Ramos v. Nebraska

• Citation: 396 F.Supp.2d 1053
• Decision Date: 17 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 4:05CV3056.,4:05CV3056.
• Parties: Angela RAMOS, Plaintiff, v. The State of NEBRASKA and Jon C. Bruning, Nebraska Attorney General, in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

396 F.Supp.2d 1053

Angela RAMOS, Plaintiff, v. The State of NEBRASKA and Jon C. Bruning, Nebraska Attorney General, in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 4:05CV3056.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska.

October 17, 2005.

Robert B. Creager, Anderson, Creager Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, for Plaintiff.

Jennifer M. Tomka, Attorney General's Office, Lincoln, NE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KOPF, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Angela Ramos ("Ramos"), has filed a § 1983 action against the State of Nebraska and the Nebraska Attorney General, seeking declaratory relief only. The defendants have moved to dismiss the action. Their motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Following a series of hearings in the County Court of York County, Nebraska, Ramos's parental rights to five minor children were terminated pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-292(2), (6), and (7).¹ (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 6-7.) Ramos appealed the termination order to the Nebraska Supreme Court, claiming, among other things, that she was denied effective assistance of counsel and that her due process rights were violated because her attorney did not file a timely appeal from an earlier County Court order that changed the permanency objective of Ramos's rehabilitation plan from family reunification to termination of her parental rights. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 13.) The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the termination order on February 28, 2003, and denied rehearing on April 23, 2003. See In re Interest of Joshua R., 265 Neb. 374, 657 N.W.2d 209 (2003). (Id., ¶ 11.)

Ramos alleges that the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected her appeal without considering whether she had a due process right to effective assistance of counsel or whether she was prejudiced by her attorney's failure to perfect an appeal from the County Court's order changing the rehabilitation plan. (Id., ¶ ¶ 11, 13.) She also complains that "[t]he [Nebraska Supreme] Court's conclusion that any violation of her due process rights with respect to counsel's untimely appeal of the change in plan was attenuated by her opportunity to fully contest the merits of the termination proceeding was arbitrary and capricious,...." (Id., ¶ 13.)

Ramos requests this court to declare: (1) "that the termination of her parental rights was procured in violation of her constitutional right to due process of law[;]" (2) "that in the event that the State seeks to terminate her parental rights ... [to] her remaining children, the State ... must provide [] her with effective assistance of counsel[;]" and (3) "that the State of Nebraska cannot terminate the parental rights of a party unless such party is provided a procedure for challenging a termination on the grounds that the party was not afforded effective assistance of counsel[.]" (Id., pp. 4-5.) Such declaratory relief allegedly is sought under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 5.)

Named as defendants in this action are the State of Nebraska and the Nebraska Attorney General, Jon C. Bruning, who is sued in his official capacity only. Ramos alleges that she was deprived "of her fundamental right to the possession, custody and control of her natural born children, in violation of her rights to due process of law and equal protection of the law" because the defendants (1) "permitt[ed] the termination of [parental] rights to occur when the record evidence showed that the [plaintiff's] court appointed attorney failed to timely appeal a court order changing the objective of the proceeding from reunification to termination," and (2) "fail[ed] to provide any procedural remedy or safeguard in the process... [to protect against] errors, neglect, or unreasonable actions by counsel." (Id., ¶ 14.)

Ramos alleges that she "was prejudiced as the result of her attorney's unreasonable and ineffective presentation of the case against termination" because (1) "termination of parental rights could be based solely on the fact that the children had otherwise been in foster care for 15 of the last 22 months,"² and (2) "a successful appeal would have precluded the case moving toward termination." (Id., ¶ 15.) Concerning her request for prospective relief, Ramos simply alleges that she "has other minor children that could be subject to further action by the State to terminate her parental rights as to those children." (Id., ¶ 17.)

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), and, in support of their motion, argue that: (1) the State is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) Ramos does not have standing; and (4) the action is barred by the Supreme Court's holdings in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). As will be discussed in some detail below, I generally agree with the defendants' first three arguments, but not the fourth, and I conclude that the plaintiff's action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although not specifically argued by the defendants, I also find that no equal protection claim is stated.

II. DISCUSSION

"A court does not obtain subject-matter jurisdiction just because a plaintiff raises a federal question in his or her complaint. If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate. Because this is a facial rather than a factual challenge to jurisdiction, [the court must] determine whether the asserted jurisdictional basis is patently meritless by looking to the face of the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). However, a district court may also make factual determinations when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir.2002) (district court's fact findings concerning availability of relief sought by plaintiff reviewed for clear error).

A court may take judicial notice of public records when considering a motion to dismiss, including a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.³ See Stahl v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir.2003); Faibisch, 304 F.3d at 802-03. Accordingly, I have considered the Nebraska Supreme Court's published opinion in In re Interest of Joshua R. that is cited in the plaintiff's amended complaint and discussed in the defendants' brief. See Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir.1996) (federal courts may sua sponte take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the matters at issue).

With respect to the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, dismissing only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. See Moses.com Securities, Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Systems, Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1062 (8th Cir.2005). Although the pleading standard is liberal, the plaintiff must allege facts — not mere legal conclusions — that, if true, would support the existence of the claimed constitutional violations. See id.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

"The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits brought against the states in federal courts."⁴ In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.1996). "The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends to both suits for monetary damages and those for declaratory or injunctive relief." Id. "In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), however, the Supreme Court established a fundamental exception to the Eleventh Amendment's immunity doctrine ... [by recognizing] that suits may be brought in federal court against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent future violations of federal law." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

Congress did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 600 (8th Cir.1992); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). See also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (a state is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983).⁵ It is also well-settled that the State of Nebraska has not waived its immunity from liability in civil rights actions. See Poor Bear v. Nesbitt, 300 F.Supp.2d 904, 913-14 (D.Neb.2004) (citing cases). Thus, regardless of the relief sought,⁶ the plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim directly against the State of Nebraska.⁷ See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.)

However, "State officials acting in their official capacities are § 1983 `persons' when sued for prospective relief, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such relief." Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir.1997). See also Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because `official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'") (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). The plaintiff's § 1983 claim therefore may proceed against the Nebraska Attorney General to the extent that she seeks prospective declaratory or injunctive relief, but not otherwise.

Most of Ramos's allegations are concerned with the conduct of past judicial proceedings in the ...