Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 94-2737 HL.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94-2737 HL.,94-2737 HL.
• Citation: 968 F.Supp. 765
• Parties: Rafael RAMOS et. al., Plaintiffs, v. DAVIS & GECK, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

968 F.Supp. 765

Rafael RAMOS et. al., Plaintiffs, v. DAVIS & GECK, INC., Defendant.

No. 94-2737 HL.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 20, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Herbert W. Brown, III, Brown & Ubarri, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Pedro Pumarada-Surillo, Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Fiddler, Gonzales & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for Davis & Geck, Inc., American Home Prod., Francisco Rosaly.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Fiddler, Gonzales & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for Cyanamid of Puerto Rico, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

On December 28, 1994, Plaintiff Rafael Ramos, his wife, and their two children filed suit alleging that Ramos' former employer Davis & Geck, Inc. constructively discharged him because of his age. On November 18, 1974, Ramos began working for Davis & Geck, Inc. as an accountant in the Accounting Division. In 1980, his supervisors promoted him to Budget Supervisor of the Cost Accounting Section. Ramos alleged that he was pressured into leaving on April 21, 1992 as a result of his demotion (in title only) to the Budget and Cost Accountant position, his transfer to a smaller working cubicle, the heated debates he had with his new supervisor, and the unreasonable pressures that the new supervisor imposed upon him. According to Ramos, these unjustified changes arose out of an age-discriminatory animus.

After a five-day jury trial which began on January 28, 1997, the jury returned its verdict and found by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) Defendant constructively discharged Ramos; (2) Defendant did not constructively discharge Ramos because of his age in violation of ADEA; (3) Defendant constructively discharged Ramos without just cause because of his age in violation of Puerto Rico's Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et. seq. (1995), and awarded Ramos $150,000.00 doubled under the law to $300,000.00; (4) Ramos' wife, Elsa González, suffered damages as a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct and awarded her $50,000.00 under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (1990); and (5) Ramos' sons, Carlos Ramos and Javier Ramos, did not suffer damages as a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct under Article 1802. Dkt. No. 75. Shortly thereafter, on February 13, 1997, the Court entered judgment accordingly. Dkt. No. 78.

Post-Judgment Motions:

Before the Court are several post-judgment motions including (1) Plaintiffs' motion for front pay, attorney's fees, and pre-judgment interest under Puerto Rico's Law 100 and Defendant's opposition thereto, Dkt. Nos. 79, 81, 86, & 92; (2) Defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Defendant's motion for a new trial, and Plaintiffs' opposition thereto, Dkt. Nos. 82 & 88; (3) Plaintiffs' motion for costs and Defendant's opposition thereto, Dkt. Nos. 80, 87, 89, & 91; and (4) Plaintiffs' motion for the execution of the judgment and Defendant's submission of a supersedeas bond, Dkt. Nos. 85 & 90.

These motions require the Court to consider two issues of first impression: (1) the parameters for recovering front pay under Puerto Rico's Law 100; and (2) the methodology applicable to an award of attorney's fees under Puerto Rico's Law 100. The Court shall consider each motion seriatim.¹

A. Front Pay, Attorney's Fees, and Pre-Judgment Interest:

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Plaintiffs timely move to amend the judgment to include front pay, attorney's fees,² and pre-judgment interest. Because the jury did not find that there was an ADEA violation, Plaintiffs properly make this motion pursuant to Puerto Rico's Law 100 and Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 44.3(b). See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et. seq. (1985).

i. Front Pay:

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should amend the judgment and award Rafael Ramos at least $240,000.00 and as much as $987,718.00 in front pay. Plaintiffs suggest that the jury's ADEA and Law 100 verdicts are inconsistent and require the Court to harmonize the results. Plaintiffs' explanation for this seeming contradiction is quite unique: Plaintiffs state:

A fair reading of the jury's verdict can only lead to the inescapable conclusion that since under Law 100 the jurors were afforded the opportunity of awarding back pay, damages for mental and moral anguish and liquidated damages they chose to proceed under Law 100, instead of under the ADEA. Had the jury awarded back pay and liquidated damages under both statutes the verdict would have been duplicitous and improper. Hence, it is evident that under a fair and reasonable reading of the verdict, Ramos prevailed in both his state and federal claims.

