Randall v. Richmond & D. R. Co

• Decision Date: 23 December 1890
• Citation: 12 S.E. 605,107 N.C. 748
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Randall. v. Richmond & D. R. Co.

12 S.E. 605

107 N.C. 748

Randall.

v.Richmond & D. R. Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 23, 1890.

Stock-Killing Cases—Presumption of Negligence.

Code N. C. § 2326, providing that, "when any live-stock shall be killed by the engines or cars on any railroad, it shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company in any action for damages against said company brought within six months thereafter, applies to a case where oxen, which were being driven along a public road near a railroad, were so frightened by the sudden appearance of a train around a curve that they Jumped on the track, and were killed by the engine. Merrimon, C. J., and Shepherd, J., dissenting. Affirming 104 N. C. 410, 10 S. E. Rep. 691.

On petition for rehearing. For former report, see 10 S. E. Rep. 691.

Charles Price and C. M. Busbee, for petitioner.

Avery, J. Counsel contended in this court that there was error in the opinion delivered at the September term, 1889, (104 N. C. 410, 10 S. E. Rep. 691,) in giving too strict a construction to the statute, (Code, § 2326,) which provides that. " when any cattle or other live-stock shall be killed by the engines or cars running on any railroad, it shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company in any action for damages against said company: provided, that no person shall be allowed the benefit of this action unless he shall bring his action within six months after his cause of action shall have accrued." The plaintiff was driving his oxen along the public highway near the defendant's road, hitched to a cart, when they were killed by the defendant's engine, running on its track; the oxen having been so frightened by the appearance of the head-light of the engine, as it suddenly turned a curve, that they jumped upon the track. Did the judge below err when he instructed the jury that, the fact of killing the oxen by the engine being admitted, there was a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant? We think that he was not in error in so declaring the law. The word "cattle" is defined by Webster, when used in this more restricted sense, as meaning "quadrupeds of the bovine tribe, " and used, as a generic term, as "including all domestic quadrupeds, as sheep, goats, horses, mules, asses, swine." It was admitted by counsel on the argument that the word "cattle" included oxen, and that the literal interpretation of the statute would give to a plaintiff, suing within six months after the killing of cattle by a train, the benefit of the presumption, whether it should appear that the animals were running at large or attached to a wagon. But it was insisted that it was the right and duty of the court to go behind the plain letter of the law, and endeavor to find out the evil that was intended to be remedied by the statute, and in that war, to ascertain and effectuate what we may conceive to have been the true purpose of the legislature in passing the law. It is conceded that the leading object to be kept in view by courts, in construing acts passed by the legislature, is to determine what was the true intent of the general assembly, and to give effect to it. There are, however, certain familiar rules prescribed for the government of courts in interpreting their meaning, one of which is that where the language of the statute is not ambiguous, and its literal import is not doubtful, the courts are not allowed to consider extraneous reasons, or to resort to the preamble of the act, even, in order to give to its words any other than their technical meaning, if they have any, or their ordinary meaning, if they have no legal signification. Adams v. Turrentine, 8 Ired.147; Blue v. McDuffie, Busb. 131. The powers of the three coordinate branches of the government being required by the declaration of rights (Const, art. 1, § 8) "to be forever separate and distinct, " it is far more importanthere than it is in England, where parliament is omnipotent, that the courts should observe and rigidly adhere to this established rule of construction, because it alone presents a barrier to the assumption by the highest judicial tribunals of the right to give to legislative acts, however clear and unmistakable their phraseology, what the courts think ought to have been, rather than what really was, the meaning of the law-makers. The presumption is that the persons selected to represent the people in the legislatures understand the import of the language used by them; and their purpose, when clearly expressed, must be carried out to the letter, if we can give no better reason than that it will occasion what the courts consider hardship or inconvenience to some person or corporation to do so. Sedgwick (in his work on Statutory and Constitutional Law, p.265) quotes with approval the following forcible expression of the principle in the opinion of the circuit court of the United States in Priestman