Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co.

• Decision Date: 21 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-2073 HL.,No. 95-1043 HL.,95-1043 HL.,95-2073 HL.
• Citation: 958 F.Supp. 721
• Parties: Eddie DOMINGUEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY et al., Defendants. Natividad Correa et al., Plaintiffs, v. Eli Lilly and Company et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

958 F.Supp. 721

Eddie DOMINGUEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY et al., Defendants.

Natividad Correa et al., Plaintiffs, v. Eli Lilly and Company et al., Defendants.

No. 95-1043 HL.

No. 95-2073 HL.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 21, 1997.

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Rosa M. Nogueras, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Carl E. Schuster, Schuster, Usera, Aguilo & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Eli Lilly and Co., Inc. of Indianapolis, IN.

Mari C. Bosch-Alomar, McConnell Valdes, San Juan, PR, Carl E. Schuster, Maria L. Santiago-de-Vidal, Schuster, Usera, Aguilo & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Eli Lilly Indus., Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs' opposition thereto. For the reasons adumbrated below, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' ADEA, Law 100, and Article 1802 claims, dismisses Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, and enters judgment accordingly.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The summary judgment tool filters out cases in which plaintiffs rely entirely upon conclusory assertions and speculative allegations to state a claim for relief. After a respectable period of time for discovery through interrogatories, requests for admissions, requests for the production of documents, and depositions, reliance upon pure speculation is unacceptable. Plaintiffs are required to garner either direct or circumstantial evidence to back upon their legal claims. Throughout the discovery process, the plaintiffs should constantly be focused on gathering relevant evidence that, at the very least, creates a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.¹ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

All too frequently, litigants before the District Court of Puerto Rico overlook the importance of the anti-ferret rule in the summary judgment stage: Local Rule 311.12. Without such a rule, the Court would have to search through the record, with or without the assistance of counsel, for lurking evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transport. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 920-31 (1st Cir. 1983). Local Rule 311.12 prevents "the recurrent problem of `ferreting through the record'" and "the specter of district judges being unfairly sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues." Id. at 931. It requires the party moving for summary judgment to file a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts that supports its claim that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. These facts are deemed admitted unless the non-moving party files a similarly separate, short, and concise statement of material facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue in dispute.

The anti-ferret rule serves one crucial purpose. It lays out the material facts in dispute clearly for a district court that is swamped with an overwhelming number of civil and criminal dispositive motions. It requires both the moving party and the non-moving party to properly support their respective lists of material facts with specific references to the Record. Without specific references to the Record, the list of uncontested and contested facts does not serve its purpose. The Court would have to continue to ferret through the Record, read all the answers to the interrogatories, study all the attached documents, and carefully scrutinize all the depositions for lurking genuine issues of material facts. Stepanischen warns parties, however, that the failure to make specific references to the Record "would, where appropriate, be grounds for judgment against the party." Id.

The anti-ferret rule does not change the shifting burdens of the parties. The moving party, along with its statement of uncontested facts, has the initial burden of pointing out the absence of evidence and the non-moving party, along with its statement of contested facts, has the ultimate burden of setting forth the specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. The rule also does not change the non-moving party's burden of coming forward with more than a trivial, "scintilla of evidence" or creating more than a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Once the non-movant comes forward with more than a scintilla of evidence, the Court construes the material facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the non-moving party.

PLAINTIFFS' VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-FERRET RULE

At issue in this case is Defendants' Early Retirement Plan ("ERP"). Plaintiffs and Defendants have diametrically opposed interpretations of why Defendants introduced the ERP. On the one hand, Plaintiffs allege that they agreed to retire under the plan because Defendants presented them with a take-it-or-leave-it demand. See Pls.' Am. Compls., Dkt. Nos. 9 & 30. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants forced them to accept early retirement because of their age by: (a) making working conditions entirely unappealable and unreasonable before they offered the ERP, see Pl.'s Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 at ¶'s 23—30 & 40; Pls.' Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 30 at ¶ 17; (b) harassing older employees before they offered the ERP, see Pl.'s Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 at ¶'s 35; Pls.' Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 30 at ¶ 21; and (c) offering them a voluntary retirement plan full of incentives under the threat that if they rejected the plan they could be demoted or discharged, see Pl.'s Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 at ¶'s 37—39 & 41—43; Pls.' Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 30 at ¶ 22—23, 25—27. In essence, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' actions forced them to retire early because of their age and, therefore, constitutes a constructive discharge in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Puerto Rico's Law 100.

On the other hand, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' acceptance of the ERP was voluntary, free from coercion and undue pressure, and selected by Plaintiffs because of the beneficial incentives in the plan. Defendants assert that it was part of a world-wide reorganization of the company which had absolutely nothing to do with age discrimination. Defendants maintain that many employees who rejected the plan continue to work for the company today.

If there was evidentiary support for both Plaintiffs and Defendants' respective positions, undoubtedly there would be several genuine issues of material facts in dispute precluding the entry of a judgment as a matter of law. However, Plaintiffs have (1) failed to comply with the anti-ferret rule and (2) failed to produce probative evidence of age discrimination.

Attached to Plaintiffs' motion opposing summary judgment is a twenty-five page list of contested facts filled with speculation, generalities, conclusory assertions, improbable inferences, and, for lack of a better phrase, a lot of "hot air." Pls.' Opp'n Mot., Dkt. No. 115 at 4—30.² Plaintiffs' quotation from the anti-ferret rule leaves out the most important part: "The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Local Rule 311.12 (emphasis added); Pls.' Opp'n Mot., Dkt. No. 115 at 4. Plaintiffs fail in every sense of the word to substantiate their contested facts with proper and specific references to the Record.

There are contested facts which do not refer to any exhibit at all: #'s 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, & 21.³ There are contested facts which refer to exhibits but leave out the specific location of the evidentiary support within the exhibit: #'s 1, 3, 12, & 18. There are contested facts which refer to exhibits that do not support the alleged contentions: #'s 1, 3, & 12. Furthermore, there are contested facts which speculate as to Defendants' intentions and actions without any evidentiary support whatsoever: #'s 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, & 20. Finally, there are contested facts that discuss issues that are entirely irrelevant to the question of whether there was age discrimination: #'s 2 (whether the ERP compensated Plaintiffs for all their years of service and whether it was an attractive plan); 10 (whether Defendants breached the terms of the ERP); 12 (while the ERP pamphlet and discussions were in Spanish, the one-page acceptance form was in English); 16, 17, 18, & 19 (whether Plaintiffs accepted a good retirement deal); and 20 (the other individuals who accepted the ERP have not sued because they either do not want to have anything to do with Defendants anymore or lack the appropriate legal advice).

As a result of Plaintiffs' violation of the anti-ferret rule, Plaintiffs have deemed admitted the following uncontested facts: #'s 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, B.1—B.13, C.1—C.11, D.1—D.3, E.1—E.12, F.1—F.4, G.1—G.9, H.1—H.8, & I.1—I.12. As explained in the discussion section below, these admissions alone require the Court to grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants.

There may be a very good reason why Plaintiffs overlooked the anti-ferret rule. An independent and thorough examination of the Record reveals that there is no evidentiary support for Plaintiffs' speculative accusations.⁴ Some of the most glaring examples of conclusory assertions without any proof are: (1) Younger individuals with less experience replaced Plaintiffs initially as temporary employees and later as permanent employees, see Pls.'...