Ramos v. State, 83-949
Decision Date | 12 June 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-949,83-949 |
Citation | 457 So.2d 492 |
Parties | Rene RAMOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and R. James Pelstring, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and G. Bart Billbrough, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS STATE'S CROSS-APPEAL
Ramos, the defendant below, having appealed from a judgment adjudicating him guilty of second-degree murder, moves to dismiss the State's cross-appeal from the trial court's ruling that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of first-degree murder. 1 We deny the motion to dismiss.
The short answer to Ramos' motion is that a trial court's determination that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict is a ruling on a question of law, and Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(H) expressly authorize the State to cross-appeal from a "ruling on a question of law" when, as here, the defendant appeals his judgment of conviction. See Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38 (Fla.1952) ( ). 2
Nothing in State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), upon which the defendant relies, dictates a different result. Even accepting, arguendo, Brown 's holding that the State's right to appeal is purely statutory, 3 Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), clearly authorizes the State's cross -appeal, 4 notwithstanding that, as Brown holds, Section 924.07 does not authorize the State's direct appeal from a similar ruling. 5
Ramos fares no better in his alternative claim that double jeopardy considerations preclude the State's appeal.
The State's cross-appeal is not subject to dismissal even in instances where double jeopardy would bar a retrial of the defendant. See Sands v. State, 328 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) ( ). Cf. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ( ). 6 Simply stated, our jurisdiction to hear the State's cross-appeal is unaffected by the fact that we might not be able to effectively grant the relief sought by the State.
But even if, arguendo, our jurisdiction to entertain the State's cross-appeal were affected by double jeopardy considerations, it is clear that double jeopardy is a consideration only when a retrial of the defendant would be necessitated by a reversal of the trial court's ruling. Compare Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38, with Watson v. State, 410 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Sands v. State, 328 So.2d 563. Here, where the State's appeal is from a post-verdict judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, a reversal of that ruling would result only in the reinstatement of the jury's verdict and the directed entry of a judgment thereon, not in a retrial of the defendant. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975):
420 U.S. at 353, 95 S.Ct. at 1026, 43 L.Ed.2d at 246-47.
Thus, our jurisdiction is clear, and our ability to grant relief upon the exercise of that jurisdiction unimpeded. The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
I am unable to agree with the majority's conclusion that "our jurisdiction is clear, and our ability to grant relief upon the exercise of that jurisdiction unimpeded." Appeal of an acquittal should never be permitted. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The court's reduction of the charge from first degree murder to second degree murder constituted an acquittal of the greater offense. Were I free to do so, I would follow State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) and dismiss the cross-appeal. Because this court is bound by Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38 (Fla.1952), I reluctantly concur.
1 The trial court's order reads in pertinent part:
"[T]he jury verdict as to the charge of First Degree Murder is set aside and a Judgment of Acquittal as to the charge of First Degree Murder is entered, and a finding of guilt as to the lesser included offense of Second Degree Murder is hereby entered, upon a finding by this Court that the evidence presented at the trial of this cause failed to prove beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant, a man with no prior criminal past, acted with premeditation uninfluenced or uncontrolled by a dominating passion." (citations omitted).
The correctness of this ruling is not now before us.
2 Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1951), the authority for the State's cross-appeal in Mixon, provided that the State may appeal from "[a] ruling on a question of law adverse to the state where the defendant was convicted and appeals from the judgment" and is...
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Brady v. State, 86-1647
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Ramos v. State
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