v. U. S., 4 Dall. 30: "By the rules which are laid down in England for the construction of statutes, and the latitude which has been indulged in their application, the British judges have assumed a legislative power, and, on pretense of judicial exposition, have, in fact, made a great portion of the statute law of the kingdom. Of those rules of construction, none can be more dangerous than that which, distinguishing between the intent and the words of the legislature, declares that a case not within the meaning of a statute, according to the opinion of the judges, shall not be embraced within its operation, although it is clearly within the words, or vice versa. We should invariably deem it our duty to defer to the expression of the legislature, to the letter of the statute, when free from ambiguity and doubt, without indulging in speculation either upon the impropriety or hardship of laws." The author (Sedgwick) then adds: "Indeed, the idea that the judges, in administering the written law, can mould it and work it according to their notions, not of what the legislator said, not even of what he me!Lnt, —in other words, according to their own ideas of policy, wisdom, or expediency, —is so obviously untenable that it is quite apparent it never could have taken rise except at a time when the division lines between the great powers of the government were but feebly drawn, and their importance very imperfectly understood. In the present condition of our political systems, this practice cannot be acted on with either propriety or safety. " In Putnam v. Long-ley, 11 Pick. 487, Chief Justice Shaw says: "The argument of inconvenience may have considerable weight upon a question of construction where the language is doubtful. It is not to be presumed, upon doubtful language, that the legislature intended to establish a rule of action that would be attended with inconvenience. But where the language is clear, and where, of course, the intent is manifest, the court is not at liberty to be governed by considerations of inconvenience." Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience, says Mr. Justice Story, " ought to have little weight. The only sound principle is to declare its lex scripta, to follow and to obey; nor, if a principle so just could be overlooked, could there be well found a more unsafe guide or practice than mere policy and convenience." Story, Confl. Laws, 17; Smith v. Rines, 2 Sum. 355; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 311; Cooley, Const. Lim. 186, 187. The principle that is so clearly expressed by the distinguished judges and authors already mentioned has been repeatedly sanctioned by the adjudications of this court. In Blue v. McDuffie, supra, the court held that where the words of a statute are vague, and the meaning uncertain, the preamble, or even the caption, may be called in aid for the purpose of construction, where the meaning was expressed with certainty. Adams v. Turrentine, supra. In State v. Eaves, 106 N. C 752, 11 S. E. Rep. 370, the principle was laid down that, where the language of the legislature is clear, the, courts will not look into the motive or purpose of the legislature in the enactment of the law. Justice Merrimon, delivering the opinion in Brown v. Brown, 103 N. C. 213, 8 S. E. Rep. 111, says: " What is called the policy of the legislature in respect to particular enactments is too uncertain a ground upon which to found the judgment of the court in the interpretation of statutes, especially when they are clear, unequivocal, and absolute in their terms and expressed purpose."

In the face of these full and unequivocal reiterations of this important rule of construction by this as well as in other courts of this country, counsel contend that we ought to look behind the language, which they admit is not vague or uncertain, and try to determine, from a consideration of matters entirely extraneous, what motives induced our legislators to enact the statute. The interpretation insisted on would involve, in effect, the interpolation after the words, "other live-stock, " in the statute, of the words, " while straying at large, but not while being driven, either attached to a vehicle, or without the restraint of bridle or harness, or when being transported on trains; " and the argument offered to sustain the correctness of such a latitudinarian construction is that a literal construction may lead to inconvenience and absurdity, and that in this case it would be "absurd" to suppose that the legislature intended to make the fact of killing in the presence of the owner or his servant prima facie evidence of negligence. The familiar instance given by Blackstone of the physician who bled a man who had fallen down in the street from a tit, in violation of a law that imposed a severe penalty for shedding blood in the streets, was referred to as authority. It is true, also, that the same principle was invoked in State v. Wray, 72 N. C. 253, (which case this court, in State v. McBrayer, 98 N. C. 619, 2 S. E. Rep. 755, declared went to the extreme limit:) but in both cases...