Ramos v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 18 April 2017
• Docket Number: AC 37498
• Citation: 159 A.3d 1174,172 Conn.App. 282
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Julio RAMOS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

172 Conn.App. 282

159 A.3d 1174

Julio RAMOS

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 37498

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 2, 2016

Officially released April 18, 2017

Mark M. Rembish, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Lisamaria T. Proscino, special deputy assistant state's attorney, and Vernon D. Oliver, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Sheldon, Js.^*

SHELDON, J.

The petitioner, Julio Ramos, appeals, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this action. In that operative petition, the petitioner challenged, on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the legality of his custody under judgments of conviction rendered against him in 1997, upon his negotiated pleas of guilty to three counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–134, one count of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54c, and one count of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–134. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas court erred in rejecting, and later abused its discretion in denying, his petition for certification to appeal from the rejection of his three part claim that his challenged guilty pleas were not entered intelligently and voluntarily due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts, more particularly, that his pleas were not entered intelligently or voluntarily because his trial counsel (1) failed to advise him of the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, which he assertedly could have raised as to all of his pending charges under General Statutes § 53a–13, based upon a misinformed evaluation of his mental capacity at the time of the charged offenses by a forensic psychiatrist to whom she accidentally gave the medical records of a different inmate for the purpose of making that evaluation; (2) failed to conduct an adequate investigation as to the potential viability of the defense of lack of intent to commit robbery due to voluntary intoxication, which he also could have raised as to all pending charges under General Statutes § 53a–7, before advising him to plead guilty to those charges; and (3) advised him not to inform the trial judge that he had taken prescription drugs on the day of his guilty pleas and then failed to correct the record when, on the basis of her advice, he denied such drug use in response to the judge's questions during the plea proceeding. We dismiss the appeal.

The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On May 6, 1997, the petitioner pleaded guilty to five charges based on his admitted involvement in five similar incidents in June, 1996. In each such incident, the petitioner used force and violence against one or more employees of a commercial establishment in an effort to steal money to fund his addiction to and daily use of heroin¹ and "illy."² The charges to which he entered his guilty pleas, as previously noted, were: three counts of robbery in the first degree, in connection with separate incidents on June 2, 15, and 26, 1996; one count of felony murder, in connection with a later incident on June 27, 1996; and one count of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, in connection with a final incident on June 30, 1996. During the plea proceeding, the prosecutor set forth the following factual bases for the charges to which the petitioner was entering his pleas. On June 2, 15, and 26, 1996, the petitioner committed three armed robberies in a substantially similar manner. On each of those dates, the petitioner entered the convenience store of a Mobil gas station on Washington Street in Hartford, pretended to select items for purchase, then produced a handgun and demanded money from the cashier. In each such incident, the petitioner walked behind the counter of the store, pistol-whipped the clerk, then took money from the cash register before fleeing from the store on foot. Thereafter, on the night of June 27, 1996, the petitioner and his heroin dealer, Frederick Wright, agreed to rob Dan's Shell Station in West Hartford to obtain money to buy drugs. After Wright parked a borrowed car in a darkened area away from the store, the petitioner entered the store, walked behind the counter, and struck the cashier in the head with a pistol. During this assault, the petitioner shot and killed the cashier before taking money from the cash register and fleeing from the store on foot.³ Three days later, on June 30, 1996, the petitioner entered another convenience store in Hartford and, once again pretended to select items for purchase, then walked behind the counter, produced a handgun and approached the clerk. At that point, however, the clerk attempted to grab the petitioner's gun and a struggle ensued. Although the petitioner struck the clerk several times in the head, the clerk surrendered no property to the petitioner, who eventually dropped his pistol and fled from the scene without taking anything. The petitioner was arrested within minutes of this attempted robbery. After being treated for injuries he sustained while he was being arrested, the petitioner returned to the Hartford police station, where he waived his Miranda rights⁴ and admitted his involvement in each of the previously described incidents, including the June 27 robbery and shooting in West Hartford.

After he was arrested and gave his self-incriminating statement, the petitioner was presented in court, where he applied for the services of the public defender. Upon the granting of his application, Attorney Karen A. Goodrow was appointed to represent him. Over the course of the following year, Goodrow met with the petitioner several times to discuss his case. During one of those meetings, the petitioner informed Goodrow that he had used both heroin and "illy" every day in June, 1996, and that he had been under the influence of the two drugs during each of the previously described incidents. He further claimed that, because he had used heroin and "illy" on the night of June 27, 1996, he could not specifically remember robbing the store where the clerk had been shot and killed, or shooting the clerk. The petitioner also informed Goodrow that sometime between the June 27 robbery and shooting and the June 30 attempted robbery that immediately preceded his arrest, he had smoked "illy" and attempted to commit suicide by placing a single round of ammunition into a revolver and pulling the trigger several times.

During the habeas trial, Goodrow testified that when she was first appointed to represent the petitioner, she was unfamiliar with the drug "illy," because the petitioner was the first client she had ever represented who claimed to have committed a crime while under the influence of that drug. Accordingly, after she learned of the petitioner's claim that he had continuously used a combination of heroin and "illy" throughout the month of June, 1996, Goodrow explored the viability of several possible defenses to the charged offenses based upon the petitioner's claimed use of that drug, in combination with heroin, at the time of his allegedly criminal conduct, including the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect under § 53a–13⁵ and the defense of lack of intent to commit robbery by reason of voluntary intoxication under § 53a–7.⁶

To that end, Goodrow hired Dr. Peter Zeman, an experienced forensic psychiatrist, to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of the petitioner in order to assess the strength of those possible defenses and to determine "whether or not there was any mitigation evidence or evidence of intoxication." Prior to Zeman's evaluation, Goodrow received an authorization from the petitioner to obtain his medical records from the Department of Correction (DOC). The records she received pursuant to the authorization, however, belonged to a different inmate, who had the same first and last names as the petitioner but a different date of birth.⁷ Failing to recognize that she had received medical records for the wrong Julio Ramos, Goodrow forwarded those records, along with the petitioner's own hospital records,⁸ to Zeman for his review. Sometime after receiving such records, Zeman met with the petitioner and performed a twenty minute psychiatric evaluation of him.

On April 10, 1997, Goodrow met with Zeman to discuss his evaluation of the petitioner. During that meeting, Zeman informed Goodrow that he did not believe that the petitioner was psychotic at the time of the incidents here at issue, and thus that he did not believe that a defense of mental defect or disease was supported by the evidence. Zeman also informed Goodrow that, although he had little experience with the drug "illy," he did not believe that the petitioner's use of "illy" affected his state of consciousness to such a degree that he lacked the ability to form the intent required to commit robbery in any of the five incidents upon which the charges against him were based. In reliance upon Zeman's opinions, Goodrow abandoned her pursuit of both the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect and the defense of lack of intent to commit robbery due to voluntary intoxication. Consequently, Goodrow did not ask Zeman to memorialize his opinions in a formal report.

Goodrow then entered into plea negotiations with the state. In light of the number and severity of the crimes with which he was charged, the petitioner faced a total exposure of over 140 years in prison if he were convicted on all charges. On April 15, 1997, Goodrow received an offer from the state, under which it would agree to cap the petitioner's sentence at a maximum of fifty years with the right to argue...