik Plaintiffs attached various complaints that Defendant's plant emits a bad odor. This appears to be an argument that the Defendant's activities is a nuisance in fact rather than a nuisance per se and, therefore, should not be considered at this stage because the parties agreed to bring only the nuisance per se issue of law to the Court's attention at this time.¹

The Ramik Plaintiffs also argue Michigan case law provides that a rendering plant such as Defendant's constitutes a nuisance per se. A judicial determination that an activity is a nuisances per se is rare. Many years ago the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that decaying...