Ramsey v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 02 June 1931 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
| Parties | ETHEL H. RAMSEY v. CAROLINE J. RAMSEY and ROBERT R. REDINGTON |
Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 11, November Term 1930.
Action on the case for alienation of affections.
James R. Morford (of Marvel, Morford, Ward and Logan) for plaintiff.
Caleb S. Layton and David J. Reinhardt, Jr., for defendants.
OPINION
RICHARDS, J. charging the jury:
This action has been brought by Ethel H. Ramsey, the plaintiff, against Caroline J. Ramsey and Robert R. Redington, the defendants, to recover damages for the injury which she claims to have sustained by the loss of the affections of her husband, Joseph G. Ramsey.
The various counts of the plaintiff's declaration charge that the defendants were responsible for her loss of her said husband's affections, and the damage resulting therefrom. This charge is denied by the defendants.
We have been requested to instruct you to return a verdict for the plaintiff against both of the defendants, or, to return a verdict for the plaintiff against each of the defendants separately, for, at least, nominal damages. This we decline to do.
Therefore, gentlemen, the sole question for your determination is, whether either or both of the defendants are responsible for the plaintiff's loss of the affection of her husband, Joseph G. Ramsey.
If you should be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants, Caroline J. Ramsey and Robert R. Redington, are both responsible for the plaintiff's loss of the affections of her said husband, your verdict should be for the plaintiff against both the defendant, Caroline J. Ramsey, and the defendant, Robert R. Redington; or, if you should be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Caroline J. Ramsey, alone is responsible for the plaintiff's loss of the affections of her said husband, your verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the defendant, Caroline J. Ramsey, alone; or, if you should be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Robert R. Redington, alone was responsible for the plaintiff's loss of the affections of her said husband, your verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the defendant, Robert R. Redington alone. Hitchens v. W. & P. Tr. Co., et al., 3 W. W. Harr. (33 Del.) 375, 138 A. 617.
The law recognizes that a husband and wife are each entitled to the comfort, fellowship, society, aid, and assistance of the other. Lupton v. Underwood, 3 Boyce (26 Del.) 519, 85 A. 965.
These rights of the one and obligations of the other spring from the marriage relations. The words, comfort, fellowship, society, aid, and assistance, as above referred to, are embraced in the general word "consortium," and for the loss of this consortium the law provides a remedy to the injured husband or wife against one who wrongfully causes such loss.
The cause of action is the loss of consortium, and alienation is evidence of the loss of consortium and an aggravation of it.
In your consideration of this case, it is proper for you to assume that the plaintiff's husband, who lived and cohabited with her for a time after their marriage, had, during that period, an affection for his wife, but this is only an assumption, and is capable of being rebutted by any testimony in the case showing that no such affection existed.
It must appear by a preponderance of the evidence that the alienation and loss of consortium were wrongfully, unjustly, and effectively caused by the defendants, or either of them, as alleged in the plaintiff's declaration in order to warrant any verdict whatever for the plaintiff. In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it is not necessary that it shall appear that the conduct of the defendants, or either of them, was the sole cause of the alienation and loss of consortium. It is sufficient if the conduct of the defendants, or either of them, was the controlling and effective cause.
If the conduct of the defendants, or either of them, was effective in causing the injury complained of, any unhappiness between the plaintiff and her husband would not justify or excuse the defendants, or either of them, for any unlawful interference between them, for, even if it should appear that Joseph G. Ramsey had little or no affection for his wife, yet no third person has a right to interfere or cut off all chance of such affection springing up in the future. Lupton v. Underwood, 3 Boyce (26 Del.) 519, 85 A. 965.
We have instructed you with respect to the general rule of law applicable to an action for the alienation of affections. A somewhat different rule obtains where the person charged with causing the separation is a parent. Perhaps, it would be better to say that in such case the general rule is modified, because of the interest a parent still has in a child, even after marriage.
A mother is not to be held liable to the wife of her son for causing their separation if the counsel given and the persuasion used by her are such as she honestly believed to be called for, for the best interests of the child, and are in good faith, from proper motive, justified by the existing situation or condition, and without malice.
The marriage of a child does not terminate the rights of a parent to interest herself in the child's welfare or happiness, but this fact does not justify or excuse a parent who, from improper motives, induces a son to leave his wife.
Such a parent may be liable in damages to the deserted spouse if the separation was caused by such motives.
In an action against a parent, for alienation of affections, malice must be shown, but it need not be direct or express. It may be implied from the facts and circumstances proved. That is to say, it is not necessary that there should have been any spite, hatred, or revengeful feeling on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff, because any wrongful act done intentionally, tending to injure, and without just cause, or excuse, is malicious.
While the mother is not liable, even though she caused the separation, if she acted in good faith, honestly, from a proper motive, and without malice, she would be liable if she acted from spite, hatred, or any other improper, mean, or unworthy motive.
It is for the jury to decide, from all the testimony, whether the conduct of the mother was the controlling cause of the separation of her son and his wife, and, if it was, then they must further decide whether the mother was actuated by a proper or improper motive. And in deciding whether her conduct was reasonable and proper, the jury may take into consideration the rights of the mother as well as the rights of a wife, bearing in mind what we have told you respecting the rights of each.
We may say to you in this connection that the mother was under no obligation to furnish a home for her son's wife after the separation.
What the Court has said with respect to the motive of the mother does not apply to the other defendant, whom the law regards as a stranger in the case, and liable to the plaintiff if his conduct was the controlling cause of the separation.
If, however, the alleged conduct of the defendants, or either of them, was not the controlling and effective cause of the alienation, the plaintiff cannot recover. If you should be satisfied from the evidence that the conduct of the defendants, or either of them, was the effective cause of the loss of affection sustained by the plaintiff, then any unhappiness between the plaintiff and her husband, while living together, for which the defendants, or either of them, was not responsible, would not, in itself, constitute a bar to the plaintiff's action, but must be considered in mitigation or reduction of damages.
The extent of the actual injury to the plaintiff, will, of course, depend upon the prior relations between the plaintiff and her husband.
Evidence in mitigation or reduction of damages will, therefore, be received which tends to show that the plaintiff has, in effect, suffered less injury than would otherwise be a probable inference from the act complained of.
It is proper, therefore, if you consider that the action of the defendants, or either of them, was the effective cause to the loss suffered by the plaintiff, for you to consider in mitigation of damages, but not in bar of the action, evidence, if any, which shows any unhappy relations existing between the plaintiff and her husband, not caused by the defendants, or either of them; any want of affection for each other, together with all the circumstances of their married life. These are to be considered by you to determine whether, on account of such relations, the plaintiff lost much or little by reason of the alleged acts of the defendants.
(The court then charged on the rule as to the preponderance of the...
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Ramsey v. Ramsey
... 156 A. 354 RAMSEY v. RAMSEY et al. Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. June 2, 1931. 156 A. 355 Action on the case by Ethel H. Ramsey against Caroline J. Ramsey and another for, alienation of affections. Verdict for plaintiff. PENNEWILL, C. J., and RICHARDS, J., sitting. James R. Morfo......