El Rancho Grande, Inc., Application of
Decision Date | 17 December 1981 |
Citation | 437 A.2d 1150,496 Pa. 496 |
Parties | In re Application of EL RANCHO GRANDE, INC. Appeal of Jack STEVENS, Daniel Galeotti, Tom Gluver, Joseph Studder, RobertWarringer and Tioga-Potter Tavern Owners Association. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
J. Leonard Langan, Asst. Atty. Gen., James J. Fitzgerald, III, Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for Liquor Control Bd.
Before O'BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order of the Commonwealth Court affirming an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County which quashed, for lack of standing, an appeal from a determination by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board ("Board") to grant a liquor license in excess of the prescribed quota for Portage Township. See Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, art. IV, § 461, 47 P.S. § 4-461(a), as amended. We vacate the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand to that court for consideration of the merits of appellants' claim.
Appellants are several individuals who hold liquor licenses in Potter County and the Tioga-Potter Tavern Owners Association ("Association"). The individual appellants participated in a hearing conducted by the Board on the application of El Rancho Grande, Inc. ("Applicant"), which had requested a liquor license for a proposed restaurant in the Township. Over the protests of the individual appellants, the Board approved the application, having determined that Portage Township was a "resort area," see 47 P.S. § 4-461(b), and that facilities provided by the existing license holders were inadequate to meet the needs of the resident and transient population of the area, see Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. Liquor License Case, 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d 154 (1962). Claiming that the township was not within a "resort area," that Potter County was already adequately served, and that their businesses would be harmed by the granting of a license in excess of the statutory quota, the individual appellants appealed the Board's ruling to the court of common pleas. Appellant Association sought leave to intervene as an additional appellant, and the court permitted the Association to intervene for the limited purpose of arguing the standing of both itself and the individual appellants. After a hearing at which arguments were presented by counsel for all parties, the trial court denied standing to all appellants stating that it did so "reluctantly." A divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. In re: Application of El Rancho Grande, Inc., 51 Pa.Cmwlth. 410, 414 A.2d 751 (1980) (Blatt, J., dissenting). We granted allowance of appeal.
Section 464 of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4-464, sets forth specific classes of persons and institutions who may appeal from the Board's determination to grant or refuse a license:
Additionally, inhabitants of the neighborhood within five hundred feet of an establishment which has successfully sought a license have been granted standing to appeal on the basis of section 404 of the Code. That section sets forth the circumstances in which the Board may grant an application for a hotel, restaurant, or club liquor license, with the following relevant provisos:
"Provided, however, That in the case of any new license or the transfer of any license to a new location the board may, in its discretion, grant or refuse such new license or transfer if such place proposed to be licensed is within three hundred feet of any church, hospital, charitable institution, school, or public playground, or if such new license or transfer is applied for a place which is within two hundred feet of any other premises which is licensed by the board, or if such new license or transfer is applied for a place where the principal business is the sale of liquid fuels and oil: And provided further, That the board shall refuse any application for a new license or the transfer of any license to a new location if, in the board's opinion, such new license or transfer would be detrimental to the welfare, health, peace and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood within a radius of five hundred feet of the place proposed to be licensed."
47 P.S. § 4-404. See Gismondi Liquor License Case, 199 Pa.Super. 619, 186 A.2d 448 (1962). 1
Appellants concede that they come within none of these provisions of the Code, but contend that they have standing to appeal the Board's determination by virtue of section 702 of the Administration Agency Law, which states:
"Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency who has a direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 ( )."
2 Pa.C.S. § 702. 2
Despite this broad legislative grant of permission to appeal from a determination of a Commonwealth agency, the majority of the Commonwealth Court panel held that because appellants did not fall within any of the classifications of interested parties set forth in sections 404 and 464 of the Liquor Code, they had no "direct interest in the adjudication of the Board" and thus lacked standing to appeal. Such a conclusion renders section 702 of the Administrative Agency Law superfluous by limiting its application to those parties who are already statutorily permitted to appeal. Moreover, it ignores section 701 of that Law, which states:
"(a) General rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), this subchapter shall apply to all Commonwealth agencies regardless of the fact that a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from an adjudication of an agency, or that the adjudication of an agency shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject to review.
(b) Exceptions.-None of the provisions of this subchapter shall apply to:
(1) Any matter which is exempt from Subchapter A of Chapter 5 ( ).
(2) Any appeal from a Commonwealth agency which may be taken initially to the courts of common pleas under 42 Pa.C.S. § 933 ( )."
2 Pa.C.S. § 701. If section 702 applies to all Commonwealth agencies even when a statute provides that "there shall be no appeal," then a fortiori it applies when a statute grants an automatic right of appeal to certain limited classes of interested parties.
Therefore, pursuant to section 702, we must inquire whether, under traditional concepts of standing, appellants have been "aggrieved" by the Board's action in granting a license to Applicant and whether they have a "direct interest" in the Board's adjudication.
Our cases dealing with standing have been summarized in Wm. Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975):
464 Pa. at 192, 346 A.2d at 280-81 (plurality opinion). Accord, e.g., Independent State Store Union v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, --- Pa. ---, 432 A.2d 1375 (1981). Moreover, "the relationship between the challenged action and the asserted injury must be direct and immediate, not a remote consequence." Independent State Store Union, supra, --- Pa. at ---, 432 A.2d at 1380.
Certainly the individual appellants here have asserted an interest beyond the common interest of all citizens. They allege that they are the closest licensees to Applicant's proposed establishment, and that certain of them are located at distances of one to three miles from the new licensee. The record contains testimony sufficient to support a finding that one or more of the individual appellants would be driven out of business by the presence of an additional licensee. Thus, the alleged injury is clearly both substantial and particular to appellants. See Wm. Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, supra, 464 Pa. at 192-97, 346 A.2d at 280-83.
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