Ramírez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced
| Decision Date | 14 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 11–2339,13–1169.,s. 11–2339 |
| Citation | 759 F.3d 10 |
| Parties | Evelyn RAMÍREZ–LLUVERAS; Jenitza Cáceres, represented by Evelyn Ramírez–Lluveras; M.C., represented by Evelyn Ramírez–Lluveras; M.A.C., represented by Evelyn Ramírez–Lluveras, Plaintiffs, Appellees/Cross–Appellants, v. Edwin RIVERA–MERCED; Pedro Toledo–Dávila; Lieutenant Víctor Cruz–Sánchez; Sergeant Rafael Figueroa–Solís; Sergeant Juan Colón–Báez, Defendants, Appellants/Cross–Appellees, Javier Pagán–Cruz; Carlos Sustache–Sustache; Zulma Díaz; Miguel Vázquez–San Antonio; John Does A–Z, Rep. Employees, Contractors, or Agents of the P.R. Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Susana I. Peñagarícano–Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom Margarita L. Mercado–Echegaray, Solicitor General, was on brief, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Judith Berkan, with whom Mary Jo Méndez and Berkan/Méndez were on brief, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
This tragic case arises out of the unwarranted shooting death of a civilian, Miguel A. Cáceres–Cruz, in Puerto Rico by an on-duty police officer, Javier Pagán–Cruz. Plaintiffs, the victim's surviving wife and children, sued Pagán, his two fellow officers on the scene, and five supervisors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the decedent's Fourth Amendment rights by causing his wrongful death.
The supervisors initially moved to dismiss the claims against them under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); that motion was granted in part and denied in part. See Ramirez–Lluveras v. Pagan–Cruz, 833 F.Supp.2d 151, 165 (D.P.R.2011). Later, after discovery, the five supervisors successfully moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims against them. See Ramirez–Lluveras v. Pagan–Cruz, 833 F.Supp.2d 165, 182 (D.P.R.2011). Afterward, the plaintiffs prevailed at trial against the defendants Pagán and the two other on-scene officers, Carlos Sustache–Sustache and Zulma Díaz. The jury awarded the plaintiffs approximately $11.5 million.
The case now reaches us on two appeals: the plaintiffs' appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the supervisory defendants (No. 13–1169) and the supervisory defendants' appeal from the district court's earlier denial of their Rule 12(c) motion (No. 11–2339). We affirm the grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs' supervisory liability claims against each of the supervisors. We dismiss the Commonwealth's appeal from the earlier partial denial of the Rule 12(c) motion as to these same defendants.
We briefly describe the procedural history before turning to the facts of the case. On April 28, 2008, the plaintiffs filed suit under § 1983 against Pagán and his two on-scene colleagues, Officers Carlos Sustache–Sustache and Zulma Díaz (collectively, the line officers), and against Col. Edwin Rivera–Merced, the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) Area Commander for Humacao, as their supervisor. On March 30, 2009, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the four other supervisory officers as defendants. However, none of the claims against any of the supervisory defendants arose from any direct supervision of Pagán on the night of the shooting or from any personal involvement of the supervisors with the shooting. The supervisory defendants answered the amended complaint and set forth a list of forty-one affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity.
On April 20, 2010, the supervisory defendants filed a “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings” under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part on September 30, 2011. Specifically, the court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, including the Fourth Amendment claims, against the supervisory defendants brought in the plaintiffs' own individual capacities, as opposed to their capacities as representatives of the victim. It did so based on its finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert individual claims because there was no allegation that the supervisors' conduct was aimed at the family relationship. The court dismissed all claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. It also granted the motion as to other claims against the supervisory defendants in the plaintiffs' representative capacities. It allowed the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims against the supervisory defendants to proceed, declining to resolve their qualified immunity defense on the pleadings.2 The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of these claims in the plaintiffs' individual capacities against the supervisors. The supervisory defendants appealed from the denial of their motion to dismiss as to the Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims against them.3
On December 22, 2011, the district court granted the supervisory defendants' motion for summary judgment. This left the claims against the line officers, Pagán, Sustache, and Díaz.
