Rancho Viejo Waste Mgmt., LLC v. City of Laredo

• Decision Date: 11 March 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-59
• Citation: 364 F.Supp.3d 698
• Parties: RANCHO VIEJO WASTE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF LAREDO, Texas, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

364 F.Supp.3d 698

RANCHO VIEJO WASTE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF LAREDO, Texas, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-CV-59

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division.

Signed March 11, 2019

Donald H. Grissom, Grissom and Thompson LLP, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

William Michael McKamie, Taylor Olson Adkins Sralla & Elam LLC, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

Marina Garcia Marmolejo, United States District JudgeThis is a case about political speech and the impact it can have on the marketplace. It is about a company's attempts to secure a permit from a state administrative agency and a community's attempts to have a voice in that process. But above all else, it is about the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional republic.

The judicial power of the United States "extends only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ " Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 –2). An "essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III" is "that a litigant have standing to invoke the authority of a federal court." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (citation omitted). The "[f]irst and foremost" of Article III standing's three elements is that a plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact. Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment , 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ).

The state administrative agency is the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), which is reviewing a landfill permit application submitted by Rancho Viejo Waste Management, LLC. The Laredo City Council determined that the proposed landfill is not in the best interests of the community and decided to express that opinion to the TCEQ. While the underlying facts are interesting, they don't bestow Article III standing—Rancho Viejo may frown upon the council's comments, but it has failed to allege a cognizable injury in fact. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 4) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

I. BACKGROUND

For several years, Rancho Viejo Waste Management has had an application for a Municipal Solid Waste Permit pending with the TCEQ. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 11 at 2–4; 11-3). Its proposed solid-waste landfill, the Pescadito Environmental Resource Center, would be located roughly twenty miles from the City of Laredo. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 4; 11 at 1–2). Both Rancho Viejo and the City of Laredo acknowledge that the landfill's proposed site is outside of the municipality's jurisdiction—the city simply lacks regulatory authority over the matter. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2; 11 at 4; 14 at 2–3).

With the TCEQ application pending, Bernhard Capital Partners Management, LP reached out to Rancho Viejo to discuss purchasing or investing in the landfill. (Dkt. No. 11-4 at 1–2). Representatives from both entities spoke frequently about the status of the application, and following a February 2016 meeting, they were optimistic that they would eventually strike a deal. (Id. at 2).

In May 2016, public concerns about Rancho Viejo's proposed landfill came to the attention of the Laredo City Council. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2, 4–6; 11 at 2; 11-2 at 32–34). The council gave advocates and opponents¹ of the project an opportunity to speak and ultimately took up "a resolution in opposition to the proposed regional landfill that is currently in the permitting process by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality." (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 13).

The resolution passed—its final form read: "Motion to resolve to oppose a regional landfill and that all public comments made at this Council meeting be forwarded to TCEQ for their consideration during the public comment in the application process." (Dkt. Nos. 11 at 2; 11-2 at 22). In May 2018, Laredo City Councilmen Rudy Gonzalez and Alberto Torres again relayed opposition to Rancho Viejo's application at a TCEQ public meeting. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 11 at 3). And in August 2018, the city asked the TCEQ for leave to file an amicus brief in opposition to the application. (Dkt. No. 11 at 3–4; 11-5).

After the city council passed its resolution, negotiations between Rancho Viejo and Bernhard Capital broke down. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 11 at 8–9; 11-4 at 3). When pressed as to whether Bernhard Capital intended to finalize a deal, one of its representatives responded, "No, the City's opposition made it impossible now." (Dkt. Nos. 11 at 8–98; 11-4 at 3).

Rancho Viejo subsequently brought this lawsuit against the City of Laredo and the councilmembers who voted in favor of the resolution, requesting damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief under § 1983 and the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause, as well as damages for tortious interference with prospective business relations under Texas law. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6–8). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6). (Dkt. No. 4). Because the Court must be assured of its power to hear an action before proceeding to its merits, it ordered the parties to address an issue that none had independently raised—standing. (Dkt. No. 10).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The judicial power of the United States flows from Article III of the Constitution, which only affords federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate actual cases or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "[T]he requirement that a claimant have ‘standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.’ " Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 554 U.S. 724, 733, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ).

Article III standing requires federal courts to make three findings: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Id. (citations omitted). Second, there must be a " ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of such that the injury is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ " Seals v. McBee , 898 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). Third, "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas , 867 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NAACP v. City of Kyle , 626 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2010) ).

"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Federal courts are permitted to assess whether those elements have been established on any one of three separate bases: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Deutsch v. Annis Enters., Inc. , 882 F.3d 169, 173 n.1 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Freeman v. United States , 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) ); Moore v. Bryant , 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Barrera–Montenegro v. United States , 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996) ).

III. ANALYSIS

The Laredo City Council notably chose to enact only a resolution in opposition to Rancho Viejo's permit application; it did not pass an ordinance, regulation, tax, or any other enactment capable of bringing the city's governmental powers to bear upon Plaintiff's activities. This is important because "[t]he distinction between legislative enactments, such as statutes and ordinances, and resolutions has long been recognized [under Texas law]." City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson , 559 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.—Hous. [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citations omitted). "[U]nlike an ordinance, a resolution is not a law, but an expression of an opinion." City of Carrollton v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality , 170 S.W.3d 204, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) ; see also 52 Tex. Jur. 3d Municipal Corporations § 192 (2019) ("A resolution does not constitute a law, but is a mere expression of the opinion or will of the governing body concerning some matter of administration coming within its official cognizance." (citations omitted) ).

The significance of this distinction is displayed in the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Miller v. City of Wickliffe , 852 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2017). Dan Miller, a plaintiff in that case, had sought to open a nightclub in the City of Wickliffe but faced pushback in two ways: First, the city passed a resolution supporting religious organizations' opposition to his application for a state liquor license. Id. at 500. Second, the city enacted an ordinance requiring nightclubs to secure a municipal permit. Id. Miller brought suit against the city raising eight claims:

(1) a request for declaratory relief under 42 ILS.C. § 1983 due to Ordinance 2009-49's alleged vagueness, overbreadth, and illegal retroactivity; (2) injunctive relief under § 1983 premised on the same; (3–5) three separate violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000A for intentional racial discrimination, selective enforcement, and disparate impact; (6) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on equal-protection violations; (7) tortious interference with a contract; and (8) tortious interference with a business relationship.

Id. at 501. After noting that Miller never applied for the required permit, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the ordinance had not given rise to an actual or imminent injury and dismissed the case for lack of standing. Id. at 502–07 ; id. at 507 ("All plaintiffs here can say is that, had the...