Pls.' Mot. Amend J., Dkt. No. 81 at ¶ 5. From the jury's verdict, Plaintiffs draw the interesting, nonetheless misguided, conclusion that co-Plaintiff Rafael Ramos prevailed under both ADEA and Law 100. Plaintiffs, for sure, do not have to rely on ADEA to argue for reinstatement and, in the alternative, for front pay. See Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distributors Corp., 116 D.P.R. 485, 16 Official English Translations 595, 623-24 (1985) (when reinstatement can not be ordered then front pay becomes an indispensable part of the just compensation of an employee under Law 100).

Regardless of Plaintiffs' motive for attempting to draw such a conclusion, Plaintiffs' explanation for the jury's verdict misses the mark. The jury's verdict is entirely consistent with the applicable law under ADEA and Law 100. In fact, it indicates that the jury had a keen awareness of the subtle differences between ADEA and Law 100. As the Court explained to the jury, the burden of proof under the federal statute and Puerto Rico statute is entirely different. One could argue that it is, in fact, potentially outcome-determinative. While the ultimate burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff in an ADEA case, the ultimate burden of proof in a Law 100 case rests upon the defendant. Wildman v. Lerner, 771 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1985); Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Company, 958 F.Supp. 721, 741-43 (D.P.R.1997); Rosa v. Burns & Roe Services Corp., 726 F.Supp. 350, 353 (D.P.R.1989). Therefore, as the Puerto Rico Supreme Court so aptly concluded, "the local legislation is more favorable to plaintiff than its federal counterpart .... it is possibly conceivable that in some controversies the result may ultimately rest on which of the two statutes applies." Ibañez Benitez v. Molinos De Puerto Rico, 114 D.P.R. 42, 14 Official English Translations 58, 73 (1983). Undoubtedly, as a result of the heavier burden of proof, the jury found against Rafael Ramos under ADEA and for Rafael Ramos under Law 100. The jury's verdict is consistent and does not require harmonization.

Plaintiffs rely on Odriozola and Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.1997) to recover Rafael Ramos' projected future earnings with Davis & Geck, Inc. until Ramos reaches the age of seventy. There are three reasons, however, why the Court denies Ramos' motion. First, Ramos did not make a specific request for front pay under Law 100 in the pretrial order. Therefore, Ramos waived his right to request this equitable remedy. Second, in the alternative, the Court finds that Ramos has not demonstrated that reinstatement, which he does not request and does not want, is an impossibility because of an existing antagonism between him and Davis & Geck, Inc. Third, even assuming that Ramos demonstrated that reinstatement was impossible because of an existing antagonism, the Court would find that the jury's verdict made him whole again and, therefore, deny his request for front pay.³

The first reason is very straightforward. The pretrial order "shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial conference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e). "If pretrial orders are to achieve their intended purpose, `courts and litigants must ordinarily take them seriously.'" Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1195 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting authority omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1423, 134 L.Ed.2d 547 (1996). The failure to state the damages that the plaintiff is specifically seeking in the pretrial order waives that claim for relief. See, e.g., Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Services, Inc., 8 F.3d 1018, 1035 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (by omitting a claim for back pay from the complaint the Secretary waived the right to seek that relief).

Ramos admits that he has never requested reinstatement. At the time the complaint was filed and throughout the course of the litigation, Ramos maintained that reinstatement was impossible or impractical. See Pretrial Order, Dkt. No. 38 at 10. A close analysis of the pretrial order also demonstrates that Ramos only sought front pay in relation to his ADEA claim and never requested front pay for his Law 100 claim. Id. at 10-11. Ramos specifically asked for back pay, liquidated damages, and front pay under ADEA. Id. at 10. For Law 100, Ramos merely stated:

Under Law 100, Ramos is entitled to recover for his mental and moral anguish as a result of his discriminatory dismissal. All damages recovered by Ramos under Law 100, including those for mental and moral anguish, must be doubled pursuant to said statute without any special showing.

Id. at 11. Quite clearly, Ramos never requested front pay under Law 100 in the pretrial order and, as a result, waived his right to seek such relief. Ramos' specific requests for relief under ADEA and his requests for pre-judgment interest and attorneys' fees under Law 100 belies any claim that he was unaware of the obligation to define the specific relief that he seeks for each claim in the pretrial order. Id. at 11. The Court must, therefore, deny Ramos' claim for front pay.

Even if Ramos included the claim of front pay under Law 100 in the pretrial order, the Court would...