Ramsey v. Sumner, s. A93A2290

• Decision Date: 01 December 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. A93A2290,A93A2291,s. A93A2290
• Citation: 211 Ga.App. 202,438 S.E.2d 676
• Parties: RAMSEY v. SUMNER. RAMSEY et al. v. NEWTON GENERAL HOSPITAL.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 676

438 S.E.2d 676

211 Ga.App. 202

RAMSEY v. SUMNER.

RAMSEY et al. v. NEWTON GENERAL HOSPITAL.

Nos. A93A2290, A93A2291.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Dec. 1, 1993.

Deming, Deming, Born & Parker, Peter L. Lublin, Norcross, for Ramsey.

Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, Cynthia J. Becker, Atlanta, for Sumner.

William J. Crowe, Lithonia, Christine C. Daniel, Marietta, William A. Moncrief, Atlanta, for Newton General.

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge.

Appellee Newton General Hospital brought suit on account against appellants Thomas and Patsy Ramsey for certain medical bills. Another suit was pending for damages arising from an automobile collision between Patsy Ramsey and Brenda L. Sumner, administrator of the estate of Charles Sumner; $15,000 in insurance proceeds was paid into the superior court registry, by defendant's insurer, in settlement of that action. On January 14, 1993, appellee hospital and appellants Ramsey entered into a consent judgment whereby appellants confessed judgment in an amount of $23,866.20 plus $4,507.77 in interest, thereby resolving all claims between the parties in the suit on account. On February 12, 1993, a writ of fieri facias was issued in accordance with the terms of the consent judgment, and it is uncontroverted that the fi. fa. was recorded on the general execution docket on March 17, 1993. Subsequently several creditors applied to the court for some or all of the funds in the registry in satisfaction of debts owed them by Thomas and Patsy Ramsey. Among those claims were medical claims of Patsy Ramsey's doctor. On April 28, 1993, appellee hospital filed a motion in appellants' suit for damages, entitled "Motion of Non-Party Newton General Hospital to Condemn Funds," asserting its claim as a judgment creditor against the entire $15,000 in the court's registry. On April 16, 1993, appellants' attorney filed a motion to set aside $6,000 in attorney fees (said amount being calculated in accordance with a 40 percent contingent fee agreement between appellants and their attorney) based upon a claim of an attorney's lien on that property of their clients in the form of the $15,000 settlement now on deposit in the court registry. This motion was filed in the suit on account, brought by the hospital against appellants, and does not appear in the record of the suit for damages brought against the estate. However, on June 16, 1993, a brief in support of the attorney's motion was filed in the suit against the estate. The total amount of all timely filed claims is nearly $100,000.

Case Nos. A93A2290 and A93A2291 are appeals from the order of the superior court entered as to both cases. This order acknowledges that the $15,000 deposited with the court is "in settlement" of the suit for damages (Civil Action No. 91-165-S). It then holds that medical claims have priority when all claims are timely filed and, accordingly, awards $3,771 to Mrs. Ramsey's attending physician and the remainder of the fund deposited in court of $11,229 to Newton General Hospital, as the first hospital to treat Mrs. Ramsey after her accident. The common enumeration of appellants is the trial court erred in ruling that medical claims have priority over a valid attorney's lien created pursuant to OCGA § 15-19-14. Held:

1. These appeals are hereby consolidated.

2. As neither party argues in its brief or cites authority supporting a claim that either the attorney's lien or the hospital's claim of lien as a judgment creditor was filed improperly or untimely, such issues are deemed abandoned on appeal. Court of Appeals Rule 15(c)(2).

3. Appellee hospital, citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Mayor etc. of Savannah, 209 Ga. 383, 73 S.E.2d 205 and Morgan v. Sims & Nance, 26 Ga. 283, asserts that, as a judgment creditor, it had a general lien over all of appellants' real and personal property, and that said lien took priority over all claims upon which no judgment had been obtained and recorded, and over all claims upon which judgment was rendered after January 14, 1993 (the date the hospital obtained judgment against appellants). Moreover, appellants assert that, pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-323, liens rank according to their date with the oldest having priority. Although we do not take issue with the general legal principles expressed in the precedent cited by appellee hospital, such precedent is not dispositive of the issue before us. Morgan, supra, involves a contest between a creditor and an alleged bona fide purchaser of the property levied on from the debtor. Id. at 287. Royal, supra, involves a contest between a judgment creditor and the State's lien under the Motor-Fuel Tax Law.

Lien laws, including the attorney's lien statute, must be strictly construed. Law Office of Tony Center v. Baker, 185 Ga.App. 809, 810, 366 S.E.2d 167. Nothing in OCGA § 44-14-470 gives an express statutory priority to a hospital or medical lien over an attorney's lien. Rather, OCGA § 44-14-470(b) pertinently provides: "Any person, firm, [or] hospital authority ... operating a hospital ... in this state shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for hospital ... care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the hospital ... care, subject, however, to any attorney's lien." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 15-19-14(b) provides: "Upon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no...