Ramos v. Municipality of Grande

• Decision Date: 11 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 18-1050 (JAG)
• Parties: CARLOS L. ROSARIO RAMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF RÍO GRANDE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

CARLOS L. ROSARIO RAMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF RÍO GRANDE, et al., Defendants.

CIV. NO. 18-1050 (JAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 11, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment. Docket No. 53. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment, DISMISSING all federal claims WITH PREJUDICE and all state claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2018, Carlos L. Rosario-Ramos ("Rosario-Ramos"), Ivelisse Rosario-Méndez ("Rosario-Méndez"), and Ricardo Torrens-Osorio ("Torrens-Osorio") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed this complaint against their employer, the Municipality of Río Grande ("Municipality"); Hon. Ángel B. González-Damudt ("Mayor"); Rey O. Caraballo-Rodríguez ("Caraballo-Rodríguez"); Leysla Ortiz-Sánchez ("Ortiz-Sánchez"); José A. Adorno-Aponte ("Adorno-Aponte"); and Evelyn González-Robles ("González-Robles") (collectively, "Defendants") in their official and personal capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.¹

In sum, Rosario-Ramos and Rosario-Méndez allege that Defendants violated their FirstAmendment rights by discriminating and retaliating against them for making constitutionally protected public statements. Torrens-Osorio—Rosario-Méndez's spouse—claims First Amendment retaliation due to his wife's statements, as well as damages under Article 1802 for the persecution and discrimination that he purportedly suffered while working at the Municipality's Public Works Department. Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages of no less than $300,000.00 for Rosario-Ramos, $300,000.00 for Rosario-Méndez, $50,000.00 for Torrens-Osorio, and $50,000.00 for the Torrens-Rosario conjugal partnership. Furthermore, they request equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate Plaintiffs to their positions, as well as attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "When the party who bears the burden of proof at trial is faced with a properly constituted summary judgment motion, defeating the motion depends on her ability to show that such a dispute exists." Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010)). But the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); see Cherkaoui, v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996)) ("Facts are material when they have the 'potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.' A dispute is 'genuine' if 'the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.'").

Failure to timely oppose a motion for summary judgment does not, automatically, justify entry of summary judgment against that party; therefore, a court is "obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would legally be appropriate." Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see De la Vega v. San Juan Star, 377 F.3d 111, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, "a party that fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment does so at its own risk and peril." QuiñonesRodríguez v. Andoxx Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 77, 78 (D.P.R. 2006); see also Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2001). As a result, the court may deem as uncontested all evidence and facts presented with the unopposed motion. Nieto-Vincenty v. Valledor, 22 F. Supp. 3d 153, 161 (D.P.R. 2014). Thus, the moving party generally prevails. Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., 440 F.3d 531, 534 (1st Cir. 2006) ("While an unopposed summary judgment still must be scrutinized in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 . . . [i]n most cases, a party's failure to oppose summary judgment is fatal to its case.").

FINDINGS OF FACT

After carefully reviewing Defendants' unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 53, and Statement of Uncontested Facts ("DSUMF"), Docket No. 53-1, as well as its supporting exhibits, the Court adopts Defendants' factual narrative by reference and deems it undisputed.³ Although the most relevant material facts are included in the forthcoming discussion, the Court will first provide a brief summary of each Plaintiff's allegations.

Plaintiff Rosario-Ramos worked as a heavy equipment driver from 2009 to January 31, 2017 under a temporary employment contract renewed every certain amount of time. DSUMF ¶¶ 181-89.He had documented attendance issues prior to September 2016, and he was publicly affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party, the Mayor's party. Id. at ¶¶ 226-33. On September 22, 2016, per the reading of a report filed with the police on that same day, Rosario-Ramos was involved in a physical altercation with his supervisor, Caraballo-Rodríguez. Id. at ¶¶ 342-50. On September 25, 2016, he posted the following on the social media website Facebook: "Populares de Rio Grande with David Acosta" (which translates to "Popular Party Members with David Acosta", who is the Mayor's political opponent). Id. at ¶¶ 192-201. On September 26, 2016, Caraballo-Rodríguez asked Rosario-Ramos to sign an OP-13 form to exhaust his compensatory balance. Rosario-Ramos's contract ran until December 31, 2016 and it was renewed by the Municipality twice during January 2017, months after the post. Id. at ¶¶ 224-40. On January 31, 2017, after the extensions ended, his contract was not renewed due to the attendance issues that traced back to months prior to the post. Id. at ¶¶ 235-36.

Plaintiff Rosario-Méndez, who was also under a temporary employment contract, worked as a Purchaser for the Municipality since July 19, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 3-5. She verified auctions and price quotes, and kept records of orders for materials. Id. at ¶¶ 5-7. Defendant Adorno-Aponte was her supervisor at all pertinent times. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27. On October 2016, Rosario-Méndez talked to a reporter named José "Cheo" Cruz regarding what she suspected were illegalities in several transactions she handled. Id. at ¶¶ 92-99. Rosario-Méndez's contract was renewed monthly from January 2017 until September 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 164-74. On October 24, 2017, her contract was not renewed due to attendance and job abandonment issues. Id. at ¶¶ 34-42; ¶¶ 164-74.

Plaintiff Torrens-Osorio works as a heavy truck driver for the Municipality since April 2006. Id. at ¶¶ 241-246. His position is permanent, and he is married to Rosario-Méndez. Id. His only allegation against Defendants is that the Municipality engaged in reprisal against him as a result of his wife's expressions to José "Cheo" Cruz. Id. Specifically, that the Mayor ordered a "demeaning campaign" against him and banned him from driving his truck. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs bring their § 1983 suit under the First Amendment, which "insulates public employees who hold nonpolicymaking positions from the vicissitudes of personnel decisions rooted in partisan political concerns." Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other grounds by Reyes-Orta v. P.R. Highway and Transp. Auth., 811 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2016)); see also Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 938 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[T]he First Amendment also prohibits government officials from taking adverse employment action against a non-policymaking government employee based on the employee's political affiliation . . . .").

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs did not place this Court in a position to believe a reasonable juror would conclude that "a particular defendant's conduct caused the deprivation of a constitutional right." Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1998). Less so when the record contains little or no evidence suggesting a causal nexus between Plaintiffs' political affiliation or expressions, and Defendants' conduct.⁴ As such, the Court will proceed to discuss each Plaintiff's claims in turn.

II. Political Discrimination

"A plaintiff bringing a political discrimination claim under the First Amendment bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence from which a jury may infer that plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct [or political affiliation] was a substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse employment action." Torres-Rivera v.P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 598 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255-56 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Maymi v.P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2008)); see also Rodríguez-Ríos v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, one must show: "(1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff's affiliation; (3) a challenged employment action occurred; and (4) political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind it." Martín-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, only one Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on his change of political affiliation....