Randall v. Randall

Decision Date03 March 1930
Docket Number28646
Citation126 So. 484,156 Miss. 656
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesRANDALL v. RANDALL

Division B

1. APPFAL AND ERROR. Appeal could not be granted from decree denying plaintiff support money during pendency of divorce suit to settle principles of cause and an appeal taken will be dismissed on court's own motion (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 9).

Wife could not be granted an appeal from decree denying her support money during pendency of divorce suit, in order to settle principles of cause, under Laws 1924, chapter 151 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 9), since temporary support for wife pending litigation is mere collateral issue and where appeal from interlocutory decree would not settle all controlling principles of cause, but only part of controlling principles, supreme court will dismiss appeal of its own motion.

2. APPFAL AND ERROR. Appeal could not be granted from decree denying plaintiff support money pending divorce suit on ground it was exceptional case (Hemingway's Code 1927 section 9).

Wife could not be granted an appeal from decree denying her support money during pendency of divorce suit, on ground that it was an exceptional case in which an appeal should be granted to avoid expense and delay under Laws 1924, chapter 151 (Hemingway's Code 1927, section 9).

HON. T P. DALE, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Marion county HON. T. P. DALE, Chancellor.

Divorce suit by Mrs. Cuna Randall against Arthur Randall. From a decree denying plaintiff support money during the pendency of the cause, she appeals, and, after the cause had reached the supreme court, plaintiff filed a motion for an allowance against defendant of a reasonable sum with which to pay her attorney for prosecuting the appeal. Motion overruled, and appeal dismissed.

Motion overruled, and appeal dismissed.

T. B. Davis, of Columbia, for appellant.

No briefs by counsel found.

OPINION

Anderson, J.

Appellant filed her bill for divorce against appellee in the chancery court of Marion county. Appellee answered the bill, denying its material allegations. Thereupon appellant made application to the court for an allowance against appellee of temporary alimony in a sum sufficient for her support, pendente lite, and with which to pay an attorney to prosecute the suit. The application was heard on evidence, resulting in a decree allowing appellant a sum with which to compensate her attorney for prosecuting the suit; but denied her support money during the pendency of the cause. From that decree the court granted appellant this appeal, to settle the principles of the cause.

After the cause had reached this court, appellant filed a motion for an allowance against appellee of a reasonable sum with which to pay her attorney for prosecuting this appeal. The only question, therefore, that this court is called on to review is the action of the chancellor in...

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3 cases
  • Rees v. Rees
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 25 Marzo 1940
    ...Rea v. Smith, 160 Miss. 848, 133 So. 125; Stirling et al. v. Whitney Nat. Bank et al., 170 Miss. 674, 150 So. 654; Randall v. Randall, 156 Miss. 656, 126 So. 484; 3 J. 616; 4 C. J. S. 343; Steam Canal-Boat Sydney, etc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 139 U.S. 331, 11 S.Ct. 620, 35 L.Ed. ......
  • Jackson Steam Laundry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 3 Marzo 1930
  • Atwell Transfer Co. v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 5 Diciembre 1960
    ...rather than avoiding the same. The chancellor based his decision on the grounds that the case was an exceptional case. In Randall v. Randall, 156 Miss. 656, 126 So. 484, this Court held that an appeal could not be granted from a decree denying plaintiffs support money pending a divorce suit......

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