Ramsey v. Arrott
| Citation | 64 Tex. 320 |
| Decision Date | 05 June 1885 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5290. |
| Parties | J. C. RAMSEY ET AL. v. JAS. B. ARROTT. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Llano. Tried below before the Hon. Jno. C. Townes.
Suit brought by James B. Arrott against W. W. Parks, James C. Ramsey and William Ramsey on the 24th of April, 1880.
On December 12, 1881, the plaintiff filed an amended original petition, and on June 17, 1884, filed another amended original petition in which he alleged that the defendants, James C. Ramsey and William Ramsey, maliciously contriving to injure plaintiff, destroy his character, and expose him to trouble, cost and charges, did, on or about the 6th day of April, 1880, falsely and maliciously, and without probable cause, complain to John C. Oatman, who at that time was county judge of Llano county, that on or about January 22, 1880, plaintiff did wilfully and wantonly, in the county of Llano, and state of Texas, kill about five hundred head of sheep, the property of F. M. Ramsey & Bro., with intent to injure the owners thereof, and thereby caused plaintiff to be apprehended and held before the county judge to answer the charge; that defendants appeared and prosecuted the charge, and by reason of the prosecution plaintiff was held and bound to appear at the next succeeding term of the district court of Llano county to await and answer the action of the grand jury of that county upon the charge, and the court having convened, and the grand jury having failed to present any bill against plaintiff charging him with the offense, he was by the court duly discharged before the filing of this suit, and that the prosecution is, and was at an end before the filing of this suit. That by reason of the prosecution plaintiff was, by virtue of a warrant issued by the county judge, arrested and confined in the county jail of Llano county for forty-eight hours, causing him great humiliation and mental and physical suffering. That by reason of the malicious prosecution plaintiff sustained damage on account of physical and mental sufferings in the sum of $5,000, which he claims as actual damages, and claims the further sum of $4,000 as exemplary damages. Plaintiff also claims special damages to the amount of $54. The petition alleges that defendants reside in San Saba county, but at the time of the institution of the suit resided in Llano county.
On June 17, 1884, the defendants, James C. Ramsey and William Ramsey, filed their amended original answer, as follows:
First. That at the time of the commencement of the suit, and ever since that time, the defendants had resided in San Saba county and not in the county of Llano. This plea was made under oath.
Second. General exceptions.
Third. A special exception that it appeared from plaintiff's amended petition that his cause of action, if any he had, accrued more than one year before the same was sued on or pleaded in this cause.
Fourth. Special exceptions to plaintiff's claim for special damages.
Fifth. General denial.
On June 18, 1884, defendants' special exception to so much of plaintiff's petition as claims special damages was sustained and the other exceptions were overruled. The case was tried by a jury on June 18, 1884, the plaintiff dismissed as to defendant Parks, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $2,750 actual damages, and $1,000 exemplary damages.
J. C. Matthews and F. D. Wilkes, for appellants, cited: Clark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344; King v. Prichard, 1 Keble, 525; Queen v. Banks, 6 Mod., 246; Potter v. Casterline, 12 Vroom, 22, and cited in note to Graves v. Dawson, 39 Am. Rep., pp. 432, 433;Griffin v. Chubb, 7 Tex., 603;McNese v. Herring, 8 Tex., 151; notes to Sharp v. Johnson, 21 Am. L. Reg., 582 to 588; 2 Addison on Torts, sec. 853, note, 858 and sec. 881; Goodrich v. Warner, 21 Conn., 435, 443; 1 Hilliard on Torts, pp. 220, 416, 417, 420, 421, 428 to 430, 437; Laughlin v. Clarkson, 27 Pa. St., 330.
H. E. Barnard, for appellee, cited: Raleigh v. Cook, 60 Tex., 442; Potter v. Casterline, Cent. Law Jour., vol. 9, p. 63 (); Schoonover v. Myers, 28 Ill., 308;Williams v. Warnell, 28 Tex., 610;Warner v. Bailey, 7 Tex., 519; Heslop v. Chapman, 22 Eng. L. & E. Rep., 296.
To sustain an action to recover damages for a malicious prosecution, the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of malice in putting the prosecution upon foot, and the want of probable cause for so doing.
The best approved definition of malice, as used in its legal sense, is that given in 2 Greenleaf's Evidence, sec. 453, as follows: “Any unlawful act, done wilfully and purposely, to the injury of another, is, as against that person, malicious.”
It is often said that malice may be inferred from circumstances; this means that the circumstances attending the prosecution may be such as to satisfy the mind that the party was actuated by wrongful motives in the institution and continuance of the prosecution. This wrong motive, coupled with a wrongful act wilfully done to the injury of another, constitutes legal malice; and may be established as well by circumstantial as direct evidence. The existence or non-existence of malice is a question of fact to be determined from a consideration of the evidence.
Even though malice may be established, yet it will not, unaided, support the action. There must be a want of probable cause concurring with the malice, before a recovery can be had.
Among the very best definitions given of probable cause, the absence or want of which is essential in actions for malicious prosecution, is that by the supreme court of the United States in Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How., 545, and which is, “the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”
From this definition it is apparent that the existence or non-existence of probable cause does not depend upon the prosecutor's belief of the party's guilt or innocence, or the existence of such facts and circumstances as might influence his judgment, without regard to the effect it might have upon the judgment of others.
Ordinarily probable cause is a question of law. Greenwade v. Mills, 31 Miss., 464;Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray, 201;Chapman v. Cowrey, 50 Ill., 512;McWilliams v. Hoban, 42 Md., 56;Masten v. Deyo, 2 Wend., 424;Sweet v. Negus, 30 Mich., 406.
When the facts are not contested, and there is no conflict in the evidence directed to that issue, the question of probable cause is a matter of law which is to be decided by the court.
But when the facts are contested, or there is a conflict of evidence, then it becomes...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Lieck
...was harmless. without change in many Texas decisions, and is of longstanding acceptance. See Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 921 (citing Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320 (1885)); Compton v. Calabria, 811 S.W.2d 945, 949-50 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, no writ); Williams v. Frank Parra Chevrolet, Inc., 552 S.W.......
-
Stubbs v. Mulholland
... ... anywise tending to prove the same. Spaulding v ... Same, 56 Mich. 366; Ramsey v. Arnott, 64 Tex ... 320; Smith v. Edge, 52 Pa. St. 419; Hamilton v ... Smith, 39 Mich. 227; 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 26, note ... 3 ... ...
-
Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co.
...Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938, 104 S.Ct. 1911, 80 L.Ed.2d 460 (1984); see Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320, 323 (Tex.1885) (quoting Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 551-52, 24 How. 544, 16 L.Ed. 765 (1860)). The probable-cause determination asks wheth......
-
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Zavaleta
...court submitted the same definition of probable cause as that used in Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.1983) and Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320, 323 (Tex.1885) (Akin and Ramsey were malicious prosecution cases.). The majority concluded that when, as in this case, the indictment is caus......