Ramsay v. Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1985
• Citation: 495 N.Y.S.2d 282,113 A.D.2d 149
• Parties: Allan G. RAMSAY, Respondent, v. MARY IMOGENE BASSETT HOSPITAL et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 282

495 N.Y.S.2d 282

113 A.D.2d 149

Allan G. RAMSAY, Respondent, v. MARY IMOGENE BASSETT HOSPITAL et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 27, 1985.

Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York City (Leo T. Crowley of counsel), for appellants

Kramer, Wales & Wright, Binghamton (Philip J. Kramer of counsel), for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and MAIN, WEISS, YESAWICH and HARVEY, JJ.

OPINION

MAHONEY, Presiding Justice.

In September 1970, plaintiff, a physician with a specialty in the field of nephrology, became associated with defendant Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital (Bassett Hospital) in the Village of Cooperstown, Otsego County. He was hired by Bassett Hospital to establish a renal dialysis department and to teach medical personnel working or studying in the field of nephrology. During such employment, plaintiff had professional differences of opinion with defendant Charles Allen Ashley, director of Bassett Hospital. As a result of these differences, Bassett Hospital informed plaintiff that for the year July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981, he would have only temporary privileges and that at the end of such period his employment would not be renewed. Plaintiff ended his employment with Bassett Hospital in June 1981, and has sought employment with numerous hospitals and universities.

During the fall and summer of 1983, while plaintiff was seeking employment in Ogden, Utah, he was informed that derogatory material about his status as a physician had been circulated in that area. In December 1983, plaintiff was given permission to examine his file at St. Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah, and discovered that Ashley had made certain statements that plaintiff alleges were false, biased and misleading. Thereafter, plaintiff attempted to obtain his files from various other institutions to determine what information had been submitted by Bassett Hospital concerning his competence as a physician. All of these institutions refused plaintiff access to their files, claiming they were confidential and could not be disclosed without permission from the individual or hospital that made the reference.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Bassett Hospital and Ashley on July 12, 1984 and July 16, 1984, respectively. Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of Statute of Limitations and, alternatively, failure to state a cause of action. Ashley, in an affidavit, swore that none of the references he provided to prospective employers of plaintiff occurred within one year prior to commencement of the action. Plaintiff, in his affidavit, contended that Ashley did furnish defamatory references within one year of the commencement of the action and, further, that he was unable to ascertain to whom and when such references were made because the institutions to which they were sent would not reveal them, claiming they were confidential. Accordingly, plaintiff cross-moved for an order directing defendants to furnish a release to authorize plaintiff to obtain copies of communications made by defendants to prospective employers. Special Term denied defendants' motion as premature with leave to renew upon completion of discovery, authorized service of an amended complaint and directed defendants to authorize discovery of their communications to prospective employers of plaintiff. This appeal by defendants ensued.

Initially, we must determine if plaintiff's claim is, in essence, one for defamation and thereby subject to the one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215). Unlike most torts, defamation is defined in terms of the injury, damage to reputation, and not in terms of the manner in which the injury is accomplished (see, Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.2d 453, 458, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641, 227 N.E.2d 572). In determining the applicability of the relevant Statute of Limitations, " 'look for the reality, and the essence of the action and not its mere name' " (id. at 459, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641, 227 N.E.2d 572, quoting Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902).

Here, plaintiff insists that he has stated, in addition to defamation, causes of action of negligence, interference with prospective contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional harm and prima facie tort. Therefore, he argues that he is entitled to the longer Statute of Limitations applicable to those causes of action. We disagree. When, as here, the claims in a complaint are in essence claims for defamation, a plaintiff may not circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to defamation by redescribing the tort as "prima facie tort" (Clark v. New York Tel. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1069, 1070, 396 N.Y.S.2d 177, 364 N.E.2d 841), "prima facie tort of interference with contractual relationships" (Kartiganer Assoc. v. Town of Newburgh, 57 A.D.2d 857, 858, 394 N.Y.S. 262, appeal dismissed 42 N.Y.2d 974), "injurious falsehood or interference with economic relations" (Noel v. Interboro Mut. Ind. Ins. Co., 31 A.D.2d 54, 55, 295 N.Y.S.2d 399, affd. 29 N.Y.2d 743, 326 N.Y.S.2d 396, 276 N.E.2d 232) or by any other characterization designed to circumvent an otherwise short limitation period (Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., supra ). A fair reading of plaintiff's complaint reveals that each cause of action defines the damage to plaintiff in terms of damage to his reputation. Since defamation is defined in terms of injury to reputation and not in terms of the manner in which it was accomplished, we conclude that the claim asserted is one for...