The claims against the line officers went to trial before a jury in late October 2012. On November 9, 2012, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against all three line officers. After entry of final judgment, the plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the supervisory defendants.4 The two appeals were consolidated.
The following facts are undisputed, except where noted. To the extent the facts are disputed, we take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs for purposes of the supervisory defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2008).
Miguel A. Cáceres–Cruz (“Cáceres”), the victim, was a member of the Punta Santiago Scooter Club. On the evening of August 11, 2007, around 6:10 p.m., roughly eleven members of the Club brought their scooters to a house for a quinceañero 5 at which they were to serve as an escort for the fifteen-year-old birthday girl. With the scooters parked on the street, two-way traffic was obstructed, so Cáceres helped direct cars around the parked scooters.
One of the cars caught in the traffic was a PRPD Ford Explorer in which officers Pagán, Sustache, and Díaz were riding. The officers were not assigned to a patrol in this area, Punta Santiago, but instead were passing through on their way to a different area, Naguabo, to which they were assigned to combat drug trafficking. They did not have any directions to engage in any actions in Punta Santiago. In fact, the officers passed through Punta Santiago only because they chose to take a different route to Naguabo than they had been instructed to take after picking up Officer Díaz, who had been late for her shift.
When Pagán reached Cáceres's position, he told Cáceres that only the police have the authority to direct traffic. He also ordered the club members to move their scooters off the road within five minutes. What happened next is not entirely clear, although both parties agree with the general outlines. There is a dispute over whether the club members actually began moving their scooters. The parties agree that Pagán and Cáceres began exchanging insults and that at some point in the exchange, Díaz told Cáceres that he was under arrest. A video of the incident shows the three officers separating Cáceres from his fellow club members. A fight broke out. The parties dispute who initiated the physical contact, but they agree that, at some point, Cáceres resisted, hitting both Díaz and Pagán. Eventually, either the officers drove Cáceres to the ground or he stumbled to the ground after being hit. Pagán punched Cáceres in the face while Cáceres was on the ground. Cáceres had been driven to a seated position on the ground with his back against a fence. As he sat, he was straddled by Pagán and surrounded by the other two officers.
From the ground, Cáceres reached up and touched Pagán's gun holster; the parties dispute whether he was simply reaching for Pagán's leg while he was trying to stand or whether he was continuing the fight. Pagán placed his hand on top of Cáceres's and the two struggled over the gun. Eventually, the gun, still holstered on Pagán, went off and shot Pagán in his leg. Pagán pulled away from Cáceres, who slumped from a sitting position to lying with his stomach on the ground. While Cáceres was still on the ground, Pagán drew his gun and shot Cáceres multiple times in the back. After a pause, Pagán shot Cáceres one final time, this time in the head, administering a coup de grâce. Cáceres died from the shooting. He was 43 years old at the time. Pagán was 33 years old, and a 13–year veteran of the PRPD.
The officers retreated to their car and left the scene. Díaz then used the police radio to inform a dispatcher that Pagán was bleeding profusely. She did not mention the shooting of Cáceres.
There are later events which the plaintiffs discuss at length as evidence of an alleged cover-up of the shooting. Specifically, the plaintiffs explain that some of the supervisory defendants represented to the media that Pagán had clearly been acting to defend himself against Cáceres's unprovoked aggression. However, the plaintiffs do not explain how any alleged cover-up after the shooting would be relevant to their claims, which are based on a wrongful death theory, since any alleged cover-up would have occurred after Cáceres had already died. We do not discuss the cover-up theory. Pagan was dismissed from the PRPD on June 4, 2008.
The plaintiffs' theories of liability against the supervisory defendants rely heavily on the proposition that Pagán's disciplinary history provided adequate warning to his supervisors that he was at substantial risk of committing an unjustified shooting of an arrestee as an armed officer, and that the supervisors were deliberately indifferent to this risk. The plaintiffs then assert theories that various policies and...
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