Rance v. State
| Decision Date | 23 July 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 1--1074A155,1--1074A155 |
| Citation | 165 Ind.App. 153,331 N.E.2d 40 |
| Parties | Franklin C. RANCE and Larry W. Thurston, Defendants-Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
R. Steven Keck, Palmer, Hinkle, Brenton & Keck, Danville, for defendants-appellants; William R. Jones, Indianapolis, of counsel.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Lockhart, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ROBERTSON, C.J., and LOWDERMILK and LYBROOK, JJ.
The only issue presented by this appeal which is necessary to our decision is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Franklin C. Rance's conviction of Second Degree Burglary 1 and Larry W. Thurston's conviction of Entering to Commit a Felony. 2
We reverse.
The evidence viewed most favorably to the State shows the following:
Sometime between 11:00 p.m. on December 9, 1973 and 6:30 a.m. on December 10, 1973, the Moose Lodge in Danville, Indiana was entered by means of a hole chopped in the roof with an ax or pry bar. Among other things, several locked bank money bags full of cash were taken.
At about 11:30 p.m. on December 12, 1973, a car driven by Rance with Thurston, the owner, as a passenger was stopped for a traffic violation near Brownstown, Indiana. A grocery sack containing the money bags taken in the Moose Lodge burglary were found in the unlockable trunk of the car. The bags had all been cut or torn open and were empty.
On appeal, Rance and Thurston contend the evidence establishes only their constructive possession of stolen property, which, under the circumstances of this case, is not sufficient to permit an inference that they committed the burglary.
Convictions of both second degree burglary and entering to commit a felony may be sustained on evidence that is wholly circumstantial. Parsons v. State (1973), Ind.App., 304 N.E.2d 802; Chapman v. State (1975), Ind.App., 321 N.E.2d 863. In considering the sufficiency of this evidence, we must examine it, not for the purpose of determining whether it is adequate to negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but rather to decide whether an inference may be drawn therefrom that the defendants are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Giles v. State (1974), Ind.App., 320 N.E.2d 806.
Evidence of unexplained possession of recently stolen property will support a conviction of the theft of that property. Vaughn v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 678, 266 N.E.2d 219. How...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Downs v. State
...to link the defendant to an intentional entry and further that the entry was with the specific intention to steal. Rance v. State, 331 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.App.1975). It is the duty of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged. In this case proof of......
-
Honey Creek Corp. v. WNC Development Co.
... ... v. Rayborn (1962), 133 Ind.App. 325, 182 N.E.2d 260, wherein this court stated: ... 'There is a well settled rule of law in this state that it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give an instruction where its subject matter is adequately covered by other given instructions ... ...
-
Sansom v. State
...of distinctive fur pelts by individuals acquainted with the ransacked premises cannot be claimed to be insufficient. Rance v. State (1975), Ind.App., 331 N.E.2d 40. O'Hara v. State (1975), Ind.App., 330 N.E.2d 396. Rather, it has been shown that substantial circumstantial evidence explainin......