Ramos v. Dep't of Educ. for Puerto Rico
| Decision Date | 01 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1653(CVR). |
| Citation | 849 F.Supp.2d 212,282 Ed. Law Rep. 881 |
| Parties | Luis Rodriguez RAMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR the Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eduardo A. Vera–Ramirez, Eileen Landron–Guardiola, Luis A. Rodriguez–Munoz, Landron & Vera LLP, Guaynabo, PR, Leila S. Castro–Moya, San Juan, PR, Carlos Del–Valle–Cruz, Rivera & Assoc., Isabela, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Carlos E. Cardona–Fernandez, Carolina, PR, Michael C. McCall, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, PSC, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Luis Rodríguez Ramos, Juan Alexis Del Valle Meléndez, their respective spouses and conjugal partnerships, and plaintiffs Elizabeth Ortega Medina, Carmen Rosa Martínez, Josefina Arroyo Saurí and María T. Toste Arana (hereafter “plaintiffs” or identified by their respective last names when applicable) filed a Complaint for civil rights violations under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. Plaintiffs allege being subject of discrimination based on their political affiliation while employed at the Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (hereafter “DE”). (Docket No. 1).
Defendants are the DE, plaintiffs' employer, and other co-defendants who were officers of the DE, who are sued in their individual and official capacities, as follows: Jesús Rivera–Sánchez, Secretary of the DE (hereafter “Rivera–Sánchez”), Carlos Chardón, former Secretary of the DE (hereafter “Chardón”), Brenda Virella–Crespo, Director of the Legal Division of the DE (hereafter “Virella”), Sonia Dalila Román, Special Aide in the DE (hereafter “Román”), Magaly Rivera Rivera, Regional Director of Caguas in the DE (hereafter “Rivera”), María de los Angeles Lizardi Valdes, Human Resources Director in the DE (hereafter “Lizardi”), Carmen Yolanda Cartagena, Special Aide in the DE (hereafter “Cartagena”), Carmen Cepeda Ramos, Special Aide in the DE (hereafter “Cepeda” and/or “defendants” or their respective last names as above cited).
The parties consented to jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge, for which the case was referred on December 5, 2011 for all further proceedings including the pending motions, the jury trial and the entry of judgment. (Docket Nos. 49 and 50).
Defendants filed separate, joint, individual and even supplemental motions 1 to dismiss, to which plaintiffs have submitted their oppositions. Thereafter the parties were allowed to file replies and sur-replies, which are now ripe for disposition, to wit:
(A) Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' Section 1983 by defendant DE on Eleventh Amendment grounds (Docket No. 8);
(B) Motion to Dismiss by defendant Rivera–Sánchez (Docket No. 9), Response in Opposition (Docket No. 17);
(C) Motion to Dismiss by defendants DE, Lizardi, Chardón, and Virella under R. 12(b)(6) and qualified immunity (Docket No. 31), Response in Opposition (Docket No. 38), Reply to Response (Docket No. 48);
(D) Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Joinder by Rivera–Sánchez to Docket No. 31 (Docket No. 35), Supplemental Response in Opposition (Docket No. 47), Supplemental Opposition (Docket No. 57);
(E) Motion to Dismiss Combined by defendants Román, Cartagena (Docket No. 39), Supplemental Opposition (Docket No. 47);
(F) Supplemental Motion to Dismiss by defendants Rivera–Sánchez (Docket No. 41), Supplemental Response in Opposition (Docket No. 47).
After the case was referred to this Magistrate Judge, defendants filed an additional motions to dismiss:
(G) Motion to Dismiss by defendant Cepeda (Docket No. 54), Supplemental Opposition (Docket No. 55), Reply (Docket No. 60).
Since the issues raised by the parties are intermingled and at times repetitious, we discuss the averments of each motion and their relevant legal contentions, as applicable.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissal may be warranted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2
To elucidate a motion to dismiss the Court must accept as true “all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). A complaint must set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory.” Romero–Barceló v. Hernández–Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996) ( quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)). The Court, need not accept a complaint's “ ‘bald assertions' or legal conclusions” when assessing a motion to dismiss. Abbott, III v. United States, 144 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1998) ( citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir.1996)).
The Supreme Court most recent opinion changes the standard for a motion to dismiss so that plaintiff will now have to include more information in the pleadings if he/she wants to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). 3 The First Circuit has cited to this decision and has already noted this new standard in Rodríguez–Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 94–95 (1st Cir.2007), copied in part below:
At the outset, we note that even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In so doing, the Court disavowed the oft-quoted language of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969. The Court found that the “no set of facts” language, if taken literally, would impermissibly allow for the pleading of “a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim,” and that “after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.” Id. at 1968, 1969.
Similarly under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, the factual statements of the complaint are considered true, indulging every reasonable inference helpful to plaintiff's cause. However, the tenet that a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions and mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
On September 6, 2011, defendant DE filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in that, as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim. (Docket No. 8). The record shows plaintiffs did not file an opposition to this legal contention.
The Eleventh Amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
A civil rights action would be barred by Eleventh Amendment when an employer qualifies as an alter ego of a state instrumentality or as a governmental agency. Figueroa–Rodríguez v. Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037 (1st Cir.1988). C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3524. The Eleventh Amendment, which deprives federal courts of power to hear claims for damages as to any state or their alter egos, has been held to apply to Puerto Rico. See Ramírez v. Puerto Rico Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694 (1st Cir.1983); 4see also Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, 991 F.2d 935 (1st Cir.1993).
It is uncontested the DE, defendant herein in a Section 1983 claim, is a governmental agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has assumed, without discussion, the DE's Eleventh Amendment immunity is coextensive with that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Díaz–Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 34 (1st Cir.2006); Marín–Piazza v. Aponte–Roque, 873 F.2d 432, 437 n. 6 (1st Cir.1989); Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 59 (1st Cir.1982); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir.1978).
Succinctly, the DE is not to be considered a person for purposes of Section 1983 relief. Second, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has not consented to be sued nor has Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity as to Section 1983 cases. Finally, as to any supplemental state claims raised in the Complaint on state law and pendent jurisdiction, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has allowed for claims to be presented only in state court and has not waived its sovereign immunity for such suits to be raised before federal courts or any other jurisdiction.
Thus, and in the absence of any objection from plaintiffs, defendant DE's Motion to Dismiss under Eleventh Amendment is GRANTED. (Docket No. 8).
Co-defendant Rivera–Sánchez requests dismissal for plaintiffs have failed to establish claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rivera–Sánchez also claims, as to being sued in his official capacity, that he is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Dismissal is also claimed for pendent state claims for money damages under Art. 1803 of the P.R. Civil Code. (Docket No. 9).
Co-defendant Rivera–Sánchez argues plaintiffs have claimed their Section...
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...to make him or her a plausible defendant.”); see also Ramos v. Dept. of Educ. for the Commonwealth of P.R., No. 11–1653, 849 F.Supp.2d 212, 222–23, 2012 WL 346455, at *9, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957, at *26 (D.P.R. Feb. 1, 2012) ( prima facie case of political discrimination not established......